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Pisma Dijaloga

Lettres de Dialogue / Dialogue Letters
(DANS L'ÉDITION "ABONNEMENT")

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Spying Against NATO for "The Serbs"

An Assessment

Raymond K. Kent

Most of the public discussion of the French Commandant Pierre Bunel has centred on three interrelated aspects. How much was he able to reveal to "the Serbs" about the concrete NATO bombing plans and actual targets? How serious is his act of espionage on behalf of a "foreign power?" And, what sentence should be due him up to the maximum of fifteen years in prison? It has already been established that Bunel did not have any access to the Order of Battle prepared by the U.S. officers for either Kosovo alone or a wider area. In addition, he neither sought nor obtained any financial gains from "the Serbs." Bunel acted instead for the "raisons humanitaires" and out of an obvious sympathy for "the Serbs." The two key factors plead for a reduced sentence. At worst, he could be perceived as a "misguided officer" who caused no real damage to NATO, including its French contingent. This may even be strictly academic since NATO decided not to implement its military threats. All of this would resemble a tempest in a teapot since nothing happened as a result of Bunel's spying. Yet, he became "l'espion qui embarrasse la France." As the French daily *Le Figaro* (4 November 1998) reported: "Cette affaire met la France dans une situation delicate, a l'heure ou la belle unanimite

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occidentale sur la crise de Kosovo se fissure.”

As is usual with both the scribal and audiovisual media, their propensity for speed and dramatizing managed to bury a number of really important revelations leaping out of the “cas Bunel.” First, there is no longer any doubt that NATO is a fig-leaf covering the naked U.S. military might. The U.S. Commander of NATO has openly reiterated that only himself and his immediate operational aides knew the Order of Battle. Given that jets from countries other than the United States were included in the projected bombing missions this is hardly an admission avuncular in nature. It shows, with slight chance of error, that only the U.S. military power really counts and that the other NATO “members” are regarded as cosmetic cream, pomade, which puts an international face on the only remaining super-Power. What is even more ominous, this serves to promote a capricious U.S. foreign policy. A comparison of the NATO (U.S.) entry into Krajina and, now, into Kosovo offers a very powerful illustration.

When Croatia proclaimed its independence from the Yugoslav Federation everything changed for the several hundred thousand Serbs finding themselves in ..(...) settle in Krajina even before the Mayflower reached North America. The local Serb settlers provided a military shield in this borderland region (Krajina) against the invading Ottoman Turks. By rebelling against the new Croat State in the early 1990’s they were accused of planning to attach Krajina to a “greater Serbia” as the abuses against them were not even noted in the international media. The U.S. response was to completely side with the Croat authorities. “Retired’ U.S. generals trained the Croat army, modernized it, provided it with electronic and other types of intelligence against the Krajina Serbs. High-ranking U.S. officials gave the green light to the Croat army for a blitzkrieg which could only end in massive “ethnic cleansing” (in August 1995). Four U.S.-NATO jets even bombed and strafed the Serb radar installations around the Krajina’s

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capital of Knin. The predictable result came within days as just under 200,000 Serbs fled in disarray and panic. This was, by far, the single most voluminous “ethnic cleansing” instance in Yugoslavia’s tragedy. Moreover, the Krajina story quickly disappeared from the scribal front pages and the evening TV newscast. Instead of an outcry over the gross violations of the Serbs’ “human rights,” the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations was showing at the time dated CIA aerial photographs of a freshly ploughed large field near Srebrenica. She implied without any real proof that the field contained mass graves of thousands of Bosnian Muslim men presumably executed by the Serbs. It is worth adding here that despite all kinds of forensic efforts under military protection such huge graves have never been found.

Disregarding conveniently all of the historical adversities which transformed Kosovo from the birthplace of the Serb ethnicity, religion and culture into an area overwhelmed by a foreign population, the U.S. factual response has been to side with the Kosovo Albanians. The U.S. is overtly supporting the “moderate” Kosovo Albanians but has done little other than to romanticize their violent men who call themselves a “liberation Army.” All the talk about “human rights” at Kosovo does not even concern the local Serb minority. The slogan of “ethnic cleansing” simply hides the fact that most of the Kosovo Albanians did not leave Kosovo but fled from shelled villages into the nearest woods. Similarly, the U.S. demand for “greater autonomy” for the Kosovo Albanians is but a prelude for the coming of their independence. The so-called “Sixth U.S. plan for Kosovo”, for example, requires that Serb police can no longer arrest any ethnic Albanians while the Yugoslav army can no longer control the border between Albania and Kosovo. Given that the Kosovo Albanians have not been paying any taxes to the truncated Yugoslavia, the U.S.-sponsored “greater autonomy” is the same kind of pomade that finds its cosmetic replica in NATO. Semantics and structures are simply used to mask the de facto detachment of Kosovo from Serbia at some future

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date while the U.S. uses NATO as a guarantor a priori of its capricious use of force to buttress ersatz and ad hoc foreign policy "successes." Unlike the Serbs of Krajina who did not demand incorporation into a "greater Serbia," the Kosovo Albanians are openly preparing to create a "greater Albania," with the help of Albania's Communist Party. Thus, in Krajina NATO was used to punish the Serb rebels for attacking the sovereignty of the Croat State. At Kosovo, NATO is now used again to punish the Serbs whose own sovereignty over Kosovo` is under serious challenge from within and from without.

This introduces two other important revelations in the "cas Bunel." Sympathy for "the Serbs" is perceived as a crime. This belief is particularly entrenched among the self-appointed "humanitarians." They are a curious lot. Bleeding their hearts out in front of TV images which showed Bosnian women in tears over their missing relatives at Srebrenica they could hardly be induced to any excitement when confronted with actual atrocities against "the Serbs." Most do not even see the moral and logical contradictions in the willingness to slaughter thousands of Serbs in order to shield the Kosovo Albanians from` perishing in the woods. This is documented by the recent assignment of the B-52s to the possible Kosovo and Serbia missions. The B-52 is not a precision weapon with which to support the NATO-U.S, claims that "collateral damage" will be "kept at a minimum." It is a terror weapon designed for carpet bombings. In truth, the media-driven anti-Serb policies of the Clinton Administration's foreign-policy mentors have turned a valuable ally in two World Wars into an "enemy" of both the United States and mankind at large. This foreign policy "success" has been drilled into American officers and men who are even spying on the French military personnel` in NATO out of suspicion that they might side with "the Serb enemies" from a very different perspective and a historical memory that has not been erased.

The second revelation is that the would-be admiration for men in uniform who vote their own conscience

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is hardly sincere across the board. The NATO preparations to bomb Kosovo and Serbia are a test which will determine if sovereignty and the rules of law are still valid. NATO has rejected the argument that it should subject its projected missions to the approval of the U.N. Security Council. The U.S. Congress alone can declare war but since NATO is an international organization the Congress can be circumvented as well. In other words, NATO is a rogue outfit controlled by the U.S. Administration but not accountable to anyone. This has been recognized even in the NATO's military journal with an article entitled "NATO Needs Steadier Legal Footing," (International Herald Tribune, 13 November 1998).

Apparently, Commandant Bunel felt that the might-is-right esprit of NATO is leading this murderous military machine into a chaotic and repugnant future. But, if Bunel is guilty of anything it is his failure to grasp just how desperately NATO needs also "the Serbs" as an enemy." In Croatia and Bosnia the Serbs rescued NATO from atrophy as a fossil of the Cold War. "The Serbs" are again shoring-up this "importance" at Kosovo. Even the International Tribunal at the Hague owes its existence to "the Serbs" who, alone in ex-Yugoslavia, figured on the Tribunal's wanted lists for almost three years. Without an enemy that can be pushed around thousands in the West would be either jobless or else would expire from boredom in routine jobs and duties. This includes not only men in uniforms but also lawyers at the Hague, media people, assorted new missionaries of the Western Civilization (whose admirers never mention the massive skeletons in its own closets), humanitarians full of hate and in search of new causes, munitions makers, "strategic thinkers," political writers and even a bevy of Western spies in the Balkans, tripping over one another. Most of them would give Bunel all of the fifteen years in jail but if the Europeans ever free themselves from the American baby-boomers out to reshape the stupid world Bunel should get a medal. Even the American people and Congress might produce one more decoration for Bunel as he has really exposed the Frankenstein Monster of the 21st Century.

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Espionner l'OTAN pour le compte "des Serbes"

Une évaluation

Raymond K. Kent

La majeure partie de la discussion qui s'est déroulée en public au sujet du commandant Pierre Bunel a porté sur trois aspects connexes.

Dans quelle mesure pouvait-il révéler "aux Serbes" les plans effectifs de bombardement et la liste des cibles de l'OTAN?

Quelle était la gravité de son acte d'espionnage pour le compte d'une "puissance étrangère"? Et quelle sentence l'attendait, aux termes d'une législation prévoyant jusqu'à quinze ans de forteresse ?

Il a déjà été établi que Bunel n'avait nullement accès à l'Ordre de Bataille que des officiers américains avaient mis au point pour le seul Kosovo ou pour une région encore plus vaste. De plus, il n'avait ni recherché ni obtenu "des Serbes" aucun gain financier. Bien au contraire, Bunel avait agi pour des "raisons humanitaires" et en raison d'une sympathie qu'il éprouvait pour "les Serbes". Ces deux facteurs principaux plaident en faveur d'une condamnation à une peine moins sévère.

Au pire des cas, il pourrait être vu comme un "officier égaré" qui n'a causé aucun dommage, ni à l'OTAN ni au son contingent français. Et même cela pourrait sembler purement académique puisque l'OTAN a décidé de ne pas mettre en oeuvre ses menaces militaires. Et toute ceci pourrait fort bien ressembler à une tempête dans un verre d'eau puisque rien ne s'est produit à la suite de l'espionnage de Bunel. Et

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cependant il est devenu “l’espion qui embarrasse la France”. Comme le disait Le Figaro du 4 novembre 1998: “Cette affaire met la France dans une situation délicate à l’heure où la belle unanimité occidentale sur la crise de Kosovo se fissure”.

Comme cela se produit d’ordinaire avec les médias écrits et audio-visuels, leur propension à la vitesse et à la dramatisation a eu pour résultat que plusieurs révélations véritablement importantes découlant du “cas Bunel” ont été enterrées. En tout premier lieu, il ne fait plus de doute que l’OTAN est une feuille de vigne qui dissimule la puissance militaire des Etats Unis. Le commandant américain de l’OTAN a ouvertement réitéré qu’il est le seul,- avec ses assistants les plus proches, à connaître l’Ordre de Bataille. Etant donné que des ‘jets’ de pays autres que les Etats-Unis étaient inclus dans les missions de bombardement projetées, il est difficile de penser qu’il s’agit là d’une déclaration faite par un gentil oncle. Elle montre, avec peu de risques de se tromper, que seule compte véritablement la puissance militaire des Etats-Unis et que les autres “membres “ de l’OTAN sont perçus comme une crème cosmétique, une pommade, qui donne un visage international à la seule super-Puissance restante.. Et ce qui encore bien plus sinistre et inquiétant, c’est que cette force sert à promouvoir une politique étrangère américaine qui semble souffrir de caprices changeants. La comparaison entre l’entrée de l’OTAN (US) dans la Krajina et celle, à présent, dans le Kosovo, offre de tout cela une illustration particulièrement puissante.

Lorsque la Croatie a proclamé son indépendance de la Fédération yougoslave, la vie de plusieurs centaines de milliers de Serbes, qui se sont retrouvés dans cet Etat nouvellement reconnu, s’en est trouvée profondément changée. Pour décrire la situation dans les termes les plus simples possibles, la plus grande partie des Croates voulaient avoir un Etat (ethniquement) homogène et les Serbes locaux sont devenus un obstacle majeur qui devait être supprimé. Les Serbes ont été les victimes d’abus de toutes sortes, tout particulièrement dans la Krajina où vivaient

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plus de 200.000 d'entre eux. Si on regarde de plus près, leurs ancêtres avaient été invités à s'y installer bien avant que le Mayflower avec à bord les *Pères Pèlerins* n'aborde les côtes de l'Amérique du Nord (le 26 décembre 1620). Installés dans cette région, les Serbes ont servi de bouclier militaire dans cette région-frontière (krajinna, en serbe) contre les Turcs Ottomans qui envahissaient l'Europe. Lorsque, au début de l'année 1990, ces Serbes se sont rebellés contre le nouvel Etat croate, ils ont été accusés de comploter pour rattacher la Krajinna à une "Grande Serbie", cependant que les médias internationaux ignoraient superbement les abus dont ils étaient les victimes.

La réaction des Etats-Unis a été de se mettre pleinement aux côtés des autorités croates. Des généraux américains 'à la retraite' ont assuré la formation de l'armée croate, sa modernisation et lui ont fourni les informations électroniques dont elle avait besoin pour mieux combattre les Serbes de la Krajinna. Des fonctionnaires américains de très haut niveau ont donné le 'feu vert' à l'armée croate pour qu'elle effectue une attaque-éclair (blitzkrieg) qui ne pouvait finir que par la "purification ethnique" massive des Serbes en août 1995. (Dans le cadre de cette opération) quatre 'jets' US-OTAN ont même bombardé et mitraillé les installations de radar des Serbes autour de la ville de Knin, capitale de la Krajinna. En quelques jours, le but prévisible avait été atteint : près de 200.000 Serbes (en majorité, des civils désarmés) pris de panique, ont fui en désordre. C'était là, et de loin, l'exemple le plus frappant "de purification ethnique" dans la tragédie de la Yougoslavie. Très rapidement, les reportages sur la Krajinna ont disparu des premières pages de la presse écrite et des écrans des télévisions. Au lieu qu'éclate un tollé de réprobation au sujet des violations grossières des 'droits de l'homme' des Serbes, l'ambassadeur des Etats-Unis (Madeleine Albright, actuellement la Secrétaire d'Etat) présentait au même moment, aux Nations Unies, des photographies aériennes, fournies par la CIA, représentant un vaste champ récemment labouré près de la ville de Srebrenica (en Bosnie). Sans

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avancer la moindre preuve, elle affirmait que dans ce champ étaient enfouis les cadavres de plusieurs milliers de combattants Bosniaques Musulmans, dont il était présumé qu'ils avaient été exécutés par les Serbes. Cela vaut certainement la peine d'ajouter à présent, dans ce texte, qu'en dépit de toutes sortes de recherches effectuées par des services médico-légaux, sous la protection de forces armées (de la SFOR), aucune de ces **immenses** fosses communes n'a jamais été trouvée.

Choisissant d'ignorer tous les événements historiques qui ont eu pour résultat que le Kosovo où sont nées l'ethnicité, la religion et la culture des Serbes, est devenu un territoire submergé par une population étrangère, la réaction des Etats-Unis a été de se ranger aux côtés des Albanais du Kosovo. Les Etats-Unis affirment qu'ils soutiennent les Albanais "modérés" du Kosovo mais n'ont en réalité ils n'ont fait que transformer en héros romantiques les hommes violents et armés qui prétendent être une "armée de libération". Aucune des affirmations relatives aux "droits de l'homme" qui seraient bafoués dans le Kosovo-Metohija n'évoque la présence de minorité serbe locale. Le slogan de "purification ethnique" dissimule simplement le fait que la plupart des Albanais du Kosovo n'ont pas quitté le Kosovo mais ont fui les villages, au cours des opérations de police contre les terroristes, pour se réfugier dans les forêts avoisinantes. De même, "la plus vaste autonomie" que les Etats-Unis exigent pour les Albanais du Kosovo n'est que le prélude pour l'octroi d'une prochaine indépendance. Le prétendu "Sixième plan US pour le Kosovo" prévoit, par exemple, que la police serbe ne pourra plus jamais arrêter des Albanais de souche et que l'armée yougoslave ne pourra plus contrôler la frontière entre le Kosovo et l'Albanie. Si l'on se souvient que les Albanais du Kosovo n'ont jamais payé des impôts ou taxes d'aucune sorte à la Yougoslavie tronquée, alors cette "plus grande autonomie" sponsorisée par les Etats-Unis est du même type de pommade que celle qui appliquée à l'OTAN. La sémantique utilisée et les propositions de structures avancées ont simplement pour

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but de masquer le fait que le Kosovo sera *de facto* détaché de la Serbie à une date future qui n'a pas encore été fixée cependant que les Etats-Unis utilisent l'OTAN pour justifier par avance une utilisation capricieuse de la force dans le but d'étayer les "succès" d'un ersatz de politique étrangère *ad hoc*. Contrairement aux Serbes de la Krajina qui n'exigeaient pas leur incorporation dans une "Grande Serbie", les Albanais du Kosovo se préparent ouvertement à créer une "Grande Albanie" avec l'aide du Parti Communiste albanais. Ainsi, dans la Krajina, l'OTAN a été utilisé pour punir les Serbes rebelles qui s'attaquaient à la souveraineté de l'Etat croate. Au Kosovo, l'OTAN est de nouveau utilisé pour punir les Serbes dont la propre souveraineté sur le Kosovo est sérieusement 'mise en cause', tant de l'intérieur et que de l'extérieur.

On entend souvent les demandes d'admirer les hommes en uniformes opposant des missions militaires allant contre leur consciences. La deuxième révélation sortant du "cas Bunel" démontre un état d'hypocrisie sévère quand il s'agit d'un officier français qui manque le désir de "punir les Serbes". Ceci nous amène à deux autres révélations importantes mises au jour par le 'cas Bunel'. Toute sympathie éprouvée à l'égard "des Serbes" est condamnée comme étant un crime. Cette croyance est tout particulièrement enracinée parmi ceux qui se sont donné le nom de "humanitaires". Il s'agit là d'un groupe des plus curieux. Leurs cœurs saignent lorsque les images de télévision montrent des femmes Bosniaques pleurant leurs parents (disparus) dans la ville de Srebrenica, mais ils résistent à toute émotion lorsqu'ils se trouvent devant des atrocités effectivement perpétrées contre "les Serbes". La plupart d'entre eux ne voient même pas les contradictions morales et logiques qui découlent de leur empressement à massacrer des milliers de Serbes pour empêcher que les Albanais du Kosovo ne périssent (de froid) dans les forêts. Ce fait est d'ailleurs documenté par la récente affectation de (bombardiers) B-52 pour les éventuelles missions au-dessus du Kosovo et de la Serbie. Or, on sait que les B-52

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ne sont nullement des armes de précision dont l'utilisation permettrait, aux dires de l'OTAN et des Etats-Unis, de maintenir "les dommages indirects" à un niveau "minimum". Il s'agit en fait d'une arme de terreur conçue pour des bombardements "en tapis". A dire la vérité, les politiques anti-serbes des mentors en politique étrangère de l'Administration Clinton, qui sont poussés par les médias, ont transformé en "ennemi" un pays qui avait été un allié précieux des Etats-Unis et de l'ensemble de l'humanité pendant les deux Guerres Mondiales. Ce "succès" de politique étrangère a été enfoncé dans les cerveaux des officiers et des soldats américains qui espionnent même le personnel militaire français au sein de l'OTAN, en le soupçonnant de s'aligner sur "les Serbes ennemis", tout simplement parce que les actions de ces Français découlent d'une perspective différente et d'une mémoire historique maintenue intacte.

La deuxième révélation met en évidence le fait qu'il est difficile d'éprouver de l'admiration pour ces hommes en uniforme. Les préparatifs de l'OTAN en vue du bombardement du Kosovo et de la Serbie sont en réalité un test destiné à établir si la souveraineté nationale et l'obéissance aux lois sont encore des facteurs qu'il faut respecter.. L'OTAN a rejeté l'argument selon lequel il devrait soumettre à l'approbation du Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies tout projet de mission punitive. Seul le Congrès des Etats Unis peut déclarer la guerre mais étant donné que l'OTAN est une organisation internationale il devient également possible de circonvenir même le Congrès . En d'autres termes, l'OTAN est une bande hors loi qui est placée sous le contrôle (exclusif) de l'Administration américaine mais n'est responsable devant personne. Ce fait avait été reconnu jusque dans le journal militaire de l'OTAN, par un article intitulé "L'OTAN a besoin d'une base juridique plus ferme" (paru dans le International Herald Tribune du 13 novembre 1998).


Apparemment, le commandant Bunel a estimé que la devise de l'OTAN "la force fait le droit" mène cette

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machine militaire (meurtrière) vers un avenir qui est à la fois chaotique et répugnant. Mais, si Bunel est coupable de quelque chose, c'est uniquement de sa défaillance à comprendre combien l'OTAN a également désespérément besoin d'avoir "les Serbes" pour ennemi.. En Croatie et en Bosnie, ce sont les Serbes qui ont sauvé l'OTAN de l'atrophie qui devait s'emparer de ce fossile de la Guerre froide. Une fois de plus, ce sont "les Serbes" qui consolident cette "importance" dans le Kosovo. Même le Tribunal international de La Haye doit son existence "aux Serbes" qui, seuls en ex-Yougoslavie, figuraient pendant très de trois ans sur les listes des personnes les plus recherchées. Sans un ennemi que l'on peut pourchasser, des milliers de personnes à l'Ouest seraient au chômage ou bien elles mourraient d'ennui dans des tâches et des travaux de routine. Ceci comprend non seulement des soldats en uniforme mais également des hommes de loi à La Haye, des professionnels des médias, toutes sortes de nouveaux missionnaires qui vont prêcher la Civilisation Occidentale (dont les admirateurs ne mentionnent jamais les énormes squelettes qui se cachent dans leurs propres placards), des humanitaires remplis de haine dans leur recherche de nouvelles causes, des fabricants (et des marchands) d'armes, de munitions et d'explosifs, des "penseurs de stratégie", des rédacteurs d'articles politiques et même des coteries d'espions occidentaux qui trébuchent les uns sur les autres dans les Balkans La plupart de ces gens infligeraient certainement à Bunel toutes les quinze années de prison prévues mais si les Européens parviennent jamais à se libérer des "baby-boomers" américains qui veulent donner une nouvelle forme à ce monde stupide, Bunel devrait alors recevoir médailles et décorations. Même le peuple américain et le Congrès des USA devraient concevoir une nouvelle décoration pour Bunel car il a exposé à la face du monde le Monstre de Frankenstein du XXI^e siècle...




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Which Islam ?

R. Kent

Published first in 1984, eight years before the war in Bosnia and after some forty years of Communist rule in Yugoslavia, 'Alija 'A Izetbegovic's *Islam between East and West* (1) reached its third edition in 1993. A reprint of 1994 confirms an ongoing interest in this text. It grew out of the earlier Islamic Declaration for which he spent time in prison. As a young and educated Bosnian Muslim he came to feel and believe that his local co-religionists had slipped the leash of Islam. Many ate pork, routinely drank alcoholic beverages, intermarried with Orthodox and Catholic Christians, and hardly observed the rituals which mark the devout Muslims, including the daily prayer (Salah). Given the atheistic nature of Communism with which Islam cannot be compatible (2), all of this converged to ignite the "Islamic Fire" in Izetbegovic and several other educated Bosnian Muslims. This reaction in a Federal Republic with almost one half of its population consisting of declared adherents to Islam alarmed the Communist rulers as a manifestation of extreme religious nationalism. What the Communist authorities did not know, as they used repression, revulsion against both secularism and distortions of Islam has many antecedents in history as a much wider reaction within Muslim societies to impositions of the West since the Crusades (3).

Western incursions into the House of Islam came in many ways, shapes and forms. Still, the prevailing perception among the devout Muslims defined all of them as a continuous attempt to drive man from God and replace the submission to His will with sterile and self-destructing individualism as well as materialism. A number of Muslim

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theologians, starting most rigorously with the Persian-born Al-Ghazzali (1058-1111 AD)~ sought to reconcile first the Greek Thought with the Islamic Teachings. Later, they tried to find avenues through which Muslim societies could come to incorporate the advances of Western Science without allowing to be dominated by materialism at the same time In the end, Al-Ghazzali abandoned his unusually interesting philosophical endeavours and became an active advocate for something radically different. He rejected reason as the path to God and decreed that the only way to communicate with Him is through personal experience of ecstasy A major subdivision ensued within Islam between those who subscribed to this conclusion and others who did not expurgate rationalism from devotion to God within Islam. This marks one of the major differences between the Shiite and Sunni Muslims although both know and understand their communality inside the House of Islam In his "Islam Between East and West" Izetbegovic and his colleagues at the time (1983-1984) declared themselves to be entirely within the Sunni chamber of the House of Islam "Rationalism that rejects mysticism," writes Izetbegovic (xix), "and mysticism that excludes a rationalistic approach" are in full discord with the "balancing principle" through which the body and the soul unite during the Salah. In the same sense, the social order reflects the ideals of religion and ethics while both Christianity and materialism are clearly distinct from Islam because they lack both the principle of balance and the merger of body and soul. The problem of incorporation, however, remains unresolved, vexing but not equally acute in every corner of the Islamic world in respect to the relationship of Western science, materialism and their impact on Muslim societies. (2)

When the 1984 text first came out in print, Yugoslavia had not disintegrated and was still under the Communist rule. At the outset, the volume provides a disclaimer that it has any connection, intended or inadvertent, with a political purpose. Just thirteen years later, Alija Izetbegovic happens to be the President of Bosnia. He led the local Muslims

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through four years of a bloody fratricidal war among the Bosnian Slaves who became rigidly subdivided into two branches of Christianity and a Muslim counterpart adhering to the Sunnite Islam with Izetbegovic as a pivotal and, at once, secular and sacerdotal person enveloped by a team of like-minded Bosnian Muslims.

The Bosnian war stopped at Dayton. All the niceties aside, the peace was imposed by the Clinton Administration some two years after it had torpedoed a non-imposed peace accord at Lisbon, brokered by Lord Owen and Cyrus Vance as well as accepted by the Bosnian Muslims, Serbs and Croats.(4) The overriding but not exclusive purpose of this cynical (read “strategic”) act was to rescue NATO from coming to an end as a useless fossil of the Cold War years. It now had a “regional” armed conflict *su misura* without any major risks at 35,000 feet and with medium-range missiles launched from the Adriatic. As the American soldiers came to the post-Dayton Bosnia without a shot fired an ever more intense debate began within the United States in particular. Should there be an internationally guaranteed Bosnian “unitary” State dominated de facto by its Muslims or should an already existing partition of Bosnia be allowed to take hold along the ethno-religious lines? Fears are being expressed, on the one hand, that failure to support and solidify the “unitary” Bosnia will open the door to its annexation by Serbia and Croatia. This would force the Bosnian Muslims to go under either the Croat or Serb Administration or yet both, in a denial of self-determination. On the other hand, it is believed that the withdrawal of the U. S. ground forces will encourage the U. S. -trained and equipped Bosnian Muslim army to “cleanse” Bosnia of its Serbs through extermination and expulsion. In turn, this could lead to a wider conflict, dragging Serbia and Croatia into it and escalating even beyond the Balkans. While Western Europeans are hardly eager to see a Muslim state in the Balkans its Christians are even less prone to put up with it. An imposed “unitary” Bosnia could become a prescription for another civil war. An all-Muslim Bosnian state, en-

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dowed with a large and U. S. trained army, using the latest weapons systems, could start a Balkan war. What really matters in this situation is the role of Islam in determining if the exertion in the path of God (jihadd, from the noun juhud) is to take a violent or pacific form (5). This has been sensed by those in the West who are taking the Clinton Administration to task for failing to interdict the entry of Shiit Iran into Bosnia and there is no longer any doubt that Iran's presence in matters of faith, money and arms is having a major impact on the Bosnian Muslims, both high and low. In bits and pieces, the Western press has reported already some tensions between the Bosnian army commanders and the civilian authorities. Similar tensions are known to be around within the Bosnian government as a whole. There is thus a very real and little known or understood debate internal to the Bosnian Muslims. Its outcome could turn to be even more important than the decision in the West what to do in and with Bosnia. Apart from the primacy of passion and regard for the Imam as the supreme authority on Islam, there is another basic difference between the Shiites and Sunnis. It consists of an established missionary tradition which came out of the earliest struggles within Islam. With the cultivation of secrecy to avoid detection by opponents, the Shi'a missionaries work by developing social contacts within all the social classes. Their true calling and mission are shielded through secular professions as merchants, military instructors, craftsmen and, even, as pilgrims when no other cover can work. In predominantly Muslim areas which are not under turmoil the missionaries have usually resorted to the highly moralistic interpretations of carefully selected suras of the Kuran. As such places have not been too attractive the Shi'a missionaries were most likely to be found in those Muslim or Muslim-dominated areas where discontent is widespread. To the angry and the disaffected the preaching invariably turns to the need for armed conflict which alone can purify a subverted

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Islam and terminate the unbearable social stress (6). With their ardent local supporters in Bosnia, the Iranian Mujahadeen are already anything for the better. The general malaise, localized through its global manifestations and, again, re-localized from much wider phenomena and noumena, hardly escaped 'Alija Izetbegovic. On the contrary, an examination of the malaise's origins in his volume's first part becomes the platform from which to launch an advocacy for the great religion of Islam as the only possible universal panacea without the shedding of blood on a massive scale. Essentially, "Islam between East and West" is a piece of writing designed to convince that Islam is not only superior to Atheism but also that it leaves Christianity far behind in the quality of human existence under God. Izetbegovic reserves the surprise of his text for the concluding section of the volume to be brought in below.

First, the philosophical underpinnings, reported as closely as possible to the text on hand without lengthy reproductions. Accordingly, religion (Islam excluded by implication and contrast) denies man's biological needs while materialism, whether posing as Socialism or Capitalism, plays havoc with man's spiritual desires. It emerges that evolution, civilization, science and utopia "are parallel to atheism" while creation, culture, art and morals "are parallel to religion." Atheism thrives on science and material progress thus going squarely against man as first and foremost a "spiritual and not a biological or social factor." As man does not live by bread alone, Atheism -in denying man- does away with what should be the centrepiece of human existence, namely "humanism, freedom and human rights." The contradiction between culture and civilization is the "same as between religion and science' Socialism has been sired by the materialistic creed. It does not really deal with man but with the methods of organizing the "life of the social animal. " In what almost amounts to a tour de force. "Anti-Christian Socialism" is the "inverse of Christianity" because Socialist values turn the Christian ones upside-

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down: instead of religion, science; instead of individuality, society, instead of humanism material progress, instead of creating man through upbringing instead of anonymous and faceless individuals in order to merge with the City of God (“Kingdom of God”) on earth? The answer “is yes.” It is to be found, with one exception, only in Islam.

One could offer numerous criticisms of the proposed philosophical edifice but here is not the place to enter into the purely philosophical argument to find points of agreement and disagreement. The purpose of this review is to come to understand the mentalite’ as a harbinger of the future. It is most important to find out whether the concepts advanced by the Bosnian Muslim elite of the 1980’s are likely to prevail in the near future of Bosnia’s Muslims and, by proxy and contact, affect the fate of the Bosnian non-Muslims as well. It should be obvious that humanism in its multiple aspects, including freedom to and freedom from, runs like a thread through much that comes most immediately into view. In siding within Islam through inner peace with oneself, by elevating love as the conqueror of violence, by rejecting the notion that Islam should submit to the “tyranny of history,” by desiring and using the material progress of science to benefit man without depriving man of spirituality, the clear message is that the Bosnian Muslim elite of the 1980’s wanted a rebirth of Islamic humanism in Bosnia. Unless its manifesto of 1984 is made obsolete by the civil war in Bosnia and its successful exploitation by the Shi’ite missionaries, there might come about an arrangement within Bosnia that will surprise everyone. *Islam between East and West* is the book to read.

Ten chapters of the volume deal with the details of creation and evolution, the phenomenon of art, morality, culture and history, drama and utopia, the Islamic nature of Law, Moses, Jesus and Mohammed, and ideas and reality in which there is a discussion of Marx and Marxism. Curiously, in a chapter which discovers “superstitions” even

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in Science (ideas and reality), there is not a word about the discrepancies between Islamic theory and practice in the documented past affecting non-Muslims in Muslim dominated states. Given that Bosnian Muslims are likely to dominate the “unitary” state it is surely a sub-topic of crucial importance. As an example, one could mention that Islamic theory allows for unimpeded self-rule for the Dhimmi communities which consist of the Peoples of the Book (Ahl al-Khitab) or Jews with the Talmud and Christians with the Bible living under Muslim overrule. Yet, the historical record reveals numerous instances of violence against them. In the “medieval” North Africa Jews had a rather bad time, especially under the Almohads. What is not generally known, the yellow markings used by the Nazis to identify Jews visually were first invented and applied by the Almohad authorities centuries ago. According to Islamic law, the Jewish Dhimrnis paid their annual tax (the jizya) in order to retain internal autonomy but neither this law nor the theory itself guaranteed protection in real life. Equally, in World War II, the Bosnian Muslim extremists joined the Nazis from Germany and Croatia, aided the Nazi war effort and slaughtered thousands of Serb civilians. They were certainly not taxed by the Kuran where no sura condones such behaviour. There is no doubt that what happened to the Serbs in Bosnia (and Croatia) between 1941-1944 is a direct prelude to the period in Bosnia between April 1992 and the signing of Dayton Accords. At the end of World War II there were no apologies for the systematic extermination of the Serbs in Bosnia. The leaders of this accurately defined genocide were never tried in any court. Intellectual discussions which eliminate empirical phenomena in favour of some goal perceived as “lofty” or politically “astute,” tend to lose much of their luster.

There is also a “Third Way,” outside Islam, in something of a surprise package toward the end of *Islam Between East and West*. This is one of the most sophisticated segments of the book. It provides the

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heading for chapter 11 (pp.271-285) and it applies mainly to England and, by extension to North America, the twin side of the Anglo-Saxon world. There is no known association between Izetbegovic and English society and thought but he does walk with ability through a host of English thinkers, He finds concordances between Islamic and English thought and practice. This is the result of the “historical” fact that England has escaped the rigid Christianity of Continental Europe, marked by the Inquisition. It is not clear whether the Continental Europe’s Protestant Churches that also evaded the Inquisition “fit” here but Izetbegovic sticks to England alone

Just as Al-Ghazzali became the most rigorous formulator of the Shi’a Islam, Roger Bacon (d. 1294) and his writings underscore the “duality” of the English life and thought in a lasting way. He was thus the forerunner and founder of England’s “later spiritual progress.” Bacon held that “inward experience induced invariably a “mystical illumination” while true science was rooted in observation (empiricism). It was John Locke who placed the “concept of God” in the very “centre of his ethical theory. “ Even Thomas Hobbes, an unabashed “positivist and materialist” thinker held that the laws of nature are in actual “harmony with the Bible.” One could object here that Hobbes died in 1679 while the system of positivism was developed in France by August Comte who died in 1857, around the age of sixty. Assigning the biblical duality to Hobbes whose entire philosophical legacy (especially through the Leviathan) hardly devotes any “centrality” to the Bible in comparison with the laws of nature (“nasty, brutish and short” in the lives of some humans) seems like trait-chasing to prove a less than fully tenable thesis. Still, this problem is reduced by the introduction of an entire “Cambridge School, with wide influence in England There is a philosophy, states the author, which “satisfies religious needs and a “religion which corresponds with reason and permeates us with the warm and bracing feeling” (this is a very English-English

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phraseology). Indeed, the English “mind has surpassed itself ‘ in creating a “utilitarian morality” which finds its echo in the American pragmatism. It is also noted that David Hume (who, by the way, was not an Englishman but a Scottish philosopher and historian) as well as Adam Smith “had an aversion to clericalism and religious organization.” Similar attitudes can be found among the Muslims. To sum it up, Izetbegovic stresses that the Anglo-Saxon version of Democracy, as practised in England and America, in its style and content, is entirely compatible with Islam. This is in contrast to the rigidity of the Continental European Christianity and its political derivatives which do not allow for the “balancing principle.” In emitting the argument that an absence of experience with the Inquisition is a major reason for the absence of rigidity, Izetbegovic does not take the Orthodox Christianity out of the sclerotic mode. Yet, Inquisition did not affect the Orthodox Christians and one could also find a number of philosophico-religious concordances between Islam and the Orthodox Christianity. For some reason, this avenue of intellectual exploration is virtually shut. One could go further in that all religions share a basic moral code consisting of five areas of behaviour: that which must not be done (say, Apostasy in Islam), that which must be done (to periodically confess one’s sins in Catholicism)/ that which should not be done (failure to observe one’s patron saint day in Orthodox Christianity underlined by the Slava among the Serbs), that which should be done (wearing of the yarmulka at the Synagogue), and a “neutral” but rather vast area of permissible behaviour, more or less “moral” in texture.

The Anglo-American “card” played here can also be seen as an attempt at ingratiation against the uncertain future. Nationalistic fissures were already happening in Yugoslavia after the death of Tito (1980). As a minority within the Yugoslav Federation Bosnian Muslims did not particularly cultivate any foreign power. A Democratic Yugoslavia as a satellite of the Anglo-Saxon power seemed

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to offer the best possible local solution. It is interesting to note that the text of Izetbegovic is replete with criticism of socialism and materialism while it is circumspect toward capitalism, the Anglo-Saxon economic system. In contrast to the earlier and more provocative Islamic Declaration, the volume on Islam between East and West recognizes a priori that the Bosnian Muslims cannot orbit out of the Balkans in which they will always be a demographic minority. For this inalterable reason, the “unveiling” of a “third way” at the volume devoted to the elevation of Islam above all other “ways” needs to be perceived as an appeal for a post-communist transformation of all the then-Yugoslav ethno-religious societies. The “model” here cannot come from Islam as a local minority religion. It can and should be derived from the Anglo-Saxon antecedents. This is entirely in accordance with the central “balancing principle” which seeks to prevent a confrontation of rigid Christianity and zealous Islam, the worst possible scenario.

A resurrection of Islamic humanism, beyond the purely theoretic framework, coupled with the advent of Democracy in all the parts of ex-Yugoslavia, would go a long way to heal the wounds of a most violent and very recent fratricidal past in which no one can claim any saints amid the sea of sinners on all sides. In both Islam and Christianity politics intersect with religion. It could hardly be otherwise. But their useful social and economic interaction becomes terribly skewed when religion is made the captive of politics and when politics -as “art of the possible”- is abandoned through sublimation with religious zeal. The torment in Ireland, so close to the Anglo-Saxon world, especially through its Anglo-Irish, is a most telling case in point. To the extent that Islam between East and West means what it is signalling for the future of all South Slavs there is a glimmer of hope. There remains, however, a monumental and not easily disposable danger. It does not come strictly from inside although there is a strong connection. The danger comes from outside interference from other Mus-

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lim countries. The strong support for the deconstruction of the Yugoslav idea, coming from Germany and the Vatican (in what some have called the “eternal return”) produced the will in Slovenia and Croatia to exit unilaterally from the Federation. The same support solidified both internationally as independent states. But, without this heavily assisted break-up there would not have been a civil war within the ex-Yugoslavia, suddenly transformed into international ‘conflicts by strokes of pen. In seeking to “unify” Bosnia under their control will the Bosnian Muslims succumb entirely to materialism by collecting endless funds from Islamic states while responding at home to the real mission of Shi’ite agents more than welcome by the local revanchists? Time will tell.

(January 1998)

(1) While Izetbegovic is the announced author of the present text there is sufficient internal evidence to suggest a collective work which represents the view of the elite Bosnian Muslims in the years immediately after the death of Tito in 1980. This makes the text even more valuable.

(2) R.K.Kent, “The Soviet Muslims, the Arab World and the Myth of Synthesis,” *Journal of International Affairs* (Columbia University), 1959.

(3) Cf. Bernard Lewis, *The Muslim Discovery of Europe*. (London and New York, 1982).

(4) The definitive work on this subject is David Owen’s *Balkan Odyssey* (New York 1995).

(5) No one has surpassed Majid Khadduri’s volume on peace and war in Islamic jurisprudence and philosophy. He clearly debunks the myth that exertion (juhud) in God’s path is to be solely translated into armed conflicts.

(6) See the *Concise Encyclopaedia of Arabic Civilization- The Arab East*, (New York, 1960). It is worth noting here that the work of contemporary Shi’ite missionaries in Bosnia is an exact replay of an old tradition. See especially pp. 486-487. For an excellent and comprehensive report on the Sunni and the Shi’ite see the *Shorter Encyclopaedia of Islam* (The Netherlands, 1953) especially pp. 534-541 (extensive bibliography, p. 541 in small print), and pp.552-553. See also the entry on Islam, pp. 176-178.

(7) For an accessible French-language “Declaration Islamique” see *Dossier Yugoslave - Les Textes Cles Dialogue 2/3*, September 1992, (Supplement).

(8) The United States is undergoing a transformation which is much debated already



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but one in which the Anglo-Saxon heritage is being deconstructed although it is still strong in law and in the written Constitution. See Michael Lind's, *The Next American Nation-The New Nationalism & the Fourth American Revolution*, (Free Press Ppbcks., New York, 1995 and 1996).

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LIVRES

ISLAMISME ET ETATS UNIS UNE ALLIANCE CONTRE L'EUROPE

Alexandre Del Valle: *ISLAMISME ET ETATS UNIS, UNE ALLIANCE CONTRE L'EUROPE , L'AGE D'HOMME* 1997.

Par Henri Regnier, Paris

Cette thèse : l'islamisme allié des U S A , est surprenante au premier abord,et pourtant. Alexandre Del Valle nous a-t'il livré un livre alarmiste ou réaliste (?), les inquiétudes qui sont son fil conducteur, qu'il a connectées aux faits et aux textes, étaient dispersées dans de nombreuses et diverses pensées; Exemple : le 13/03/1993, Mr Chérif EL SHOUBASHY, qui à cette date était le directeur du bureau Parisien du quotidien Egyptien " AL AHRAM ", adresse un courrier au journal le "LE MONDE" dont le titre est "L'OCCIDENT JOUE AVEC LE FEU". Il y cite deux bienveillances US et une Française avec les Islamistes, puis au milieu de sa correspondance, il pose une question : " Inconscience ou illusion , l'Occident penserait-il être en mesure de sauvegarder ses intérêts dans un Sud radicalisé par la religion, ou pense-t-il pouvoir utiliser les mouvements fanatiques comme moyen de pression potentiel sur les régimes en place dans le Sud ? Dans les deux cas l'Occident joue avec le feu. Il commet une lourde erreur de jugement en croyant pouvoir pactiser avec les chefs Islamistes actuels. Une prise du pouvoir des Islamistes dans le monde Arabe pourrait représenter au moins les trois dangers suivants. Le premier est le contrôle par les

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éléments jusqu'au-boutistes des principales réserves de pétrole dans le monde d'aujourd'hui. Le deuxième est le danger d'une rupture entre le Nord et le Sud de la Méditerranée et une guerre larvée sur les plans politique, économique et culturel qui ne peut être que préjudiciable. Quand au troisième, il touche la majorité des pays occidentaux et notamment la France dans le plus profond de leur tissu social. En effet des millions de Musulmans résident aujourd'hui en Occident. Il serait naïf de penser que l'arrivée au pouvoir des extrémistes dans leurs pays d'origine ne se traduirait pas très vite par une radicalisation de ces communautés et l'apparition de groupuscules enclins à la violence et au terrorisme' “.

Et il conclut, en nous disant qu'il est temps de “réviser la stratégie occidentale dans le monde Arabo-Islamique, avant que vienne le temps des remords “.

Les inquiétudes de cet intellectuel Egyptien, n'ont pas disparues, elles se concrétisent même de plus en plus, notamment à travers la tragédie Yougoslave, la guerre civile d'Algérie et le problème Chypriote, à un point tel, que beaucoup d'entre nous attendaient l'ouvrage remarquable et courageux, de géopolitique, que vient de nous offrir Mr Alexandre DEL VALLE .

Sa thèse diffère un peu des remarques de Mr Chérif EL SHOUBASHY pour qui l'Occident est l'élément essentiel, en effet elle se résume dans le titre de son ouvrage, mais la différence est beaucoup moins évidente quand on lit son chapitre VI intitulé “Le masochisme politique Ouest-Européen au service des intérêts Américains” où il nous livre, sur 64 pages , des analyses roboratives qui sont d'une grande franchise.

Un exemple d'informations inquiétantes qu'il nous donne dans son livre, page 255, concernant les Balkans : “ Grâce à un programme de l'OTAN, d'inspiration américaine , baptisé “CASCADE”, la Turquie est, de tous les pays, celui qui a reçu le plus d'armes entre 1992 et 1994, d'après le second registre annuel des Nations-Unies sur les armes conventionnelles. La Turquie a reçu

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ainsi, entre 1993 et 1994, 1017 chars de combat, presque autant que l'ensemble du parc de blindés Britannique. Et les récents accords stratégiques israélo-turcs ont vocation à procurer à Ankara de nouvelles armes de pointes d'origine américaines et israélienne. Les USA leur ont également accordé une licence pour la fabrication de missiles sol-air portables STINGER, arme légère mais redoutable, dont avaient déjà bénéficié les MOUDJAHIDIN Afghans “.


Avant de conclure sur “ALORS QUEL DESTIN POUR L'EUROPE ?”, ce livre d'une grande érudition qui débute sur l'analyse des sources de l'Islam, aboutit sur le chapitre VIII “UNE ALLIANCE OBJECTIVE ET SUBJECTIVE CONTRE L'EUROPE”, où l'auteur se réfère à de nombreuses et diverses sources émanant entre autres de grands Orientalistes et Géopoliticiens, parfaitement compréhensible il est, sur 325 pages d'une grande clarté, où, cherchant surtout à démontrer avec faits et textes à l'appui, Alexandre DEL VALLE va déranger et même choquer bien des optimistes et des naïfs, il fera aussi grincer les dents du département d'état US, des Islamistes et de leurs féaux. Controversé ce livre fondamental qui fera date, n'en sera que plus fécond, il est à lire absolument afin de mieux comprendre la situation actuelle et les enjeux graves qui en découleront. Il aura vaincre un “certain silence” et pour cela mérite un grand succès.

Il est préfacé par le Général (C.R) Pierre-Marie GALLOIS (ancien de la R.A.F.) bien connu et apprécié pour ses ouvrages de géopolitique , et postfacé par Mr Jean-Pierre PERONCEL-HUGOZ, orientaliste, auteur de plusieurs ouvrages sur le monde Arabe et chroniqueur au journal LE MONDE, qui conclut en disant “ Pendant ce temps, les stratèges de la diplomatie secrète de Washington avaient placé leurs pions sur l'échiquier Musulman et plus précisément Islamiste de l'Arabie à l'Algérie... C'est dans ce territoire NON AUTORISE AUX CURIEUX, AUX PERSPICACES ET AUX

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COURAGEUX, qu'Alexandre DEL VALLE a planté sa canne d'escalade et ses stylos. Ecoutez bien, **PENDANT QU'IL EST ENCORE TEMPS**, le récit édifiant de ses découvertes en **ISLAMERIQUE** ! “.

PS : Une critique : Il manque un index des noms. Une petite erreur : Page 197, remplacer DJEN-DJEN par JIJEL (ex DJIDJELLI). Une suggestion : une traduction, au moins en Anglais, serait judicieuse.



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Alija Izetbegovic: Islamic Hero of the Western World

by Diana Johnstone

-Izetbegovic, Alija, *Islamic Declaration*, 1970.

-Izetbegovic, Alija, *Islam Between East and West*, American Trust Publications, Plainfield, Indiana, 1984; third edition, 1993, 302 pages.

Of the local figures who emerged from the wreckage of the former Yugoslavia, the President of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Alija Izetbegovic, is by far the most respected in the world outside, and notably in the United States (1). While younger men like Haris Silajdzic and Mohamed Sacirbey defended his government to the world with consummate skill and in perfect English, Izetbegovic was a largely silent figure on television screens, the elder statesman whose serious mein expressed both worry and serenity, reflecting the martyrdom of his people. The respect accorded him has rarely taken the form of interest in the ideas on which he based his Party of Democratic Action (SDA), the Muslim political movement in control of the Sarajevo government. In Europe and America, Izetbegovic is seen much more as a symbol than as a political leader with a particular program.

The war in Bosnia-Herzegovina aroused far more passion in the West than the earlier war in Croatia because it brought to the television screens the revelation of a European Islam that offered the ideal model for solving a current problem of vital importance in countries such as France: assimilation of Muslim immigrant populations. Sarajevo was discovered as a multicultural paradise, an oasis of civilization, populated mainly by gentle blue-eyed Mus-

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lims, practicing musical instruments and expressing sentiments of tolerance for their neighbors of other religions. The “lukewarm” Islam seen in Sarajevo seemed totally suitable for integration into any European country.

The fact that Bosnia seemed to offer a potential solution to Western Europe’s own “Muslim problem” helps explain the vehement hostility that arose against the Bosnian Serbs, whose utterly peculiar rustic nationalism (the same, commentators noted, that had triggered the carnage of World War I) imbued with religious bigotry was held responsible for an unprovoked brutal assault on this exemplary society. Any “ethnic cleansing” would be outrageous, but here the crime was doubly reprehensible: a “genocide” bent on wiping out Europe’s best model of a multi-ethnic society including Muslims.

This interpretation of events helps explain the extreme passion aroused, expressed in the slogan, “Europe lives or dies in Sarajevo”. Especially on the liberal left, many intellectuals were, and largely remain, convinced that multicultural Sarajevo represented a test case for the survival of European integration in the broadest sense (2).

Western media, not least those newspapers and television channels (CNN, Arte) devoting the most coverage to the conflict, readily identified idealized Sarajevo with the Bosnian Muslims, and the Islam of Western dreams with the person of Alija Izetbegovic. Any suggestion that Mr. Izetbegovic might be an “Islamic fundamentalist” could only be dismissed with total incredulity and outrage as blatant Serb propaganda, invented to justify aggression and ethnic cleansing. How could the leader of the Bosnian Muslims be an “Islamic fundamentalist” when the Bosnian Muslims were obviously such a model of modern tolerance?

Acceptance of Izetbegovic as the personification of multi-ethnic Bosnia-Herzegovina obscured the fact that the President not only did not represent the population of Bosnia-Herzegovina in all its variety, he did not even represent all the Muslims (3).

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Politics and Religion

That Izetbegovic could not be considered the uncontested leader of a unanimous Muslim community, much less of “multi-ethnic Bosnia”, is clear from his own published writings, the “Islamic Declaration”, first distributed in 1970 and republished twenty years later, and *Islam Between East and West*, first published in the United States in 1984.

The “Islamic Declaration” was a manifesto, a sort of “what is to be done?” addressed to Bosnian Muslims discontented with their condition and status. For Izetbegovic, it is clear that Muslims cannot be satisfied in a secular order. “Islamic society without an Islamic government is incomplete and impotent... A Muslim, in general, does not exist as an individual. ...to live and exist as a Muslim, he must create an environment, a community, a social order. ... History does not know of a single truly Islamic movement which was not simultaneously a political movement” (4).

The 1970 Islamic Declaration was written in the context of a global awakening of the Muslim world, “made up of 700 million people possessing enormous natural resources and occupying a geographical area of the first importance”. “The time of passivity and peace is gone forever...” The time had come to show the way to “the realization of Islam in all fields of private life of the individual, in the family and in society, by rebirth of Islamic religious thinking and creation of an Islamic community from Morocco to Indonesia.”

Izetbegovic singled out two currents within the Muslim community which stood in the way of the political renewal of Islam: the “conservatives” on the one hand and the “modernists” on the other.

The “conservatives” were identified with “hodjas and shayks” who by confining Islam to a “religion”, limited to spiritual concerns, kept it in the hands of the clergy, neglecting its necessary political role in the world, and accommodating a secular regime incompatible with fully

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developed Islamic life. “More closed to science and more open to mysticism”, the “hodjas and shayks” criticized by Izetbegovic are evidently linked to the Sufi tradition of mystical Islam, which in some times and places (notably the Caucasus region and Algeria in the nineteenth century) has been the center of particularly violent resistance to the West, but which took quite tame forms in the western territories of the former Ottoman empire.

As for the “modernists”, they are considered by Izetbegovic to be a veritable disaster for Islam throughout the Muslim world. They are often influential in public life, but as they also consider Islam merely a religion that need not or cannot order the external world, they too accommodate secularism and prevent Islam from exerting its proper role in ordering all aspects of life. The “Islamic Declaration” very explicitly rejects the intellectual currents which, notably in Arab countries, have attempted to build modern secular nation-states on the Western model of separation between government and religion. For Muslims, Izetbegovic declares, secularism and nationalism are purely negative.

He illustrates this with the example of Turkey, a Muslim country ruined, in his view, by secularism and nationalism. “Turkey as an Islamic country ruled the world. Turkey as a copy of Europe is a third-rate country like a hundred others around the world.”

What Izetbegovic has to say about Turkey is particularly significant, inasmuch as he is himself an heir to a Muslim elite in the Balkans which consistently opposed efforts by Istanbul to reform the Ottoman Empire in ways that would diminish the privileges traditionally monopolized by Muslims. (Under Ottoman rule, only Muslims had the right to own land, to occupy administrative posts, to enter town on horseback, or to wear green, among other things.) When Ottoman power was finally driven out of the Balkans by the Serb, Bulgarian and Greek national liberation movements, all Orthodox Christians, a certain number of south Slav Muslims emigrated to Turkey where even today they may constitute a lobby nostalgic for the good old

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days, as well as a potential source of support for the growing Islamic political restoration in Turkey itself.

The country which Izetbegovic singled out in his "Declaration" as an example and inspiration, as "our great hope", is Pakistan. "Pakistan constitutes the rehearsal for introduction of Islamic order in contemporary conditions and at the present level of development." These words were written before the Islamic Revolution in Iran, which brought a new source of financial backing to Izetbegovic's project of Islamic revival in Bosnia-Herzegovina. For secular society, however, Pakistan as example is no more reassuring, considering its ongoing backing of armed Islamic groups in neighboring countries, notably Afghanistan (5).

Izetbegovic's constant message is that the Koran calls for unification of religious faith and politics. There can be no "separation of church and state" -- a Christian division totally unacceptable to Muslims. "The first and most important" conclusion to be drawn from the Koran is "the impossibility of any connection between Islam and other non-Islamic systems. There is neither peace nor coexistence between the 'Islamic religion' and non-Islamic social and political institutions."

"Having the right to govern its own world, Islam clearly excludes the right and possibility of putting a foreign ideology into practice on its territory. There is thus no principle of secular government and the State must express and support the moral principles of religion."

Izetbegovic's immediate concern in writing the 1970 "Islamic Declaration" was not in combatting the Communist regime in Yugoslavia, which by recognizing a "Muslim nationality" had greatly facilitated the revival of a Muslim consciousness and community. Rather, he was calling for an awakening of an Islamic consciousness as the first necessary step toward eventual restoration of international Islamic unity and Islamic government wherever Muslims would constitute a majority. This is stated quite clearly.

"Emphasis on giving priority to religious and moral renewal doesn't mean that Islamic order can be realized

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without Islamic government... This position means that we don't start with the conquest of power, but by the conquest of men, and that Islamic regeneration is first of all an upheaval in the field of education, and only afterwards in the political field. We must be preachers first and soldiers later."

At what moment will force accompany these educational means? "The choice of this moment is always a precise question and depends on a number of factors. One can however establish a general rule: the Islamic movement can and must take power as soon as it is normally and numerically strong enough not only to destroy the existing non-Islamic government, but also to construct a new Islamic government. ... Acting too soon is as dangerous as acting too late! Seizing power... without adequate moral and psychological preparation and the indispensable minimum of strong and well-trained cadre means making a coup d'Etat, not an Islamic revolution..." (Earlier, he specifies that: "An Islamic regime can be achieved only in countries where Muslims are a majority.")

The "overthrow of the state" was perhaps nearly as distant and hypothetical for Izetbegovic in Yugoslavia in 1970 as it was for Communist Parties in the non-Communist West in the mid-20th century. The precipitation with which Izetbegovic has in fact become President of a largely Muslim and potentially Islamic state is clearly due to a series of events that even a religious visionary is most unlikely to have foreseen in 1970 or even in 1983 -- although by then, the Islamic Revolution in Iran had opened new prospects. Notably, a sort of competition between Teheran and Saudi Arabia has provided Islamic movements everywhere with a lucrative rivalry for influence between oil-rich sponsors. Izetbegovic's party has been notably successful in winning important political and material support from all Muslim countries regardless of rivalries between them.

Islam as Political Synthesis of a Dualistic World

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Islam Between East and West was published first in English in the United States in 1984, at a time when Izetbegovic was in jail in Yugoslavia for "counter-revolutionary" activities. The book was could not be published in Bosnia-Herzegovina until after he was released in a general amnesty in 1988.

The book is a lengthy attempt to elaborate the ideological underpinnings of the central political argument of the "Islamic Declaration". It is thus part of the intellectual preparation which Izetbegovic considered necessary before proceeding to the next step of establishing Islamic government.

All of Izetbegovic's thinking centers on a single simple formula: Islam is the only synthesis capable of unifying mankind's essentially dualistic existence.

"There are only three integral views of the world: the religious, the materialistic, and the Islamic. They reflect three elemental possibilities (conscience, nature, and man), each of them manifesting itself as Christianity, materialism, and Islam. All ideologies ... can be reduced to one of these three" (p.xxv).

The book proceeds to make these reductions. The method employed is to touch briefly on virtually every subject imaginable, citing a wide range of celebrated or obscure facts and authors, usually out of any clear context, in order to illustrate this simple hypothesis. Thus assertion takes the place of logical argument, repetition the place of definition. Izetbegovic is not at all an analytical thinker, but a classifier. His approach is to attempt to fit everything -- all philosophy and science, notably -- into his three preconceived categories.

These categories are summarized in the book's appendix as the "table of the opposites", in three columns representing the "religious", the "materialistic" and the "Islamic" views of the world. The "Islamic" is the synthesis of the other two, which unites them, as it unites the dual aspects of man's nature. "Man" as a whole thus belongs in the "Islamic" category.

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Samples:

Materialistic	Religious	Islamic
Matter	Spirit	Man
Materialism	Religion	(Islam/Man)
Body	Soul	(Islam/Man)
Science	Christianity	(Islam/Man)
Nature	Art	(Islam/Man)
Intelligence	Morality	(Islam/Man)
Society	Community	(Islam/Man)
Power	Morals	Law-Shari'ah
Violence	Non-violence	Justice-Jihad
Civitas Solis	Civitas Dei	Caliphate
-- etc., etc.		

Izetbegovic devotes many pages to expressing his regard for science and attempting to recount what he takes for those of its findings that seem to support his thesis. A golden age of scientific knowledge is one of the benefits he foresees from Islamic renewal. Nevertheless, his own purely ideological approach is light years away from a modern scientific method.

Arbitrarily, Izetbegovic proclaims that "life is dual". Arbitrarily, he proclaims that only Islam overcomes this dualism. "Man experiences the world dualistically, but monism is in the essence of all human thinking." Mere "religion", by clinging to one side of the dichotomy, cannot satisfy man's need for "monism". He is saved because "Islam cannot be classified as a religion. Islam is more than a religion for it embraces life." This is a totalizing, one might say implicitly totalitarian, claim. "There is only one Islam, but like man, it has both soul and body" (op.cit.,p.xxxi). By equating "Islam" with "man", Izetbegovic appropriates "humanism" for Islam, giving the term an exclusive theological meaning very far from common acceptance. "Atheistic humanism is a contradiction because if there is no God, then there is no man either" (p.39). "Everything must serve man, and man must serve God only. This is the ulti-

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mate meaning of humanism" (p.40). "Man cannot be a Christian" because he cannot be a perfectly spiritual being, and the Koran says that "God does not charge anyone with a burden he cannot carry" (p.227). In contrast, Islam "suits man because it recognizes the duality of his nature. .. That is why man is the most obvious argument of Islam." (p.228)

This dualism recalls the two adversaries to Islamic renewal within the Muslim community cited in the "Islamic Declaration". The "conservatives" are on the "spiritual" or "religious" side of the dichotomy, while the "progressives" are on the "materialistic" side. Both thereby fail to realize Islam in its fullness.

A passage in the chapter on "Drama and Utopia" (p.161) well illustrates Izetbegovic's rigorous dualism. "Does evil come from inside, from the dark depths of the human soul, or does it come from outside, from the objective conditions of human life? This question divides all people into two large groups: believers and materialists. For believers all evil and good is in man. ... To assert that evil is outside, that a man is evil because the conditions in which he lives are bad, that changes in these conditions would bring changes in man, to insist that man is a result of outside circumstances, is from the religious point of view the most godless and the most inhuman idea which has ever appeared in the human mind. Such an opinion degrades man to a thing, to a helpless executor of outside, mechanical, unconscious forces. Evil is in man versus evil is in the social environment. These are two mutually exclusive statements."

The mechanism of the dualistic approach can be seen here. Two extreme propositions are set against each other, and proclaimed to be irreconcilable. Their irreconcilability lies precisely in their extreme formulation, and is thus a truism. This approach automatically excludes all intermediate formulations which might combine elements of the two positions and thus render them reconcilable. This exclusion of the intermediate reasoned positions is necessary in order to arrive at the "problem" -- a universe of irreconcilable opposites -- which can be solved only by an

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extra-rational miracle: God. Or, for Izetbegovic, to be precise, submission to God's will, that is, Islam.

Only Islam can bring the virtues of religion into the real world. "Being a priori against the use of violence, Christianity and religion in general could not directly influence anything that might improve man's social position." (p.192) "Islam started as mysticism and ended as a state. Religion accepted the world of facts and became Islam." (p.194) "Islam knows no specifically 'religious' literature in the European sense of the word, just as it knows no pure secular literature. Every Islamic thinker is a theologian, just as every true Islamic movement is also a political movement." (p.197)

While the "Islamic Declaration" is concise and clear, the 300 pages of *Islam Between East and West* are replete with dubious science, dubious philosophy, erudite references and logical fallacies, all summoned to illustrate the author's sweeping assertions (6). In this type of text, abounding in truisms and circular reasoning, it is impossible not to find some statements with which one can agree, and others one cannot accept. In short, it is *pure ideology*, a series of statements that one may accept or reject, but that cannot be proved or disproved.

The Political Impact of Izetbegovic's Ideas

Along with a dozen co-religionists, Izetbegovic was arrested in still-communist Yugoslavia and sentenced to prison in 1983 (all were freed by a general amnesty in 1988) for "counter-revolutionary activities" and seeking to transform Bosnia-Herzegovina into an "ethnically pure Islamic state" (7). The very fact that such charges were brought by a Communist state, and again reiterated by "nationalist" Serbs, has seemingly protected Izetbegovic's writings from critical examination.

From a democratic secular viewpoint, there is nothing, absolutely nothing, in either the "Islamic Declaration" or *Islam Between East and West* to justify arresting Mr.

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Izetbegovic and putting him in prison for five years. The harm done by jailing people for ideas goes beyond the personal injustice suffered. The fact that Izetbegovic was persecuted for his ideas has tended ever since to make any free criticism of those ideas “taboo”, since criticism is readily equated with endorsement of communist persecution. Unfortunately, the fear of taking “the wrong side” in one way or another has stood in the way of free and open debate regarding all the main “subversive” writings that marked the ideological crisis of the Titoist regime, notably the most controversial, those of Izetbegovic, Tadjman and of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts. Without open debate, the prevailing tendency has been to cite such texts (often inaccurately) for polemic purposes rather than to examine them fairly and critically.

The unquestionable right of Mr. Izetbegovic to express his ideas without being sent to prison should not preclude evaluating the impact of those ideas on the recent history of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Those ideas became notorious locally as a result of two trials in the 1980s in which Muslims were accused of fomenting counter-revolution of the basis of the “Islamic Declaration”. Later, supporters of the Sarajevo regime dismissed any suggestion that Mr. Izetbegovic might be considered an “Islamic fundamentalist” as grotesque Serbian nationalist propaganda. The question was not examined seriously. Insofar as “fundamentalism” can be defined as basing an entire social and political order on religion, then Mr. Izetbegovic is certainly a “fundamentalist”. There is another aspect that deserves study, and that is the extent to which fear of the implications of the “Islamic Declaration”, specifically the call for an Islamic state *once Muslims are a majority of the population*, drove large numbers of the Orthodox and Catholic Christians of Bosnia-Herzegovina into the arms of nationalist Serb and Croat parties. This is a legitimate question, that needs to be elucidated as part of the process of clarifying the causes of the conflict and working for reconciliation between communities (8).

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FOOTNOTES

1. It is indicative of his reputation that in March 1997, Izetbegovic received an award for “democracy development” from the U.S. Center for Democracy in Washington, D.C.

2. In his passionately pro-Bosnian book, *Slaughterhouse: Bosnia and the Failure of the West* (Vintage, New York, 1995), the American writer David Rieff points to the major significance he and many others saw in the war in Bosnia. He had come to Europe to write about immigration, he explains, to see whether the Old Continent would be able to cope as successfully as the United States with the mass influx of people of different cultures. It was “in search of this ‘Americanization’ of the European future”, with the “conviction that in the twenty-first century we would all be polyglot or we would kill one another off”, that he discovered the war in Bosnia, which seemed to support the second, pessimistic hypothesis.

3. The fact is noted in the influential book by Laura Silber and Allan Little, *Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation*, London, Penguin, 1995; page 211: “Fikret Abdic, a local hero in the far northwestern corner of Bosnia, received 1,010,618 votes, compared to 847,386 for Izetbegovic. [...] In an unexplained deal, Abdic, who did not have enough support within the SDA, traded his rightful position as head of the presidency in exchange for naming his man, Alija Delimustafic, as Interior Minister.” Chris Hedges, *New York Times-International Herald Tribune*, 26/4/1996, called the deal “bewildering”. Except for such rare references, the popularity of the Bihac businessman who favored cooperation with Serbs and Croats was quickly forgotten by Western media which accepted Izetbegovic as the unchallenged leader of his people.

4. An oddly deceptive introduction to *Islam Between East and West* by one Dr. Balic, a Bosnian Muslim teaching at Frankfurt, states that Izetbegovic had no interest in politics.

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The purpose of this false assertion was no doubt to deny any grounds for the political prosecution of Izetbegovic and his colleagues. Such a claim is belied not only by the historic facts but by the book itself. The very theme running through everything Izetbegovic has written is the necessarily political nature of Islam.

5. It may be pointed out that Izetbegovic's criticism of "conservatives" and "modernists" has nothing to do with the distinction, much noted in the West since the Iranian revolution, between Sunni and Shi'ite Muslims. If he rejects Sufi mysticism, that is a tendency found in both. One passage in the Islamic Declaration explicitly rejects a key Shi'ite tenet, the importance of Ali as direct descendent of the Prophet: "The hereditary califate represents the abandoning of the elective principle clearly asserted as an institution of Islam." However, this is no doubt of limited significance in light of Izetbegovic's clear advocacy of a worldwide unity of the Islamic community, regardless of the Sunni-Shi'ite distinction.

6. Example: On page 57, Izetbegovic asserts that: "Religiousness is inversely and crime is directly proportional to the largeness of a city." To support this sweeping statement, he cites, in a footnote, "an inquiry" (unidentified) according to which "12 to 13 percent of the inhabitants of Paris come to the Catholic mass, in Lyon 20.9 percent, and in St. Etienne 28.5 percent. Data about crime would certainly show the inverse gradient." Would they indeed? We have no way of knowing. Izetbegovic simply asserts that this relationship exists, and that it is due to the superior "experienced aesthetics" of the countryside in comparison to the city. Aside from the lack of serious supporting data or the dubious superiority of the "experienced aesthetics" of St. Etienne over Paris, this insistence on the moral influence of urban or rural environment is in blatant contradiction to Izetbegovic's central argument, cited above (from p.161), rejecting the "materialistic" argument that evil comes from external "conditions of human life" as "the most godless and the most inhuman idea which has ever

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
appeared in the human mind". But Izetbegovic is immune to accusations of contradiction, since he can reply that "Islam" synthesizes every proposition and its opposite!

7. Alexandre Popovic, "Islamic Movements in Yugoslavia", in Andreas Kappeler, Gerhard Simon, Georg Brunner & Edward Allworth, *Muslim Communities Reemerge: Historical Perspectives on Nationality, Politics and Opposition in the Former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia*, Duke University Press, Durham & London, 1994, p.335.

8. Such a question is typically dismissed out of hand, for example by Silber & Little, op.cit., p.208. "Serb and Croat nationalists point to the *Islamic Declaration*, an esoteric document penned by Izetbegovic, in 1973, as proof that Izetbegovic planned to create a Muslim state. In fact, it was a work of scholarship, not politics, intended to promote philosophical discourse among Muslims. In it, he excluded the 'use of violence in the creation of a Muslim state, because it defiles the beauty of the name of Islam'. A more significant indicator of Izetbegovic's orientation was *Islam between East and West*, first published in the United States in 1984, and then in Yugoslavia after his release from prison four years later. This book mapped out his vision of an Islamic state in the modern world. In it he charts a course between Islamic values and material progress, arguing that the benefits of secular western civilization are without meaning unless they are accompanied by the spiritual values found predominantly in Islamic societies."

Their comments on Izetbegovic's writings are so far off the mark as to raise the question: have they read them? Or are they quoting the author of the work cited in their two footnotes, Srecko M.Dzaja, *Bosnia i Bosnjaci u hrvatskom politickom diskursu*, Erasmus, December 1994, p.33? This seems likely. There is in fact nothing "esoteric" about the "Islamic Declaration", nor can it reasonably be called "a work of scholarship, not politics".


To say that the 1984 book "charts a course between Islamic values and material progress" is a gross misreading. In reality, Izetbegovic presents Islamic values themselves



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
as uniting the material and the spiritual, and this is the course he charts, not a course “between” Islamic values and anything else.

What is clear is that Izetbegovic, like, for instance, the Islamic fundamentalists in Algeria, sets great value on modern technology, and sees no contradiction whatsoever between material progress and Islam. This acceptance of the technological fruits of the enlightenment, accompanied by rejection of the enlightenment’s philosophical content, recalls the “revolt of the masses” forecast by Jose Ortega y Gasset. In that connection, it can be noted that contemporary American Christian fundamentalists are also highly receptive to modern technology while rejecting the philosophical heritage of the enlightenment.





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RELIGION IN KOSOVO: A CHRISTIAN AND A MOSLEM VIEW

(23 Oct 1998)

1. A Christian View

Hieromonk Sava Janjic

As opposed to Bosnia and Herzegovina, where abuse of religion directly or indirectly caused the escalation of inter-ethnic conflicts, the religious communities in Kosovo and Metohija can play a much more constructive role in achieving peace and making possible coexistence, and thus preventing the existing conflict from acquiring religious characteristics.

People of the Eastern Orthodox, Roman Catholic, and Islamic faiths have been living in Kosovo and Metohija for several centuries, sharing the tumultuous historic experiences that took place in this part of the Balkans. These communities have played a very important role in building and preserving the national and cultural identity of the region's ethnic groups. Thus, for instance, the Serbian Orthodox Church created and maintained the spiritual identity of the Serb nation, especially during the hardships of Ottoman rule. Furthermore, in Kosovo and Metohija there are over 1,300 Serb Orthodox churches and monasteries of the greatest importance, along with other cultural and historic monuments of extreme significance not only to the

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Serbs, but also to the other peoples that live here, and to the world as a whole.

Unlike the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Serb-Albanian conflict in Kosovo and Metohija is primarily a clash between two national ideologies, and not a clash of two peoples or religions. Religion played a secondary role in the formation of contemporary national consciousness, especially in the case of the Albanians, among whom are members of all three major denominations. On the other hand, the Eastern Orthodox Christian Church has never incited national intolerance, but primarily limited itself to protecting Serb spiritual tradition and culture. The Albanian and Serb Christians frequently rebelled together against the Ottoman occupiers. Because of this and despite all the antagonism and occasional exceptions, there has been a relatively high degree of religious tolerance in the region.

Until recently, the Albanians, both Muslim and Roman Catholic, frequently visited Orthodox holy places and large gatherings and fairs. In addition, many Serbs and Albanians established strong personal ties and visited each other on religious holidays. Unfortunately, owing to increased ethnic tensions in the past several years, all contacts have been reduced to a minimum. However, despite the present grave conditions, representatives of religious communities can now play a very important part in resolving the Kosovo problem and establishing peace.

Activities of religious communities towards establishing peace and advancing coexistence could develop in the following directions:

1. Despite all their religious differences, religious communities ought to clearly demonstrate readiness to pursue a lasting peace based on truth, justice, and respect of human rights. This goal can be achieved only by developing cooperation, personal contacts, and organizing symposiums and debates in the spirit of tolerance and mutual respect for tradition and customs. Religious communities could make an active and sincere contribution to building trust and furthering coexistence.

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2. Parallel with the official negotiating process, members of religious communities, academicians, scientists, humanitarian activists, crisis-solving experts, could, by way of unofficial meetings, assist the negotiating process by proposing solutions as well as contribute to the implementation of the agreements reached. Religious communities should distance themselves from all forms of ethnic extremism and religious intolerance, which requires refraining from unbalanced statements, unfounded charges and referring to members of other ethnic groups in a derogatory manner, as well as reducing ethnic animosities by promoting peace and respect for one's fellow men.

3. It is essential to establish cooperation in the area of humanitarian work, especially by creating conditions for the return of refugees and other displaced people. The work of humanitarian organizations and their free access to endangered areas should be openly supported and direct cooperation with them established.

4. In no way should religious communities directly or indirectly incite or justify any use of violence against innocent people, and they should condemn every abuse or violation of basic human rights. In doing so, appeals, official announcements of certain events, and active efforts within their respective communities in fighting violence would be of great assistance. It should be particularly stressed that human life is the greatest gift of God, and that human beings and their dignity should be respected as required by both earthly and divine laws.

5. There should be intense activity against discrimination along ethnic or religious lines. This could be achieved by increasing humanitarian activities and making aid available to all in need of it, regardless of nationality or faith, as well as by protecting ethnic groups which are minorities in certain areas or are otherwise endangered.

6. Special, strong appeals should be made against the destruction and desecration of sacred places (mosques, churches and cemeteries) and cultural monuments. To destroy that which has been preserved for centuries is an act of

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ultimate barbarism. On the other hand, such places should under no circumstances be used for military purposes.

7. In the area of humanitarian activities, acts of personal vengeance and retaliation, together with the abduction of people and other forms of illegal detention, should be particularly condemned. Strong appeals should be launched against the unnecessary and deliberate destruction of private property: the torching of houses and crops, and slaughter of livestock, and at the same time all assistance available should be offered for the renewal of areas ravaged by the clashes.

8. Religious communities should appeal to news media to prevent provocative and biased reporting on the activities of religious communities, as such reporting often fans the flames of inter-ethnic hate and intolerance. Educational programs on electronic media should not promote quasi-historic theories denying religious and cultural identity to any ethnic group. Abusing and forging history for the sake of political objectives is an injustice which seriously undermines inter-ethnic and inter-religious relations.

9. Religious communities should demand normal contact with their congregations. All attempts to jeopardize religious freedom should be openly condemned and unobstructed activity of spiritual leaders and institutions secured, as well as free access for believers to their places of worship.

We, the representatives of the Serbian Orthodox Church, are ready and willing to do everything possible to ensure that these principles are respected and implemented in the spirit of peace and tolerance, and thus create conditions for the restoration of trust. For example, the fraternity of the Visoki Decani Monastery has appealed for peace and a cessation of hostilities on a number of occasions. In addition, the Monastery organized humanitarian aid not only for Serb refugees, but for the Albanian population as well. This could help the monastery bridge the gap between the Serbs and Albanians in the Decani region. We are planning a more ambitious humanitarian project with the

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IOCC and other humanitarian organizations, both at home and abroad, to assist a greater number of displaced people on both sides.

With a rational and sober attitude, our Church -- and we hope this applies to all other religious communities -- might become a key factor in finding a peaceful resolution and establishing a modern, democratic society in this region. Though deeply bound to their tradition, religious communities must encourage all citizens of Kosovo and Metohija to seek their common interest in the future and in the integration of this part of the Balkans with Europe and the world. Throughout this period, our bishop, Artemije, on many occasions has pleaded with the government to start negotiations as soon as possible, while representatives of our Church presented our peaceful platform in many places, from Washington, to London, to Paris, having been met everywhere with support for our peaceful and non-violent position. It is our deep conviction that the problem of Kosovo and Metohija should be perceived within the context of the wider problem of democratization and human rights in the Balkans, instead of as a local, territorial problem that should be resolved by force. Therefore it is necessary that all citizens of the province actively contribute to finding a solution, acceptable to all the people who live here. This solution should also be in accordance with international charters and law.

The Holy Scripture teaches us that one cannot love God without first loving one's neighbor, and that we should treat other people in the same way that we would like them to treat us. Guided by these basic Christian principles, the Serbian Orthodox Church sincerely believes that all people of good will in this region will find enough strength and will to emerge from this nightmare of war and intolerance, and seek to give an active contribution to democratization and the improvement of everyday life, taking care to preserve their spiritual tradition and cultural and historic heritage.

Or, in the words of Eleanor Roosevelt: "It is not enough to talk about the peace. One must believe in it. And

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it is not enough to believe in it. One must work at it.”
(*The author is a hieromonk in the Serb Orthodox Monastery of Visoki Decani.*)

2. A Moslem View

Qemal Morina

For some Serb circles the conflict in Kosovo may even be a “Crusade,” but for the Albanians it has an exclusively ethnic and national character.

There is no doubt that religion, as one of the most important components of the spiritual life of every nation, was a key factor in shaping the consciousness of the Albanian nation. Since Albanian territories lie on a strategic crossroads, where the interests of the East and West meet, during history they became the arena in which many battles were waged and the different interests of the East and West clashed. The result of these clashes, and of the political, military, and religious dominance of one or another great power, is the fact that in regard to faith, the Albanians belong to various denominations.

This is why Albanians, wherever they live - be it in Albania proper, or in their ethnic territories in Kosovo, Macedonia, or Montenegro - are mostly Muslims, though there are also Roman Catholic and Eastern Orthodox Christians. However, it has to be stressed that the Albanian nation, though not strong in numbers and though divided by two great religions and a number of religious rites, never

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experienced a single religious clash in its long history. To the contrary: it is renowned for its enormous religious tolerance, and for respect shown towards religious monuments of other religious groups, which have been preserved for generations.

This tolerance and generosity demonstrated by the Albanians was probably initiated by their religious leaders, who properly understood and preached religion as a mission of God which strives for equality of people regardless of nationality, race, or creed. The Koran says: "People! We have created you from a single man and a single woman and made you into nations and tribes to differ one from another. The noblest among you are the most devoted."

There is no doubt that after the Second World War, with the advent of the communist system in Albania and in other places populated by the Albanians, religious feelings began to weaken, primarily among young people. For many, religion was but a formality that could be deduced from names and surnames. However, even this was gradually eliminated because traditional Albanian names were abandoned and instead of them were adopted ideological or international names.

Maybe this introduction was necessary as a response to the question posed by a number of media and which involves the role played by religion in the ongoing Kosovo conflict. But, first of all, we have to say that this conflict has a long history. It started in 1878, when the Ottoman Empire was declining and when the first ethnic cleansing of 600 Muslim villages in the region of Nis, Pirot, Vranje, Leskovac, and other towns was carried out. At the time, Serbia and Montenegro enjoyed the support of Russia, and even of Great Britain and France.

The Albanians realized they were threatened by their neighbors, and consequently formed the Albanian League in Prizren to defend Albanian territories from their neighbors' hegemonistic aspirations. But later, at the London Conference in 1913, and the Versailles Conference in 1918, Albanian territories fell prey to the Great Powers, and the

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greed of their neighbors.

The Albanians were disappointed by this injustice committed against them by the Great Powers, and had never accepted it. Because of that the present conflict between Albanians and Serbs should not be seen as accidental. Certain changes took place in the territory of the former Yugoslavia - several new states have been created along ethnic lines, and it is entirely normal for the Albanians to choose their own path, knowing that they differ from the Serbs in regard to nationality, language, culture, and religion.

Therefore, when analyzing the role and influence played by religion in the ongoing Albanian-Serb conflict, we come up with entirely opposed results. On the one hand we have the Serbs, who always used religion when they needed to mobilize their forces for any holy "Crusade" of cleansing "Serb lands" of Muslims. But, this argument is used also to mobilize the European and Western public for the defense of Christian Europe from Islam, as Serb propaganda puts it, against the "Green Belt" -- Turkey, Macedonia, Albania, Kosovo, Sandzak, and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

There is no doubt that the main force that sets this propaganda in motion in the Serbian Orthodox Church, with all its institutions. Orthodox Churches in general -- the Serb, the Greek, the Romanian, etc. -- as opposed to the Roman Catholic Church, are also national churches, close to the national interests of their respective countries.

Historic data provides the best evidence that the Serbs are engaged in a religious war. Towards the end of the last century, for example, Belgrade had 275 mosques, but they were all destroyed and there is only one left standing in the city, and it is a frequent target of attacks. During their horrible war in Bosnia, the Serbs destroyed about 1,000 mosques, massacred tens of thousands of civilians, and raped thousands of Muslim women.

Almost the same scenario is being repeated in Kosovo. Since the revoking of Kosovo's autonomy, but even since earlier times, Serbia waged a "Crusade" in Kosovo, pretend-

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ing to “defend Europe from Islamic invasion,” because the majority of the Kosovo’s population are Muslims.

This propaganda of the Serbian Orthodox Church is frequently joined by leaders of political parties, even the communists. The former secretary of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia, Milomir Minic, accuses the Albanians “of Islamic fundamentalism because of their high birth rate.”

On the other hand, in 1992, the former head of the Kosovo district said at a meeting with a delegation of Russian parliamentarians: “In Kosovo we are not only defending the Serbs, but primarily Eastern Orthodox Christianity from the Albanian Islamic invasion.”

Recently, the leader of the Serbian Renewal Movement, Vuk Draskovic, said at a press conference that “the foundations of European democratic principles cannot rest on the standards of Sharia - the Muslim religious law - and that Europe cannot be joined by constructing high walls around one’s houses.”

The “fear” of Albanian Islam is the main target of the Serbian establishment and the Orthodox clergy. The loudest of all is the bishop of Raska and Prizren, Artemije, as well as the bishop, Lavrentije, who according to *Nasa Borba*, which, in turn, quoted the *Macvanske Novine* newspaper, said: “Bishop Artemije might have been right in proposing, with great pain, that we should give away a part of Kosovo that we love the least to Albanians. Maybe this part of Kosovo would become a challenge for Serbia’s future, and the future of all of Europe, because it will serve as an obstacle to the Islamic thrust northward. If this is not done, I fear that the Albanians will rather soon get as far as Sumadija, and even reach the gates of Belgrade, because in only two decades they will be the most numerous nation in Serbia. If ethnic Albanians served in the Yugoslav Army, every third recruit would be Albanian, as would every third representative in the Serbian Legislature,” concluded Lavrentije.

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Serb offensive and were completely destroyed, a number of imams were massacred, while Shah Muhedin was killed in his tekhe (dervish school) in Orahovac, together with all the civilians who took refuge there. Because of this, as far as the Serb side is concerned, the conflict in Kosovo has the character of a religious war, as all the signs point in that direction. The Serbian Orthodox Church should be considered the mastermind behind all these acts as long as it does not condemn them.

Unfortunately, the head of the Serbian Orthodox Church, Pavle, blessed such criminals as Karadzic and Mladic, instead of distancing himself from their misdeeds in Bosnia. As far as the other side in the conflict is concerned, that is, the Albanian side, except for one small minority, the conflict is exclusively ethnic and national. Precisely because of that, the entire Albanian establishment is turned towards Europe and the U.S., which hold the keys to the Kosovo problem in their hands.

To show that they are close to the West, in 1991 the Albanians formed the Democratic Christian Albanian Party, whose members are chiefly Muslims. Ibrahim Rugova said once that he was "a symbolic Muslim." During his frequent meetings with Western representatives, he also met on several occasions with Pope John Paul II and keeps his portrait in his office, and has never visited a single Muslim country.

All symbols of the Kosovo Liberation Army have only a national character. And, finally, proof that the conflict in Kosovo for the Albanians has only an ethnic character, is that it is seen by all Albanians as a common resistance and a common struggle, regardless of whether they are Muslims or Christians. The Serb army killed a number of Christian Albanians and their villages and settlements have met the same fate as those of their Muslim brothers.

(The author is a lecturer at the Faculty of Islamic Culture in Pristina)

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Commentary

by Fr. Sava

Having read the text by Mr. Qemajl Morina, the lecturer at the Islamic Faculty in Pristina, I found it necessary to comment some of his positions which will, I am sure, clarify the positions of our Church and our Orthodox people in Kosovo on the role of Religion in this region. With due respect for Mr. Morina and his freedom to think what he feels, I can't help observing that this article is very different in tone from my text. I tried more to speak about the future and what we as religious representatives and people of good will can do now to make things better. I am afraid Mr. Morina got stucked in the controversial historic arguments and unfounded accusations to which I feel necessity to respond. Fr. Sava

*Qemajl Morina**
Fr. Sava***

**For some Serb circles the conflict in Kosovo may even be a "Crusade," but for the Albanians it has an exclusively ethnic and national character .*

***Comm: The very first sentence of Mr. Morina is directly in collision with my crucial argument, that is - Kosovo conflict is not a religious war but a conflict between two extremist nationalist ideas.

**There is no doubt that religion, as one of the most important components of the spiritual life of every nation, was a key factor in shaping the consciousness of the Albanian nation. Since Albanian territories lie on a strategic crossroads, where the interests of the East and West meet, during history they became the arena in which many battles were waged and the different interests of the*

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East and West clashed. The result of these clashes, and of the political, military, and religious dominance of one or another great power, is the fact that in regard to faith, the Albanians belong to various denominations.

***Comm: The expression "Albanian territories" is rather relativistic. "The territories where Albanians live" would be much more objective expression.

*This is why Albanians, wherever they live - be it in Albania proper, or in their ethnic territories in Kosovo, Macedonia, or Montenegro - are mostly Muslims, though there are also Roman Catholic and Eastern Orthodox Christians. However, it has to be stressed that the Albanian nation, though not strong in numbers and though divided by two great religions and a number of religious rites, never experienced a single religious clash in its long history. To the contrary: it is renowned for its enormous religious tolerance, and for respect shown towards religious monuments of other religious groups, which have been preserved for generations.

This tolerance and generosity demonstrated by the Albanians was probably initiated by their religious leaders, who properly understood and preached religion as a mission of God which strives for equality of people regardless of nationality, race, or creed. The Koran says: "People! We have created you from a single man and a single woman and made you into nations and tribes to differ one from another. The noblest among you are the most devoted."

There is no doubt that after the Second World War, with the advent of the communist system in Albania and in other places populated by the Albanians, religious feelings began to weaken, primarily among young people. For many, religion was but a formality that could be deduced from names and surnames. However, even this was gradually eliminated because traditional Albanian names were abandoned and instead of them were adopted ideological or international names.

Maybe this introduction was necessary as a response to the question posed by a number of media and which involves the role played by religion in the ongoing

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Kosovo conflict. But, first of all, we have to say that this conflict has a long history. It started in 1878, when the Ottoman Empire was declining and when the first ethnic cleansing of 600 Muslim villages in the region of Nis, Pirot, Vranje, Leskovac, and other towns was carried out. At the time, Serbia and Montenegro enjoyed the support of Russia, and even of Great Britain and France.

***Comm: I wonder that Mr. Morina is silent about the period before 1878 when many Orthodox Serbs were driven away from Kosovo, many Orthodox churches converted into mosques or simply destroyed. The fact that once dominant Christian population of Kosovo became a minority in the 19th century clearly shows that Mr. Morina argument is not very convincing. When we speak of history I must say that it did not start in 1878. We must also know the historic background of the more recent events. Since the fall of the Serbian Medieval state in Kosovo at the end of the 14th century the number of the Serb Christian population was diminishing on expense of the growing Moslem population.

**The Albanians realized they were threatened by their neighbors, and consequently formed the Albanian League in Prizren to defend Albanian territories from their neighbors' hegemonistic aspirations. But later, at the London Conference in 1913, and the Versailles Conference in 1918, Albanian territories fell prey to the Great Powers, and the greed of their neighbors.*

***Comm: Unfortunately, this view is rather one sided. The local Serbs equally understood the threat from the Albanian League which worked on making of Greater Albania in which the Serbs would be the second rate citizens as they were under the Ottomans. As Kosovo was for the Albanians "an Albanian territory", the Serbs with equal right considered Kosovo their own native territory, which was a heart of the Serbian state and the cradle of its culture and religion in pre Ottoman period. Therefore the wish for freedom cannot be so easily branded as "hegemonistic" and "greedy". I am personally sorry that Mr. Morina fails to understand that Kosovo is neither Serb or Albanian but belongs to all

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peoples living here. Supporting the 19th century ideas at the threshold of the 21st century is really very outdated.

**The Albanians were disappointed by this injustice committed against them by the Great Powers, and had never accepted it. Because of that the present conflict between Albanians and Serbs should not be seen as accidental. Certain changes took place in the territory of the former Yugoslavia - several new states have been created along ethnic lines, and it is entirely normal for the Albanians to choose their own path, knowing that they differ from the Serbs in regard to nationality, language, culture, and religion.*

*****Comm:** It is understandable that the Albanians were dissatisfied with the course of events and could not accept easily the new political realities in the Balkans. But the new states which appeared were not created along ethnic lines. The political borders in the Balkans never completely reflected the ethnic or religious realities. After all the Albanian people was granted an independent state of Albania. The fact that certain number of Albanians was found outside of their mother state was not an isolated case. There were also substantial Serb groups outside of Serbia and Montenegro which also caused dissatisfaction among the Serbs. It is important to know that one of the main reasons why Kosovo became a part of Serbia was that the most important cultural and religious monuments of our people were found exactly in Kosovo and Metohija. Their number far exceeds the number of other religious monuments.

**Therefore, when analyzing the role and influence played by religion in the ongoing Albanian-Serb conflict, we come up with entirely opposed results. On the one hand we have the Serbs, who always used religion when they needed to mobilize their forces for any holy "Crusade" of cleansing "Serb lands" of Muslims. But, this argument is used also to mobilize the European and Western public for the defense of Christian Europe from Islam, as Serb propaganda puts it, against the "Green Belt" -- Turkey, Macedonia, Albania, Kosovo, Sandzak, and Bosnia and*

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Herzegovina.

***Comm: The idea about the Serb Orthodox "Crusade" is completely unfounded and untrue. The Serbian Orthodox Church never incited religious hatred but worked more on preservation of its spiritual heritage. I must admit that I personally regret that Mr. Morina in his essay is going more and more to the past instead of looking to our common future. But nevertheless, I cannot but mention that the idea of ethnic cleansing in these areas was first applied by Moslems who forcefully displaced and converted the Christian population, ruining their churches and converting them into mosques. The ideas of the "Green Belt" threat come mostly from the nationalist and not religious circles. After all, having in mind all what the Christians of the Balkans suffered during the Ottoman rule makes it quite understandable why they felt fear.

**There is no doubt that the main force that sets this propaganda in motion in the Serbian Orthodox Church, with all its institutions. Orthodox Churches in general -- the Serb, the Greek, the Romanian, etc. -- as opposed to the Roman Catholic Church, are also national churches, close to the national interests of their respective countries.*

***Comm: This accusation by Mr. Morina is simply not true. In fact, if one took it for granted and did not know the historic background of this region, he would think that all the history of the Balkans was suffering of the Moslems under the repressive Christian yoke and not the opposite.

The Orthodox Churches are organized on national principle but they are not nationalistic. They have played a very important role in preserving of ethnic, religious and cultural identity of these peoples under the Turkish yoke. Of course, within these Churches there were individuals who preferred their national interests to spiritual ones, but we must have in mind that ethnofyletism (chauvinist nationalism) was condemned by the Orthodox Church as a heresy and any kind of violence and murder is a grave sin.

**Historic data provides the best evidence that the Serbs*

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are engaged in a religious war. Towards the end of the last century, for example, Belgrade had 275 mosques, but they were all destroyed and there is only one left standing in the city, and it is a frequent target of attacks. During their horrible war in Bosnia, the Serbs destroyed about 1,000 mosques, massacred tens of thousands of civilians, and raped thousands of Muslim women.

***Comm: It is true that Belgrade had many mosques but it is also true that before the arrival of the Moslems it had double more churches and chappels which had been ruined or converted into mosques by the new Moslem rulers. Belgrade and central Serbia did not have native Moslem population and with withdrawal of Turkey from these areas the Turks fled with their army. By the way, Prizren, the old capital of the Medieval Serb Kingdom was a flourishing Christian city before the arrival of Ottoman armies. According to existing historical evidence it had more than 300 churches. Now there are only 4. The largest mosque in Prizren was built out of stones from the ruined St. Archangels monastery by Sinan Pasha who was of the Albanian origin, by the way.

Concerning the war in Bosnia with great regret I must admit that nationalist and atheist Serbs destroyed many mosques. But that was not organized by the Church and our Patriarch spoke many times against these barbarous acts. As for the killed and massacred people, with same regret we must admit that all three sides engaged in similar things more or less. But compared to Mr. Morina's very quick attribution of these crimes to the Serbs in general, I would be more cautious and ascribe these crimes to extremists on all three sides and these extremists and criminals are definitely not true representatives of their peoples.

**Almost the same scenario is being repeated in Kosovo. Since the revoking of Kosovo's autonomy, but even since earlier times, Serbia waged a "Crusade" in Kosovo, pretending to "defend Europe from Islamic invasion," because the majority of the Kosovo's population are Muslims.*

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***Comm: Unfortunately the idea of the “Crusade” is a leit-motif of Mr. Morinas text. The Orthodox Church has NEVER in its long history been engaged in any kind of a Crusade. It is very well known that the relationship between the Christian Orthodox and Moslem population in the Middle East was relatively tolerant until the Crusaders from the West came and committed many slaughters there. The brunt of the Moslem revenge was felt especially hard by the native Orthodox population which was found between two warring sides. Therefore the idea of a “Crusade” does not exist in Orthodoxy, which any objective historian may confirm. On the other hand Mr. Morina forgets that many Kosovo Serbs and Christians in general suffered from the consequences of the Moslem “Jihad” (Sacred war). It was not unusual in the Ottoman period that young Christian boys were forcefully taken to Turkey and converted to Islam (Jannissaries). The Moslem beys (noblemen) in the Balkans enjoyed the privilege of “the right of the first night” (ius primae noctis) and could sleep the first night with every new Christian bride.

But, let us leave the dark pages of history behind. What sounds rather unusual for me is the statement that even before the Kosovo autonomy was revoked by Milosevic the Serbs “waged a Crusade in Kosovo”. I say this because after World War 2 the Albanians were granted a very wide autonomy within Yugoslavia and under the Albanian dominated provincial administration it was the Serb Orthodox who felt as a second rate citizens and not the opposite. The best evidence of that was that the number of the Albanian population in that period was increasing while many Serbs had to leave Kosovo under various subtle pressures and threats. Therefore Mr. Morina’s argument is quite unfounded and may be understood only as his private opinion but not as a historical fact.

**This propaganda of the Serbian Orthodox Church is frequently joined by leaders of political parties, even the communists. The former secretary of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia, Milomir*

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Minic, accuses the Albanians “of Islamic fundamentalism because of their high birth rate.”

***Comm: That is the statement by a former communist leader and he has not got to do anything with our Church. The Serbian Orthodox Church was very much persecuted in Kosovo by the communist authorities. Among them were both Serb and Albanian atheist officials. In my article I never mentioned Islamic fundamentalism nor the high birth rate. In fact we very often criticize our own people for the low birth rate and abortions.

**On the other hand, in 1992, the former head of the Kosovo district said at a meeting with a delegation of Russian parliamentarians: “In Kosovo were are not only defending the Serbs, but primarily Eastern Orthodox Christianity from the Albanian Islamic invasion.”*

***Comm: Well, Mr. Morina himself is trying to push forward a very similar theory of an alleged Serb “Crusade”. In my opinion, both theories are untrue and only incite hatred instead of love and tolerance. We must have in mind that many Serbs talking about the “Islamic threat” are not religious themselves. But we cannot evade the historic fact that Prince Lazar together with his Christian Serb and Albanian knights defended a Christian Civilization. After all both Serbs and Albanians in that time were Christians. Whether Mr. Morina liked that or not, it is well known that Islam came to the Balkans with the Turkish invasion and force and not through a peaceful and free conversion or missionary work. That can be read in any historic book and encyclopaedia.

**Recently, the leader of the Serbian Renewal Movement, Vuk Draskovic, said at a press conference that “the foundations of European democratic principles cannot rest on the standards of Sharia - the Muslim religious law - and that Europe cannot be joined by constructing high walls around one’s houses.”*

***Comm: Despite my personal disagreement with Mr. Draskovic in many points I cannot but agree that a modern society must be based on secular laws. Our Church Canon

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law is restricted only to our Church affairs. There are many Moslem countries where the modern laws are observed. Turkey for example is a modern secular state although the majority of the population are Moslems. I only believe that Mr. Morina did not want to say that he would like a state like Iran or Sudan in the middle of Europe. The today's Europe is ready to accept all peoples of different ethnicity and religion but not the customs according to which certain sins are punished by a public lynching. With all respect for the freedom of Moslems to profess their religion we, as Europeans, must strive towards modern civilizational values and not towards the decadent laws of the past. In the Middle Ages some European states had also the laws which were very brutal but that time has passed and we must think now in a different way. I am sure that Islam has much other important things to offer to the modern world beside the Sharia law.

**The "fear" of Albanian Islam is the main target of the Serbian establishment and the Orthodox clergy. The loudest of all is the bishop of Raska and Prizren, Artemije, as well as the bishop, Lavrentije, who according to Nasa Borba, which, in turn, quoted the Macvanske Novine newspaper, said: "Bishop Artemije might have been right in proposing, with great pain, that we should give away a part of Kosovo that we love the least to Albanians. Maybe this part of Kosovo would become a challenge for Serbia's future, and the future of all of Europe, because it will serve as an obstacle to the Islamic thrust northward. If this is not done, I fear that the Albanians will rather soon get as far as Sumadija, and even reach the gates of Belgrade, because in only two decades they will be the most numerous nation in Serbia. If ethnic Albanians served in the Yugoslav Army, every third recruit would be Albanian, as would every third representative in the Serbian Legislature," concluded Lavrentije.*

***Comm: During eight years of being an Orthodox Christian Bishop in Kosovo, Bishop Artemije never said anything against the Islam. I wish Mr. Morina could produce a single

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original and authentic statement of that kind. Therefore, the uncontrolled and rather vile accusations against this man of peace are very humiliating. The statement by Bishop Lavrentije is first of all a second-hand statement and not an authentic statement by Bishop Artemije. If Bishop Artemije really thought in that way it is impossible that in all these years only this statement from a provincial newspaper could be produced as a proof. Mr. Morina himself has already several times accused our Church of waging a Crusade which is equally or even more “heavy” statement than that by Bishop Lavrentije. I would be pleased to see any other proof of Bishop Artemije’s alleged anti-Islamic positions. But to disappointment of those who are trying to accuse this man of what he is not guilty there are no other statements because he simply does not think that way.

**While over 40 mosques were the target of the latest Serb offensive and were completely destroyed, a number of imams were massacred, while Shah Muhedin was killed in his tekhe (dervish school) in Orahovac, together with all the civilians who took refuge there. Because of this, as far as the Serb side is concerned, the conflict in Kosovo has the character of a religious war, as all the signs point in that direction. The Serbian Orthodox Church should be considered the mastermind behind all these acts as long as it does not condemn them.*

***Comm: Our Church sincerely regrets for the damage made on certain number of Islamic religious monuments in Kosovo. Many times so far we have condemned such acts and our Church has officialy expressed its condolences to the Islamic community on occasion of the tragic death of Shat Muhedin from Orahovac. But I must add that compared to Bosnia where the religious facilities were systematically razed to the ground the damage on the religious facilities in Kosovo appeared only in the areas where there was fighting. As far as we know neither of the mosques has been mined or completely pulled down in the “Bosnian” style. Of course, saying this I do not want at all to find any justification for this but I dare say that the damage on the mosques IS NOT

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a result of a “Religious war” against the Islam but a consequence of tragic events and fighting between the government forces and the KLA.

The statement that our Church “should be considered as the mastermind behind all these acts” is simply outrageous and extremely unjust. So far our Church and our Bishop have condemned violence so many times, on both sides while on the other hand no one from the Islamic Community ever gave any statement of that kind. Quite on the contrary, the Bishop and our Church were many times accused by the Islamic community completely unjustly and the extremism was supported. Despite our attempts to open a dialogue with the Islamic community our faxes have never been answered. I am afraid that all this shows that FOR MR MORINA THIS REALLY IS A RELIGIOUS WAR. But for us it will never be. The efforts of our Church in direction of development of multiethnic, modern, democratic society based on tolerance and rule of law have been recognized from Washington, to London and Paris. The peace missions of Bishop Artemije are very well known to all people of good will. We can only regret that Mr. Morina remains closed in his “time capsule” of intolerance.

**Unfortunately, the head of the Serbian Orthodox Church, Pavle, blessed such criminals as Karadzic and Mladic, instead of distancing himself from their misdeeds in Bosnia. As far as the other side in the conflict is concerned, that is, the Albanian side, except for one small minority, the conflict is exclusively ethnic and national. Precisely because of that, the entire Albanian establishment is turned towards Europe and the U.S., which hold the keys to the Kosovo problem in their hands.*

***Comm: Whoever knows personally Patriarch Pavle he could easily see that he is a man of peace, tolerance and love. During the previous war in Bosnia, he spoke many times against the violence and worked for the peace. Of course, due to the complexity of the situation in Bosnia he could not just leave the Serb people there and ignore them, especially when they were suffering. As far as I have heard,

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whenever he met Karadzic and Mladic, which he could not evade in his official visits and audiences, he appealed that everything was resolved in peace and Christian love. There is not a single statement by Patriarch Pavle in which he “blessed” the Bosnian atrocities and crimes and there are many statements in which he distanced himself from violence and war. I can only say that I am sorry that Mr. Morina is ignorant of this fact.

The opinion that for the Albanians, “except for a small minority”, the conflict in Kosovo is ethnic and national is quite in disagreement with the previous attitudes by Mr. Morina in which he insisted so much that the conflict was a religious war. The only conclusion might be that he belongs to that minority of which he was speaking about

**To show that they are close to the West, in 1991 the Albanians formed the Democratic Christian Albanian Party, whose members are chiefly Muslims. Ibrahim Rugova said once that he was “a symbolic Muslim.” During his frequent meetings with Western representatives, he also met on several occasions with Pope John Paul II and keeps his portrait in his office, and has never visited a single Muslim country. All symbols of the Kosovo Liberation Army have only a national character. And, finally, proof that the conflict in Kosovo for the Albanians has only an ethnic character, is that it is seen by all Albanians as a common resistance and a common struggle, regardless of whether they are Muslims or Christians. The Serb army killed a number of Christian Albanians and their villages and settlements have met the same fate as those of their Muslim brothers. The author is a lecturer at the Faculty of Islamic Culture in Pristina)*


****Comm: Well, all I can add at the end is that for the Serbs this war is not a religious war or a “Crusade”. That is why our Church is calling all people of good will to cooperate on restoration of the lasting peace and tolerance in Kosovo. The perpetrators of crimes on both sides must be identified for the sake of future peaceful life and every kind of generalization and hate speech should be evaded.*

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I can only pray to God that Mr. Morina changes his rather tough positions and cooperates together with his community with us in our common peace efforts. That is the only way for us all to find the road to the 21st century and the modern Europe to which both of our peoples strive. If we really want to live in Europe we must accept the European standards of democracy, tolerance and respect of freedom. From our painful and controversial past we must preserve and remember only that which will help us to live together in the present time and future.


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TO USE A WAR

Diana Johnstone

Richard Holbrooke: *TO END A WAR*

RandomHouse, New York, 1998; 408 pages, \$27.95.

Throughout three years of war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the United States showed less interest in ending the war than in denouncing any possible European-brokered compromise settlement [FN#1] as “appeasing aggression” or betraying “multicultural” Sarajevo. Then in mid-1995, the Clinton Administration was faced with having to keep a promise to help its NATO allies withdraw their troops from the United Nations Protection Force stationed in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This would have meant engaging U.S. forces there, a move strongly opposed in both Congress and the Pentagon. In danger of being caught between a hostile Congress and disgruntled European allies, with the risk of discrediting the U.S. commitment to NATO, the Clinton administration dispatched Holbrooke to make the very sort of compromise deal that the U.S. had previously scorned.

Ostensibly, Richard Holbrooke’s assignment in 1995 was “to end a war”. It was also, and especially, to *use* a war to further U.S. policy aims in Europe. Before ending it (for how long?), the United States *used* the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina to reassert its supremacy in Europe and further the conversion of NATO into a global instrument of power projection.

Three years later, the United States has been using the Kosovo conflict in Serbia to confirm and expand the NATO role [FN#2]. Far from achieving lasting peace and reconciliation, this instrumentalization of conflicts has actually made them more intractable than ever. Especially in Kosovo,

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outside interference is a main cause of the killing that took place in recent months. More war is virtually certain.

Understandably, Holbrooke has not written a book to explain the real nature and aims of U.S. policy, but to justify his own role in an enterprise that may become more controversial as events direct public attention to what was wrong with the peace agreement that Holbrooke imposed on the rival Yugoslav leaders in Dayton, Ohio, on November 21, 1995. Sharing responsibility for what he knows was a perilously flawed diplomatic result, and incidentally countering frequent charges of being an uncooperative egotist, Holbrooke stresses the excellent teamwork he achieved as head of the U.S. mission. Otherwise, he makes a special point of his vigorous role in getting NATO to bomb and re-bomb the Bosnian Serbs prior to negotiations.

Zeal for bombing would be a novel boast in a peace-maker. Holbrooke, however, does not belong to the category of peace-makers, but of war-enders, the big birds of prey who come in to sort out and pick the bones on the battlefield.

“Let’s Win This One for the Gipper”

Although he scarcely puts it this way, Holbrooke’s double mission was to strengthen U.S. leadership of NATO and at the same time appease the Bosnia [FN#3] lobby in the U.S., which included not only Senators such as Bob Dole and Joe Biden, but also important members of the Clinton administration such as Al Gore and Madeleine Albright. This required a great show of “getting tough with the Serbs”.

Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic had long been anxious to settle the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina at almost any price, in order to get international sanctions lifted [FN#4]. For months, the Clinton administration had been rejecting a peace settlement that was within reach of Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Robert Frasure, who had been holding talks with Milosevic. Now, however, Holbrooke was sent in to end the war on the basis of the talks already held between

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Frasure and Milosevic.

On August 19, the U.S. negotiating team including Holbrooke and Frasure were being driven into Sarajevo from a helicopter base on Mount Igman when a piece of the road broke off under the weight of one of the two armored vehicles carrying the Americans. The vehicle plummeted down the steep mountainside and burst into flames. Frasure and two other high-ranking Americans were killed.

This shocking accident, rather than the fate of Bosnia, provides Holbrooke with his opening chapter and the “tragic leitmotif” that runs through his book. The loss of these American colleagues emerges as *the* overriding Bosnian tragedy. As sacrificed martyr, Frasure no doubt considerably helped Holbrooke “sell” his deal to the divided Clinton administration. It was necessary to “win this one for the Gipper”.

“Bombing the Serbs to the Negotiating Table”

Frasure had recommended negotiating the fate of Bosnia-Herzegovina not with the Bosnian Serbs themselves, who were directly involved, but with Milosevic. Frasure knew that Milosevic was fed up with the Bosnian Serb leaders and was ready to do almost anything to overcome Serbia’s international isolation. The way to sideline Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic was provided by the International Criminal Tribunal (ICT) set up by the U.N. Security Council in The Hague to judge “war crimes in the former Yugoslavia”. The ICT made a great point of placing Karadzic at the top of its “wanted” list, although the case against him was no stronger than cases that could be -- but never are -- made against Croatian President Franjo Tudjman or President Alija Izetbegovic of Bosnia-Herzegovina himself. Holbrooke declared that he would not negotiate with “indicted war criminals”, thus making sure that the Bosnian Serbs had to delegate authority to the President of Serbia. With the help of the Serbian Orthodox Church, Milosevic

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gave Holbrooke his trump card: an agreement by the Bosnian Serb leaders to allow the Serbian President to negotiate on their behalf.

Still, before undertaking peace talks with the three Presidents, Milosevic, Izetbegovic and Tudjman (who had no trouble representing the Bosnian Croats, since it was his own Croatian army that had been fighting in Bosnia-Herzegovina on their behalf [FN#5]), Holbrooke was eager for NATO to bomb.

NATO was all prepared. However, it “took an outrageous Bosnian Serb action to trigger Operation Deliberate Force”, recalls Holbrooke.

This happened right on time. On August 28, Holbrooke arrived in Paris to work out a negotiating position with Izetbegovic and his foreign minister Muhamed Sacirbey. That day, CNN reported a particularly gruesome bomb massacre in downtown Sarajevo, with scores of civilian victims. The timing was perfect. Later that day, at his second meeting with Holbrooke, Izetbegovic had “changed into a sort of paramilitary outfit, complete with loose khakis, a scarf, and a beret bearing a Bosnian insignia.” Thus “dressed like an aging Left Bank revolutionary”, Izetbegovic “demanded that NATO launch strikes against the Bosnian Serbs immediately. Sacirbey went further, saying his President would not see us again until NATO began bombing...” (p.96). Izetbegovic was exclusively “focused on the necessity for immediate NATO bombing, and wary of negotiations”...

“From Pale the Bosnian Serbs accused the Bosnian Muslims of staging the incident to draw NATO into the war”, Holbrooke recalls. Within NATO, experts disagreed, and U.N. Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali called for an investigation. “None of this mattered much”, according to Holbrooke. “What counted was whether the United States would act decisively and persuade its NATO allies to join in the sort of massive air campaign that we had so often talked about but never even come close to undertaking.” (pp.91-92) The opportunity was too good to miss. American experts

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instantly attributed the massacre to the Serbs.

Holbrooke fails to mention that British ammunition experts serving with the U.N. in Sarajevo said they found no evidence that Bosnian Serbs had fired the lethal mortar round and suspected the Bosnian government army might have been responsible. [FN#6] Whoever was responsible, everything was ready for bombing the Serbs.

The following evening was chronicled by the fashionable Paris writer Bernard-Henri Lévy, who arrived with Sacirbey at the American Ambassador's residence for a dinner hosted by "the lovely Pamela Harriman". Holbrooke kept leaving the party for the telephone, which struck BHL as rude, until he saw Izetbegovic in his strange costume sitting in an adjoining room, and realized that the American negotiator was working out final details of the major air strikes that began at 2 a.m. the next morning. Bombing the Serbs was the social event of the season.

The "Operation Deliberate Force" air strikes on Bosnian Serb targets gave rise to a useful and oft-repeated falsehood: that NATO air strikes were necessary to "bomb the Serbs to the negotiating table".

In reality, the Serbs were eager to negotiate and to make peace. Izetbegovic, on the contrary, wanted to continue the war. Even when the Serbs lifted the siege of Sarajevo, Izetbegovic was not satisfied. "He would prefer to let the people of Sarajevo live under Serb guns for a while longer if it also meant that the NATO bombing would continue," Holbrooke observed. Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic "showed even greater fury" in demanding more bombing.

In short, it was never a matter of "bombing the Serbs to the negotiating table". Rather, NATO had to bomb the *Serbs* in order to get the *Muslims* to the negotiating table.

"Bombs For Peace"

The air raids ended on September 1, and Holbrooke began to

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look for a new pretext to get them started again. In the absence of a massacre, some Serbian hyperbole had to do. In an angry letter to the French U.N. forces commander in Bosnia, Bosnian Serb commander General Ratko Mladic called NATO bombing "more brutal" than Nazi bombing of Belgrade, because NATO had targeted churches and cemeteries during funerals of victims. "When we saw Mladic's letter, we assumed it resolved any question about resuming the bombing," writes Holbrooke. "What answer other than a resumption of the bombing was appropriate under the circumstances?" [FN#7].

Holbrooke rushed to the Turkish capital, Ankara, where Izetbegovic had many friends in high places, to persuade Izetbegovic to accept the U.S. draft for negotiations about to begin in Geneva. As usual, Izetbegovic balked. "The Bosnians are barely on board", Holbrooke warned, in an urgent call to the White House from Ankara, "[...] and when we see Izetbegovic again in the morning for a last review of the draft, the bombing must have resumed." He concluded dramatically: "Give us bombs for peace." (P.132)

Thus a second and more deadly wave of NATO "bombing for peace" began on September 5. Tomahawk cruise missiles and F-117s came into play. Once the decision to bomb was taken, "the Navy and the Air Force both wanted to publicize, especially to Congress, the value of their new weaponry. For the Navy, this meant the Tomahawks, which were launched from naval vessels in the Adriatic. For the Air Force, it meant the expensive and controversial F-117, whose value had been questioned by some Pentagon critics." (p.145)

This bombing campaign was stopped only when Pentagon officers informed the State Department that NATO was running out of authorized targets. Meanwhile, the bombing had knocked out Serb communications and enabled forces of the U.S.-contrived "Bosnian-Croatian Federation" -- an extremely uneasy alliance between Tudjman's Croatian Army and Izetbegovic's forces -- to conquer large swathes of

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territory in Western Bosnia inhabited almost exclusively by Serbs. According to Holbrooke, this generated “at least one hundred thousand Serb refugees” (p.154), in addition to about double that many who only a few weeks early had been driven out of their homes in the Croatian Krajina region by Tudjman’s army, with German arms and U.S. approval. All this time, Holbrooke was urging Tudjman to take more Serb towns in Western Bosnia, but to stop short of capturing Banja Luka. (p.160)

Holbrooke explains this restraint by the fact that capturing Banja Luka would generate over two hundred thousand additional refugees, and he “did not think the United States should encourage an action that would create so many more refugees.” (p.160) Holbrooke was aware that “we could be accused of applying a double standard.”

“Using a provocative phrase normally applied only to the Serbs, I told Tudjman that current Croatian behavior might be viewed as a milder form of ethnic cleansing.” Aside from this rare burst of humanitarian concern, ending the Federation offensive was necessary because the Serbs were recovering from the bombing and mending their defenses, and even more because the Croat and Muslim forces in the region were starting to turn on each other. At the top, this was reflected in Tudjman’s “deep hatred of the Muslims” and the “intense personal animosity” between Tudjman and Izetbegovic that came out when they were brought together.

Good Guys and Bad Guys

The basic reason for the NATO bombing goes to the heart of U.S. foreign policy.

As Holbrooke tells it, the roots of Bosnia policy go back to Clinton’s first election campaign in 1992, when his advisers were aware that his weak point in relation to Bush was foreign policy. They concluded that Bosnia would make an excellent election campaign issue (p.41), one on which the Democratic candidate could attack Bush and appear more

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forward-looking. Thus on August 14, 1992, Clinton gave a speech promising to “make the United States the catalyst for a collective stand against aggression.” This was the traditional “world leadership” stand of the United States, now shifting into a “collective” stand of the “international community”.

In order to take such a stand against aggression, there is need for “aggression” to fit traditional “world leadership” rhetoric. Only in the face of “aggression”, preferably by an “evil” adversary who “refuses to negotiate”, can it become clear why it takes the United States to be the “catalyst”: its overwhelming military power. It is essential to illustrate that diplomacy can succeed only in conjunction with the overwhelming military force represented by U.S. air power. Otherwise, one might as well turn the whole problem over to a bunch of Scandinavians....

For bombing to be used, however, “outrage” is necessary (“It took an outrageous Bosnian Serb action to trigger Operation Deliberate Force”) against a single “bad guy”, the villain, the aggressor. And once there is a single “bad guy”, his adversaries are automatically promoted into “good guys”... who proceed to exploit their position shamelessly.

So it was that as Milosevic was transformed into Satan, Tudjman and Izetbegovic were increasingly able to blackmail the United States to get what they wanted. This pattern is repeating itself today, with potentially even more disastrous consequences, with the Albanians in Kosovo.

Whatever the difficulties in taming Izetbegovic or Tudjman, the United States succeeded in the more important task of putting the European Allies in their place. At the end of his adventure, Holbrooke could find satisfaction in the fact that NATO had for the first time acted “out of area”, and that even the French had acknowledged that “America is back”.

When the irritable Bosnian Muslims finally came to Dayton, they constantly obstructed the negotiations and each other. After a fortnight in Dayton, Holbrooke reported to Christopher that the most disturbing difficulty he faced was

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the “immense difficulty of engaging the Bosnian government in a serious negotiation”. Bitter personal rivalry opposed Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic and Muhamed Sacirbey, while the dour Izetbegovic never showed any interest whatsoever in making peace.

“Any form of compromise, even minor gestures of reconciliation to those Serbs who had not wanted war and were ready to re-establish some form of multiethnic community, was not easy for Izetbegovic. His eyes had a cold and distant gaze; after so much suffering, they seemed dead to anyone else’s pain. [...] although he paid lip service to the principles of a multiethnic state, he was not the democrat that some supporters in the West saw”, recounts Holbrooke (p.97).

Although Silajdzic, on the other hand, spoke with passion about the need to re-create a multiethnic country, “he referred to the Croats with such animosity that I did not see how he could ever cooperate with them.”(p.97) Silajdzic and Sacirbey both occasionally flew into rages against Holbrooke and shouted that the Muslims would never give in to U.S. threats or blackmail.

Holbrooke, on the other hand, more than once gave into Muslim blackmail, notably by agreeing to “equip and train” Muslim forces after the peace accords.

As the Dayton talks were at the eleventh hour, Holbrooke was deeply concerned “that even if Milosevic makes more concessions, the Bosnians will simply raise the ante.” Western officials were wondering: Does Izetbegovic even want a deal? And Holbrooke wasn’t sure: “Sometimes he seems to want revenge more than peace...” And Holbrooke’s colleague Chris Hill complained that: “These people are impossible to help.”

Clearly, Dayton would never have produced any agreement at all without the unflagging help of the one participant who really seemed anxious for peace: Slobodan Milosevic.

From start to finish, Milosevic is described as cheerful, alert, quick to understand, and above all, ready to make concession after concession. He spoke excellent English and loved the United States, even Dayton and Packy’s Sports

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Bar. He looked back nostalgically on his trips to New York when he was a banker in Tito's Yugoslavia, he sang along with a trio of American black women sergeants singing "Boogie Woogie Bugle Boy" (while Izetbegovic sat sullenly), he was the life of the party. "Watching Milosevic turn on the charm, Warren Christopher observed that had fate dealt him a different birthplace and education, he would have been a successful politician in a democratic system." In fact, Milosevic *was* a successful politician (although a disastrous statesman) in a "transitional" system that was at least as democratic as those run by Tudjman or Izetbegovic, and probably more so.

Dayton is a chronicle of concessions made by Milosevic. Indeed, many of the concessions were *invented* by Milosevic to get the talks out of an impasse. At the very end, it was, typically, Milosevic who saved Dayton from total failure, when once again, Izetbegovic had rejected what everyone else thought was an agreement.

Volunteering to "walk the final mile for peace", Milosevic offered to agree to arbitration for Brcko one year from now. This was a huge and perhaps fatal concession. When he heard that Izetbegovic had finally, if reluctantly, accepted his offer, Milosevic had tears in his eyes.

Unrequited Love

Milosevic again and again saved the negotiations by giving up something. He got next to nothing in return. On December 14, 1995, President Clinton joined the three Balkan Presidents in Paris for the ceremonial signing of the agreement reached in Dayton.

"Finally came the President's first discussion with Milosevic. The White House had taken care to ensure that there would be no photographs of the encounter. Still, this was a meeting Milosevic had long wanted; it put him on a plane with other world leaders after years of isolation. `I

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know this agreement would not have been possible without you,' President Clinton said, cool and slightly distant. 'You made Dayton possible. Now you must help make it work.' "Milosevic said that the key to peace lay in strict implementation of the Dayton agreements. Then he requested full normalization of U.S.-Yugoslav (i.e., Serbian) relations. We swiftly ended the discussion." (p.322)

The sanctions were "suspended", but not lifted, as Milosevic had hoped. And what the United States calls the "outer wall" of sanctions -- the exclusion of Serbia/Yugoslavia from international institutions such as the United Nations and its agencies, the Organization for Cooperation and Security in Europe (OSCE), the World Bank, etc. -- remain in place. Thus Belgrade's diplomatic isolation, its inability to speak for itself in international forums, has been maintained [FN#8].

The Holbrooke-Milosevic encounter created a mutual dependency. Each man has needed the other to produce "results", even though the results produced may eventually turn out to be disappointing, even disastrous.

The Dayton Accords do not lay the groundwork of a lasting peace, and contain the seeds of renewed war. To bribe Izetbegovic, the United States agreed to arm and train the Bosnian Muslims. As Holbrooke himself acknowledged in his book, this was "the most controversial" of all programs. The U.S. military "hated the idea", so did the Europeans, and finally, it made no sense to sign a peace agreement for a single Bosnia-Herzegovina, and then arm one faction of it. In an ideal world, admits Holbrooke, all the armies should have been sharply reduced and merged into a single force. But NATO refused to accept the job of implementing a disarmament program. This "Equip and Train" program, largely farmed out to Turkey, was supported by "a powerful group of Senators led by Republican Majority Leader Bob Dole and two senior Democrats, Joe Lieberman of Connecticut and Joe Biden of Delaware". It was defended in Congressional hearings by none other than the Reagan administration's "Prince of Darkness", former Assistant

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Secretary of Defense Richard Perle, a notorious arms buildup enthusiast, who represented the Muslim side in military negotiations at Dayton.

The other major failure at Dayton was the absence of any agreement on the status of the town of Brcko, which connects the two parts of Serbian Bosnia, "Republika Srpska". Together, these two factors mean that only prolonged outside military occupation can prevent the rearmed Muslim forces from renewing the war against the Serbs.

Meanwhile, supposedly "multicultural" Sarajevo has been transformed by Izetbegovic's ruling party, the Democratic Action Party (SDA), into an increasingly exclusive Muslim city. The Croats retain tight and exclusive control of their territory. The Serbs have always been more divided among themselves, but ostentatious "international community" support for the "moderates" led by Biljana Plavsic, including NATO action (recommended by Holbrooke) to shut down Bosnian Serb "nationalist" television, led to Plavsic's defeat in elections last December. This political defeat was such a blow to the "international community" officials actually running Bosnia-Herzegovina that it took them several days to pull themselves together and announce the results. Whatever else one can say for them, the September 1998 elections showed that neither television nor money from the "international community" determined the way Bosnian Serbs vote.

Resentment of "international community" control, as instituted by the Dayton accords, is by now the one thing that Muslims, Serbs and Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina can agree on.

But Holbrooke himself and the whole "international community" chorus of officials and media keep repeating their standard excuse for any and all failures of Dayton: it is all because "Serbian war criminals" have not been arrested. This pursues the Manichean myth of moralistic power politics: the world would be a fine place, with everybody going about their business, if it weren't disrupted from time to

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time by “bad guys”. The solution to all world political problems is thus a court to punish the “criminals”.

The same pattern is reproducing itself over Kosovo. Milosevic still has only one ambition: to end his country’s isolation. He is still looking to the United States and his “friend” Holbrooke to get him out of the Kosovo trap. And Holbrooke needs the pliable Milosevic to give him another “success”.

Prior to Dayton, Holbrooke obtained what he called “something of a diplomatic innovation -- a document drafted by us but signed only by the Serbs as a unilateral undertaking [FN#9]. None of us was aware of diplomatic precedent for this, but it fit our needs perfectly.”

This was the same formula used recently by Holbrooke for Kosovo, by which Milosevic unilaterally agreed to remove Yugoslav security forces from a section of their own country, and to let international “verifiers” wander around the country to make sure they had really left. This in return for nothing. As a result, the armed ethnic Albanian rebels are more convinced than ever that they have the support of the United States and NATO, and are readying their spring offensive.

Milosevic, who set out to bring unity and prosperity to Yugoslavia, is a dramatic failure as a leader. Unlike the media propaganda, he is neither a dictator nor a racist nor a bloodthirsty tyrant. He is a vain, clever, manipulative political leader who drastically misjudged the situation of Yugoslavia in the post-communist transition period, and who keeps masking his failures with unreal optimism. Although recent events have inevitably given them second thoughts, most Serbs want to think of America as their friend. They retain memories of alliance in two World Wars, their educated children emigrate *en masse* to Canada and the United States. Milosevic has kept hoping to be accepted by America. This feeling was, by all accounts, enforced by conviction that European leaders could not be relied upon as partners, and that only the United States has the power to make a deal stick.

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All this has made Milosevic an indispensably weak and accommodating partner for Holbrooke.

In Serbia, very many people are convinced that Milosevic is kept in power solely by the Americans, who need him to give away Yugoslavia bit by bit. There is even a widespread belief that Milosevic wants NATO to force him to give up Kosovo, since he doesn't know what else to do with it, and that military offensives against ethnic Albanian separatists are only part of the scenario of turning the territory over to NATO.

Many Serbs believe that after Kosovo, the "international community" will step up its encouragement of separatism in Montenegro, the Vojvodina and the Novi Pazar region (called "the Sanjak"), using Milosevic simultaneously as pretext and broker for ongoing disintegration, until there is nothing left of Serbia but the Sumadija forest region where "Black George" led his peasant revolt against Ottoman oppression nearly two hundred years ago [FN#10]. And when they've used him to establish a NATO protectorate in the Balkans, it is predicted, the Americans will throw Milosevic away like a squeezed out lemon peel. Instead of retirement in New York, or even Dayton, Milosevic may be sent to The Hague for a show trial.

Ignorance, Images and Analogy Construction

"Washington is well known as a city where social events can have policy consequences", observes Holbrooke. Supporting "Bosnia", meaning the Muslims, early became both politically correct and socially acceptable in Washington.

Holbrooke describes how he first joined the cause. "In the spring of 1992, I saw the Bosnian Ambassador to the United Nations, Muhamed Sacirbey, on television calling on the world to save his nation. Impressed with his passion and eloquence, I phoned him, introducing myself as an admirer of his cause, and offered my support. Sacirbey thus

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became my first Bosnian friend.” The fact that this “first Bosnian friend” was an American no doubt made the matter easier. Sacirbey came from a “distinguished” family and had played first-string football at Tulane University. “Mo” Sacirbey “was tough, strong, and fit.” Good material for the fraternity.

The “bey” is the name Sacirbey, like the “beg” in Izetbegovic, is a trace of the Ottoman “beys”, the aristocracy that monopolized property and power under Turkish rule. Their Democratic Action Party (SDA) represents descendents of the ruling class that was overthrown by egalitarian peasant revolts in the 19th century. To many Bosnian Serbs (who, until only twenty years ago, were the majority in Bosnia-Herzegovina), creation of a Muslim-led Bosnia inevitably looked like an attempt to restore the *ancien régime*, dominated by those professing the Muslim faith. SDA leaders maintain close ties with Turkey. Through NATO, Turkey is being brought back into Balkan lands it ruled for 500 years.

Such historical background was of no concern to Holbrooke. Like so many others, he excuses his ignorance of history by dismissing it as inconsequential. The perfect rationalization for this ignorance was provided by the writings of Noel Malcolm, whose books on Bosnia and Kosovo have come along just in time to provide rationalization for anti-Serb positions [FN#11]. “Malcolm undermined the conventional wisdom that the war was the inevitable result of ancient hatreds”, notes Holbrooke gratefully. Thus Holbrooke, “executive summary” style, replaces one reductionism with another: if the war wasn’t “inevitable” on account of “ancient hatreds”, it must be all the fault of the Serbs.

With history out of the way, the conflict was judged by images and analogies. Holbrooke’s account confirms the crucial importance in forming U.S. policy of the famous “barbed wire” photo exposed by German journalist Thomas Deichmann as deceptive [FN#12]. In August 1992, Holbrooke went on a fact-finding mission to Sarajevo to find out about “the death camps that have gotten so much

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publicity”. Like other Western “fact finders” of the period, Holbrooke was apparently totally unaware of the equally dreadful prison camps run by Muslims in and around Sarajevo itself [FN#13]. Holbrooke noted in his diary that “television pictures rouse the world” and are “the reason we are here” (p.36). As a UN official observed, “a few pictures of people being held behind barbed wire and the world goes crazy.”

The term “death camps” is part of the analogy construction which served to identify Serbs with Nazis. As Holbrooke puts it, “[...] in the summer of 1992, the world began to see shocking film of emaciated prisoners in northern Bosnia, looking at the unblinking camera through barbed-wire fences, scenes straight out of World War II -- yet happening now.”

The Nazi analogy dispenses the outsider from even attempting to understand the causes of a conflict and the viewpoints of the various parties, and to search for solutions on that basis. The problem is reduced to the existence of “evil” which needs to be eradicated. Holbrooke readily concludes that “the search for explanations failed. One simply had to recognize that there was pure evil in the world.”

But where was this “pure evil”? Not, apparently, on the Muslim side, even after U.N. troops in Bosnia unearthed a stash of terrorist weapons, including anti-personnel explosive devices disguised as toys, in the possession of Islamic Mujahidin under command of Izetbegovic’s SDA [FN#14]. At one point Holbrooke’s Hungarian-born wife Kati Marton worried that her husband might be killed by the “ Hamas wing of the Serbs”. This is pure fantasy, all the more surprising coming from a woman who has published books on political matters. There had never been anything like a “ Hamas wing of the Serbs”.

On the other hand, the fact that Izetbegovic’s Bosnia actually had become a Mecca for Islamist mujahidin from all over the Middle East, many of them veterans of Afghanistan, linked to terrorist networks in several countries and vio-

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lently anti-Western, only provided another motive for the United States to support Izetbegovic, supposedly to weaken his dependence on Iran. The presence of Mujahidin among ethnic Albanian separatists in Kosovo is producing the same reaction.

In Paris for the December 14 ceremonial signing of the accords, President Clinton complained to Izetbegovic about the mujahideen who were lingering on in Bosnia, in violation of their agreement. Holbrooke recalls: "Izetbegovic told the President that the bulk of such personnel 'had already left,' a statement we knew not to be true."

But Izetbegovic can lie; he is a "good guy", the leader of the victims.

Things They Said

In an age in which "image" is reasserting its supremacy over ideas, all the focus has been on the media image of the protagonists. Their ideas are ignored or distorted. Flagrant double standards have been employed in interpreting statements by Serb or Muslim leaders.

"I would sacrifice peace for a sovereign Bosnia-Herzegovina, but for that peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina I would not sacrifice sovereignty" Silber & Little, p.211], Izetbegovic declared on February 27, 1991 [FN#15]. At that time, there was peace but no "sovereign Bosnia Herzegovina". It was only a year later that, over protests of its Serb population, Bosnia-Herzegovina held a referendum in which a majority of voters casting ballots (but only 39% of the electorate) chose to leave Yugoslavia for a "sovereign" Bosnia-Herzegovina ... and civil war, which began at exactly the same time.

The prospect of war never deterred Izetbegovic. Once the war began, he wanted to keep it going, and even after Dayton, he continued to arm in order to be able to resume it.

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Holbrooke describes the moment at Dayton when he finally lost patience with Izetbegovic. "If you want to let the fighting go on, that is your right," Holbrooke told him, "but Washington does not want you to expect the United States to be your air force. If you continue the war, you will be shooting craps with your nation's destiny." (p.195)

Aside from the inappropriate nature of the metaphor (one cannot imagine the austere Izetbegovic "shooting craps" or having any familiarity with such an activity), Holbrooke's warning echoes an earlier warning by none other than the Bosnian Serb leader, Radovan Karadzic.

This occurred during a heated exchange in the parliament of Bosnia-Herzegovina during the night of October 14-15, 1991. Karadzic's Serb Democratic Party (SDS) wanted to keep Bosnia-Herzegovina within Yugoslavia or, short of that, create autonomous Serb regions. Izetbegovic's Democratic Action Party totally rejected such suggestions. Calling on Izetbegovic to recognize the Serbian people's desire to remain in Yugoslavia, Karadzic declared: "You want to take Bosnia-Herzegovina down the same highway of hell and suffering that Slovenia and Croatia are travelling. Do not think that you will not lead Bosnia-Herzegovina into hell, and do not think that you will not perhaps make the Muslim people disappear, because the Muslims cannot defend themselves if there is war -- How will you prevent everyone from being killed in Bosnia-Herzegovina?"

These are strong words, but they could be interpreted as a warning to Izetbegovic of the dangers of war and an invitation to compromise to save the peace. Instead, they have been interpreted as announcement of intention to commit genocide, and as such constitute prime evidence in the International Criminal Tribunal indictment against Karadzic for "genocide" [FN#16].

There has been no suggestion by the Tribunal and its sponsors (primarily the United States) that Izetbegovic's declared readiness to sacrifice peace for a future secession implies responsibility for the ensuing war.

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Serb suggestions that Izetbegovic intended to set up an Islamic state are consistently dismissed by the Americans as far-fetched lies, tinged with typically Serb paranoia. The reaction of Roger Cohen is typical: "Izetbegovic's devotion to his religion was evident in a tract called the 'Islamic Declaration' in 1970 that was pushed on me insistently in 1992 in Belgrade and Pale as proof of his 'fundamentalist' design for Bosnia." Cohen saw in it merely "an attempt to reconcile the precepts of the Koran with the organization of a modern state", a casual reading indeed (see article on Izetbegovic's writings). True, as a journalist, Cohen was disturbed by "ominous" reflections implying the need to control media. ("The media should not be allowed -- as so often happens -- to fall into the hands of perverted and degenerate people who then transmit the aimlessness and emptiness of their own lives to others. What are we to expect if mosque and TV transmitter aim contradictory messages at the people?")

"But Izetbegovic had no army or plans for war [...]", concludes Cohen, anxious to dismiss Serb concerns as artificial [FN#17]. However, it is not true that Izetbegovic "had no army or plans for war".

In a November 1996 interview in the Bosnian Muslim newspaper *Liljan*, Izetbegovic's deputy foreign minister Hasan Cengic recounted how, at a February 1991 SDA meeting, he proposed a three-part strategy for the future independent Bosnia-Herzegovina. This comprised (1) international promotion of Bosnia-Herzegovina, headed by Haris Silajdzic, (2) control of the Interior Ministry, and (3) a Muslim military organization. In May 1991, ten months before the independence that set off civil war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Cengic gave written instructions to SDA party faithful from all over the Republic for formation of brigades under command of General Sulejman Vranja, a Yugoslav army officer still on active duty.

Thus Izetbegovic's Islamic party, the SDA, had its own armed forces, which went into action to secure Muslim areas at the same time and in much the same way as the

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Bosnian Serb party, the SDS. The Croatian nationalist party did the same, somewhat later and on a smaller scale, relying mainly on intervention of the Croatian army.

While perfunctorily dismissing Serb (or Croat) worries about the implications of the “Islamic Declaration”, Western observers have readily accepted accusations by the various anti-Serb secessionists that Milosevic triggered the disintegration of Yugoslavia by an ultra-nationalist project to create a “Greater Serbia”, expressed in the ceremonial speech delivered by Milosevic at Kosovo Polje on the 600th anniversary of the famous battle fought there in 1389. More than once, Milosevic protested to Holbrooke that his speech was not “inflammatory”, to no avail [FN#18].

This is another unshakable myth of the Yugoslav disaster. Milosevic certainly bears a huge share of responsibility, not because he was “racist”, or because he was planning “Greater Serbia”, but because he grossly misjudged the way his efforts to reform Serbia and Yugoslavia would be interpreted, with catastrophic results. But strictly speaking, the Kosovo Polje speech was not especially “inflammatory” and certainly not “racist”. Along with other samples of triumphalist rhetoric characteristic of such patriotic celebrations, it contained sentences which are never quoted, such as: “Harmony in Serbia will make possible prosperity to Serb people, to Serbia, and to each of her citizens without regard to national or religious affiliation. [...] Serbia was never in its history inhabited only by Serbs. Today more than ever, citizens of other nationalities and ethnic groups are living here. This is not a handicap for Serbia. Indeed, I am convinced that this is an advantage. This is the direction of change in national structure of all countries in the contemporary world, especially in the developed countries.”

Cohen, who dismissed Izetbegovic’s “ominous” reflections as inconsequential, comes up with an imaginatively sinister reading of the Kosovo Polje speech [FN#19]. Quoting various sentences in which Milosevic celebrated (all too prematurely, as it turned out) the restoration of “unity” (the

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Serbo-Croatian word Milosevic used was *sloga*, meaning “harmony” or “accord”), Cohen interprets this as the announcement of the goal of a “Greater Serbia” that would “unify all Serbs in one state”. The word for political unity, as in “national unity”, is however not *sloga* but *jedinstvo*. This far-fetched interpretation is the only proof such an able writer as Cohen (who apparently knows the language) is able to produce of the alleged “Greater Serbia” project of Milosevic.

Responsibility, both verbal and active, for the ongoing conflicts in the Balkans is shared by leaders on all sides. By identifying one national group with “pure evil”, the “international community” has enormously deepened the distrust and resentment between the peoples who must continue to live side by side. Real peace and reconciliation require an effort to understand the interplay of responsibility between all parties -- including outside powers, notably Germany, the European Union, and last but not least, the United States.

1. See the numerous index references to the United States in: David Owen, *Balkan Odyssey*, Victor Gollancz, London, 1995.

2. See the very clear summary of U.S. policy in William Pfaff's column carried by the Los Angeles Times Syndicate, published in the *International Herald Tribune* of 5 December 1998 as “Washington's New Vision for NATO Could Be Divisive”.

Excerpts: “The Holbrooke-Milosevic agreement on Kosovo in October was accurately described by Richard Holbrooke as an unprecedented event. NATO had intervened in an internal conflict inside a sovereign non-NATO state, not to defend its own members but to force that other state to halt repression of a rebellious ethnic minority. [...] Washington sees this as a precedent for a new NATO that would deal with a variety of existing and future problems inside and outside Europe. This goes beyond Balkan unrest to proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, as in Iraq, Iran and South Asia, other troublemaking by ‘rogue states’ international terrorism and even the drug trade. [...] Zbigniew Brzezinski, in his latest book (‘The Grand Chessboard’), sees the alliance as the instrument of an ‘integrated, comprehensive and long-term geostrategy for all of Eurasia,’ in which NATO would eventually reach Asia, where another American-led alliance would link Pacific and Southeast Asian states.”

3. Holbrooke never speaks of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the country's full name, but of “Bosnia”, and uses the term “Bosnian” for the Bosnian Muslims alone, a usage implying that the Muslims are somehow more “Bosnian” than the Serbs or Croats

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living there. This usage, although in contradiction with the notion of “Bosnia” as an ideal multicultural society, is common among its supporters. In this regard, little attention is paid to the fact that President Alija Izetbegovic’s ruling Islamic political party, the Democratic Action Party, has from the start included Muslims who live *outside* Bosnia, notably in the Novi Pazar region of Serbia, and thus are not “Bosnians” at all.

4. On June 1, 1992, United Nations Security Resolution 757 imposed on Yugoslavia what the New York Times called “the most sweeping economic and other sanctions it has ever imposed, including a trade embargo, a ban on oil sales to the Belgrade government and an end to all sports and cultural links”. These extraordinarily severe sanctions not only caused hardship to the population while offering smugglers opportunities for enrichment, they severely restricted normal communication between Serbia and the outside world, making it that much easier to portray the Serbs as monsters.

5. The 1992 U.N. sanctions against Serbia were imposed as punishment for a supposed invasion, which had not taken place. Rather, Yugoslav army units stationed there had withdrawn by the time the sanctions were imposed. Before the Yugoslav army withdrew, it had lost soldiers to the opposing new armies and indeed left most of its heavy equipment to the Bosnian Serbs, who benefited from Serbian financial support. In contrast, Croatia actually did send its own armed forces into Bosnia-Herzegovina to carve out an ethnically pure Croatian territory known as “Herceg-Bosna”, and has never been punished with more than half-hearted reprimands.

6. “Serbs ‘not guilty’ of massacre: Experts warned US that mortar was Bosnian”, The Sunday Times, 1 October 1995, p.15. The Times defense correspondent Hugh McManners reported that the British experts said “French analysts who also examined the scene agreed with them. But they were overruled by a senior American officer, and the UN issued a statement saying it was beyond any doubt that the Bosnian Serbs were responsible for the blast, in which 37 people were killed and 90 wounded.

“The carnage was used as a pretext for NATO’s huge air campaign against the Bosnian Serbs, which was followed by extensive battlefield losses, and forced the Serbs to the negotiating table.

“The British experts were in a UN crater-analysis team that reached the Trznica market in Sarajevo 40 minutes after the mortar attack on the morning of August 28.[...]”

7. In contrast, the French commander to whom Mladic had addressed his letter, General Bernard Janvier, was insisting that it was possible to start negotiations with the Bosnian Serbs (p.128).

8. The United States never normalized relations, and early in 1998, just as economic relations between Yugoslavia and the European Union were starting to be normalized, the Kosovo crisis brought a new round of sanctions against Belgrade -- including a ban on its civilian airline, JAT, whose business is being picked up by European carriers.

9. The unilateral undertaking called for the Serbs to remove all their heavy weapons from the Sarajevo area, essentially surrendering their positions there. The parallel with the recent Kosovo agreement is obvious.

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10. I have heard this belief expressed in numerous private conversations with Serbs, notably during a trip to Serbia in June 1998.

11. *Bosnia: A Short History*, 1994, and *Kosovo: A Short History*. See Aleksa Djilas, "Imagining Kosovo: A Biased New Account Fans Western Confusion", *Foreign Affairs*, September/October 1998, pp 124-131.

12. See CAQ, autumn 1998. Deichmann shows that the British TV photographer filmed Muslims from within a barbed wire enclosure, thus creating the illusion that the Muslims were enclosed by a barbed wire fence, which was not the case.

13. Documentation sent to the Hague Tribunal on crimes against humanity in Muslim camps for Serbs in Sarajevo, Srebrenica, Zenica, Dretelj near Mostar, Tarcin, etc., has been ignored. Only the case of the Celebici camp was taken up by the Tribunal thanks to a chance encounter between a Serbian-American woman and the Hague prosecutor at the time, Richard Goldstone, at a U.S. cocktail party. Another indication of the importance of "social relations". This documentation has been collected by a number of women, including Maritsa Mattei, who lives in Paris and has visited the Tribunal on several occasions.

14. The Serbs have constantly claimed that the three notorious Sarajevo bomb massacres of civilians (the 27 May 1992 "breadline massacre" which occurred on the eve of the U.N. Nations vote on sanctions against Serbia; the 5 February 1994 massacre of shoppers in the Sarajevo market, followed by an ultimatum demanding withdrawal of Serb heavy weapons; and the 28 August 1995 slaughter referred to above) were in fact staged by Muslims to gain international support. "Black propaganda", committing atrocities to be attributed to the other side, is not unusual in Middle East conflicts, and is the reason for the question asked in such cases, Who profits from the crime? Outside professionals such as the Mujahidin with the toy bombs would be prime suspects for that sort of operation.

15. Laura Silber & Allan Little, *Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation*, Penguin Books/BBC Books, London, 1996, p.211.

16. The citation, in English, from Silber & Little, p.215, was read into the record at the farcical "Rule 16 hearing" against Karadzic and Mladic held in The Hague on September 16, 1996. The Tribunal did not allow the presence of an attorney for the defense.

17. Roger Cohen, *Hearts Grown Brutal: Sagas of Sarajevo*, Random House, New York, 1998, p.148.


18. "When I asked Milosevic in 1995 about this famous speech, he heatedly denied that it was racist, and charged Ambassador Zimmermann with organizing a Western diplomatic boycott of the speech and the Western press with distorting it. Unfortunately for Milosevic, however, his words and their consequences are on the record", writes Holbrooke (p.26). On another occasion, Holbrooke and Chris Hill "asked him about his famous 1989 speech at Kosovo that ignited Serb extremism. He vigorously denied that this was his intent [...] Chris Hill, who knew the history in detail, defended Zimmermann and reminded Milosevic that the speech had been inflammatory by any standards."

19. *Hearts Grown Brutal*, pp.272-273.

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
Mladen Srbinovi}

Belgrade





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TI[MA

SUCCÈS ET INFORTUNES D'ALEKSANDAR TISMA

Milivoj Srebro, Paris

Ti{ma vu par la critique française

1. L'écrivain aux nombreuses traductions

Avec Ivo Andriæ et Danilo Ki{, Aleksandar Ti{ma fait partie du trio littéraire yougoslave le plus traduit en France : huit de ses livres, romans et nouvelles, ont été publiés dans ce pays durant les quinze dernières années. Mais bien qu'il soit presque autant traduit que ses deux compatriotes, ce chroniqueur du " temps de l'ignominie ", comme il appelle lui-même la période de la Deuxième Guerre mondiale, ne peut pourtant pas rivaliser avec eux quant à l'accueil qu'on leur a fait en France. Si on le compare au Prix Nobel, on peut constater que Ti{ma n'a pas réussi à entretenir un intérêt soutenu de la critique française, comme l'a fait Andriæ, certes avec des difficultés et d'importantes périodes d'oubli. De même, si l'on fait un parallèle entre lui et Ki{, on se rend compte que la conclusion n'est pas en sa faveur. Malgré le fait que plusieurs de ces livres traitent d'événements qui ont

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marqué l'histoire contemporaine européenne - le thème de l'holocauste qui le rapproche justement à l'auteur du *Sablier* - Ti{ma n'a pas réussi, contrairement à Danilo Ki{, à se faire accepter complètement dans le milieu littéraire français intéressé par ce thème.

Certes, il faut le préciser : tous les livres d'Aleksandar Ti{ma n'ont pas subi le même sort. Certains d'entre eux, il est vrai, sont passés sous un silence quasi total, alors que d'autres ont rencontré un intérêt modéré. Quant à *L'usage de l'homme*, le maître-livre de cet écrivain, il a été, en revanche, accueilli d'une façon tout à fait convenable : avec l'attention et l'enthousiasme qu'on réserve seulement aux chefs-d'oeuvre.

2. UN UNIVERS SANS DIEU

Le premier livre d'Aleksandar Ti{ma, paru en français tout au début des années quatre-vingt, est un recueil de nouvelles dont le titre métaphorique, *l'École d'impiété* (1), traduit bien la nature d'un univers de violence et de souffrance où l'homme est un loup pour l'homme, comme le précise un critique. C'est un univers sans Dieu et sans pitié, mais historiquement réel, dont les différentes facettes seront montrées aussi dans les quatre romans traduits peu après *l'École d'impiété* ; romans qui, avec ce recueil de nouvelles, font partie d'un même cycle, d'une sorte de " Pentateuque ", intitulé par l'auteur *Rameaux croisés*.

Échappé à la mort par pur hasard, à cette mort violente et programmée qui fut, dans un moment historique, le destin collectif des peuples entiers, Ti{ma n'a pas pu longtemps résister aux thèmes de la guerre et aux images de ce cataclysme qui était particulièrement cruel dans la Pannonie yougoslave où il a pris la forme d'un génocide des Serbes et des Juifs (2). Cette préoccupation de l'écrivain de faire face à une Histoire déchaînée, ce besoin de revivre une expérience tragique et douloureuse à travers l'écriture et les formes littéraires,

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ont fait donc naître plusieurs livres dont le point commun est justement cet univers cruel et impie. Précisons ici seulement, pour éviter tous les malentendus, que ce besoin personnel n'est pas chez Tiçma une simple volonté de témoigner contre l'oubli. Il s'agit plutôt d'une obsession créatrice dont le but est la quête de la vérité, individuelle et universelle, ainsi que la recherche d'un art narratif capable de satisfaire les plus exigeants critères esthétiques.

Cette double recherche, où la forme et le style de narration doivent coïncider avec le sujet, est déjà mise en oeuvre dans *l'École d'impiété*. Mais les critiques, malheureusement peu nombreux, qui ont prêté attention à ce livre bouleversant ont été plutôt attirés par son sujet, par cet univers impie où fleurissent la cupidité, la torture et la brutalité des vainqueurs. C'est un monde de misère et de cruauté d'où " Dieu est absent, totalement ; l'homme est le seul et il est tueur ou bourreau ", constate, par exemple, le critique du *Magazine littéraire* (3) après avoir exprimé son profond pessimisme de façon sous entendue dans la question : " Vivre est-il supportable lorsque l'homme sait qu'il est voué au malheur ? " Quant au critique de la *NRF* (4) qui essaie de pénétrer plus profondément dans la psychologie des personnages de Tiçma, il aborde ce dilemme d'une autre manière. D'après lui, vivre dans un tel monde signifie, pour les personnages de *l'École d'impiété*, faire un compromis, donc d'accepter délibérément l'inacceptable. C'est pourquoi, précise-t-il, " aucun d'entre eux ne songe un instant qu'il pourrait se soustraire à ce *fatum* insidieux qu'il perçoit trop bien pour le reconnaître ". En d'autres termes, " la vie est une école d'impiété, mais elle a de bons élèves ", conclut ce critique désillusionné.

3. UNE PROPOSITION AU JURY DU PRIX NOBEL

Le même univers atroce, le même climat de

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souffrance et de mort, la même vision impitoyable de l'homme laissé à la merci de forces maléfiques, sont présents aussi dans *L'usage de l'homme* (5). Mais cette fois-ci, Ti{ma a choisi la forme romanesque, sans doute plus convenable, pour exprimer l'ampleur d'une tragédie collective, d'un tourbillon infernal de l'Histoire qui a broyé des familles entières de Serbes et de Juifs. Construit soigneusement, sans aucune concession au pathétique, dans le seul but de trouver la meilleure expression littéraire qui puisse réinventer, sans déformation aucune, une complexe réalité historique, ce roman puissant, ce maître-livre d'Alexandre Ti{ma peut rivaliser, sans aucun doute, avec les meilleures oeuvres européennes écrites sur la Deuxième Guerre mondiale.

Couronné dans son pays par le " Prix NIN " et particulièrement remarqué par la critique et le public yougoslaves, *L'usage de l'homme* n'a pas non plus laissé indifférents les critiques français qui se sont, après avoir manqué le rendez-vous avec l'*École d'impiété*, littéralement précipités pour saluer ce livre hors du commun et pour rendre hommage à son auteur. Bouleversés par les images violentes d'un monde infernal mais ô combien réel, profondément émus par la force intérieure du roman - cette force que l'on ressent seulement au contact des vraies oeuvres d'art - les critiques n'ont pas caché leur émotion. C'est un " livre douloureux, livre précieux. Horrible. ", constate tout au début de son compte rendu le critique de la *NRF* (6). Ti{ma " ne raconte pas ; il ne décrit pas, il nous rend témoins - inutiles - de la violence publique ou du désespoir intime, jusqu'à une limite rarement atteinte dans la fiction ", écrit, de son côté, le critique du *Monde* avant d'être emporté par une vague de fortes émotions : " C'est insoutenable ! Allez-y voir quand même. C'est un grand livre ! " (7) Pris par le même sentiment, le commentateur du *BCLF* réagit de la même manière : " Ti{ma est implacable, féroce dans sa sobriété ", dit-il, " mais c'est du grand art exprimant de terribles vérités ! " (8)

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D'autres critiques, troublés eux aussi par la lecture de *L'usage de l'homme*, n'ont pas non plus respecté le langage stéréotypé du compte rendu. Ainsi, pour le critique de *Minute*, il s'agit d'un " roman magnifique et désespéré qui est sans doute l'une des plus fortes nourritures dont puisse nous régaler la littérature du moment " (9); l'*Actualité religieuse* le place, sans aucune réserve, " au rang des grands chefs-d'oeuvre humanistes " (10), tandis que le commentateur du *Réveil du Centre* reconnaît volontiers, et avec satisfaction, qu'il n'a pas " connu dans la production littéraire de l'année 85 d'ouvrage équivalent " (11). Celui qui va le plus loin, cependant, est le critique du *Matin* qui, enchanté, fait une proposition peu habituelle. " Si les Nobel cherchent un successeur à Ivo Andric ", propose-t-il, " nous leurs suggérons le nom de Tisma, ils ne seront pas déçus " ! (12)

4. " Une littérature d'après l'impensable "

Ce qui a le plus frappé la sensibilité des critiques, ce qui a provoqué, comme nous l'avons vu, leurs plus vives réactions, c'est la violence qui apparaît dans *L'usage de l'homme* sous toutes ses formes. C'est-à-dire celles qui semblent ordinaires, mais aussi celles qui dépassent l'entendement. C'est pourquoi, par exemple, J.-M. de Montremy définit cette oeuvre, en la comparant à un cratère d'obus, comme " une littérature d'après l'impensable ", ou plus précisément, comme " une littérature de ce qui demeure lorsque l'impensable a eu lieu ". (13) De plus, aux différentes formes de violence du monde, causées par les forces incompréhensibles de l'Histoire, correspond aussi la violente vision de l'homme, mis à nu et réduit à son " usage ". Car, comme l'observe à juste titre Laurand Kovacs, l'homme de Tisma " porte à jamais la couronne d'épines, les clous et le marteau ". (14) En d'autres termes, il est toujours " un lieu de

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souffrance, qu'il soit victime ou bourreau ", d'où vient, d'ailleurs, son *usage* : " souffrir ou faire souffrir " !

Mais bien qu'ils soient choqués par les images terrifiantes du roman, les commentateurs ne se sont pas pour autant arrêtés là dans leurs interprétations. Ils savaient trop bien que, réduire ce roman tellement riche de significations à ses images choquantes, aurait été l'appauvrir. Il suffit de citer, par exemple, l'opinion d'Antoine Spire qui, pourtant, n'oublie pas que l'auteur de *L'usage de l'homme* " ne fait pas dans la dentelle " (15). Il est vrai, commente-t-il, que la démarche impitoyable de Ti{ma ressemble parfois à celle de Géricault qui se servait des morceaux du corps humain rapportés de la morgue " pour mieux peindre la raideur cadavérique ". Mais Ti{ma, ajoute-t-il tout de suite, " ce n'est pas seulement 'le choc des images', un morceau d'anthologie de la morbidité ". Rejoint sur ces points par d'autres commentateurs, Spire relève qu'il y a chez cet écrivain beaucoup d'autres choses à découvrir : son humanisme, sa passion pour la vérité, sa pitié pour l'homme malgré tout, et, sur un autre plan, un art narratif dont la puissance intérieure captive le lecteur.

La pitié ? Oui, même la pitié. Car, malgré tout, malgré même sa vision impitoyable de la nature humaine, affirme Laurand Kovacs, " Tisma est 'tendresse de pitié', comme disait Albert Cohen " (16). Et il n'est pas le seul à l'affirmer. Olivier Rolin, dans *Libération* (17), partage la même opinion. Il découvre ce sentiment de Ti{ma " au plan le plus enfoui du livre ", " dans une certaine complicité entre les mots et la douleur ", ou plus précisément, dans " une modestie des mots devant la douleur " causée ou subie par les hommes.

D'autre part, même quand il décrit les situations extrêmes, Ti{ma se garde, grâce à une expérience qui ressemble à une sorte de sagesse, de la grandiloquence ou du manichéisme. Il part du principe que le Mal n'est jamais exclusivement réservé aux uns et le Bien aux autres. C'est pourquoi chez lui, comme le constate André

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Clavel, “ la frontière entre l’héroïsme et l’abjection semble imperceptible : c’est le hasard seul qui décide des saints ou des monstres, des victimes ou des bourreaux, car la guerre pervertit tout ce qu’elle touche ” (18). En effet, ajoute de son côté Nicole Zand, les victimes comme les bourreaux, les héros comme les salauds, ils sont tous, dans *L’usage de l’homme*, offensés et humiliés. Car, comme chez Dostoïevski, précise-t-elle, “ ils marchent en titubant, entre les joies et les douleurs, les lâchetés et les crimes, vers une sérénité résignée, vers un au-delà où Dieu n’a pas de place. ” (19)

Pour décrire un tel état de l’homme, en allant au plus profond de la condition humaine, sans jamais tomber dans les pièges du manichéisme et du moralisme, il fallait donc avoir une solide expérience personnelle, un savoir et une lucidité propres aux sages. Mais aussi un fort talent pour être capable de trouver le style juste et la forme romanesque appropriée à cette vision de l’homme et du monde. Conscient de la délicatesse de son entreprise, l’auteur de *L’usage de l’homme* n’a pas choisi, délibérément, la forme d’une saga ou d’une vaste fresque épique, souvent utilisées pour ce genre du sujet. Il n’a pas non plus adopté le style de la “ plate lamentation sur l’horreur ou le système exténué du témoignage national-dramatique ”, comme l’observe à bon droit J.-M. de Montremy. Non, “ il mène plutôt, en passant d’un personnage à l’autre, une sorte de méditation, se gardant de toutes les ‘scènes-à-faire’ ”, poursuit le même critique (20); méditation donc qui, à travers un “ attachement à la délicate matière des choses ”, rend l’atmosphère de son roman tout à fait spéciale.

Ce procédé qui met en relief la méditation, et en particulier, pour reprendre l’expression de Nicole Zand, son “ rythme achronique ” qui mélange les temps, le présent et le futur, Norbert Czarny (21) le considère comme une technique plutôt propre à l’impressionnisme. Chez Ti{ma, commente-t-il, “ rien ne semble fixé ni sûr ”. Il “ estompe les contours vifs ”, en peignant “ au plus

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près, comme un impressionniste, les actions et les hommes ". Son écriture est fluide et son livre lent et sinueux, ce qui rend le cadre de l'intrigue, la ville de Novi Sad, encore plus étrange, plus brumeuse.

Quelques autres critiques ont aussi souligné la spécificité de l'art de narration de Ti{ma en élargissant leurs observations sur d'autres qualités de *L'usage de l'homme*. Ainsi, Olivier Rolin met en valeur " l'usage raffiné, à la lettre flamboyant, des temps du récit " en le comparant à celui qu'on retrouve dans *Louons maintenant les grands hommes* de James Agee (22); le critique de *l'Humanité* souligne que, malgré sa simplicité apparente, la narration du roman devient petit à petit un " écheveau narratif complexe " (23), tandis que celui du *Figaro magazine* met l'accent sur le côté émotionnel du roman : " C'est cette émotion qui fait le poids du livre. Elle redonne du sens, de la vie, de l'espoir ", en dépit des forces obscures de l'Histoire. (24)

Enfin, citons une observation de Michel Rostin, dans *La Libre Belgique*. (25) En mettant en évidence les diverses qualités esthétiques de *L'usage de l'homme* aussi bien que l'importance de son sujet, ce critique a souligné que cette oeuvre exceptionnelle, venue de l'Europe de l'Est, mérite le même respect " que l'on réserve ces dernières années " en Europe occidentale aux livres : *Les Hauteurs béantes* d'Alexandre Zinoviev et *Vie et Destin* de Vassili Grossman. Il est clair que le jugement du critique belge rejoint celui de ses confrères en France.

5. Un " Job désespéré " ou un " picaro en négatif "

Après cet accueil chaleureux, on aurait pu croire que Ti{ma aurait désormais auprès de la critique française, sinon un statut privilégié, du moins un traitement à la hauteur de son importance et de ses qualités littéraires. Cela pourtant n'a pas été le cas. Même les romans sortis

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dans les années suivantes, *Croyances et méfiances* et le *Kapo*, qui font partie du même cycle *Rameaux croisés* n'ont pas rencontré l'intérêt attendu par l'auteur et son éditeur, pour ne pas parler des livres, publiés plus tard, au moment où l'enthousiasme suscité par le livre majeur de Ti{ma était déjà presque oublié.

Certes, *Le Livre de Blam* (26), paru immédiatement après *L'usage de l'homme*, a profité d'une certaine manière de l'atmosphère favorable, née autour de chef-d'oeuvre de Ti{ma. Mais, bien qu'ils aient été encore sous la forte impression de la lecture de *L'usage de l'homme*, les critiques se sont, cette fois-ci, montrés plus modérés dans leurs déclarations et leurs commentaires. Une attitude sans doute en partie conditionnée par le fond du roman. L'histoire d'un Juif yougoslave, Miroslav Blam, échappé par hasard au destin collectif, à l'holocauste, est, peut-être, aussi tragique que celle racontée dans le livre précédent d'Aleksandar Ti{ma. Mais, privée des images puissantes et des scènes violentes, concentrée sur le monde intérieur d'un petit homme timide et au comportement effacé, elle ne suscite pas effectivement des émotions aussi fortes que l'histoire de ceux qui n'ont pu échapper à la mort programmée, racontée dans *L'usage de l'homme*.

Le premier à annoncer le nouveau livre de Ti{ma, a été Claude Frochoux, dans le *Journal* de L'Age d'Homme qui a accompagné la sortie du *Livre de Blam* (27). Loin d'être une simple affiche publicitaire, le texte de ce critique montre d'emblée plusieurs facettes de ce roman, discret mais profond, avant de le comparer au livre-clef d'Alexandre Ti{ma. " Moins polyphonique que *L'usage de l'homme* ", écrit Frochoux, " il ne lui cède en rien à ce qui était sa valeur centrale : l'homme au plus fondamental, indestructible autant que vulnérable. Sans concession, sans échappatoires, sans alibis. "

La particularité et la force de *Livre de Blam* résident d'abord, selon lui, dans la manière dont l'écrivain présente l'histoire de son héros dont " l'incertaine existence paraît

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tirée aux cartes ” par des joueurs indifférents :

“ On pense étrangement au roman picaresque, où le picaro n'existe que comme catalyseur et révélateur. Mais un picaro en négatif, aussi terne que son glorieux prédécesseur pourrait être haut en couleurs. Le résultat est le même : les hommes se révèlent, leurs intérêts se dévoilent. Les instincts refont surface et la géographie des classes sociales se déploie dans tout le faste de son hypocrisie. ” (28)

Mais, bien que l'on puisse comparer *Le Livre de Blam* au roman picaresque, cela ne signifie pas pour autant que l'écrivain suit aveuglement un quelconque schéma stéréotypé. Avec une rare virtuosité dans l'art de jouer avec le temps, avec une sensibilité qui ressemble à celle du Tchekhov de la *Tristesse* et de l'*Oncle Vania*, avec aussi “ son courage tranquille et cette sérénité au coeur même de l'horreur ”, Ti{ma appartient, conclut-il, à cette race des romanciers authentiques “ qui ont pu et su mettre le roman au registre de notre univers contemporain ”.

Quant à Georges Dupoy du *Quotidien de Paris* (29), il s'attache à analyser le personnage principal du roman, apparemment ordinaire mais, au fond, très complexe, en essayant de retrouver les clés psychologiques qui pourront expliquer les vrais raisons de son salut. Et il les retrouve dans la “ blessure secrète ” de Miroslav Blam, dans une sorte de “ remords dissimulé ” qui laisse deviner, en effet, que sa survie est en rapport direct avec sa passivité et, peut-être, même avec sa lâcheté. Quoi qu'il en soit, poursuit-il, même si l'on peut le qualifier d'“ antihéros ”, il s'agit avant tout d'un personnage profondément tragique, d'un “ Job désespéré que la grâce n'a jamais touché ”.

D'autres critiques, chacun à sa manière, ont lu *Le Livre de Blam* en mettant l'accent sur les différents aspects du roman, ce qui n'a pas empêché leurs regards de se croiser ou même de se compléter. En analysant la

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manière mise en place dans l'emploi des temps narratifs, le critique des *Livres* (30) constate, par exemple, que dans ce roman " présent et passé se mêlent, se confondent, au point de ne plus exister ni l'un ni l'autre ", ce qui donne une impression floue de la réalité. Pour le critique de *La Croix* (31), il s'agit effectivement d'une réalité qui n'est pas facile à saisir. " Après le roman d'atmosphère, Tisma a inventé le roman brouillard ", écrit-il non sans humour. Mais ses explications reposent sur d'autres arguments. D'après lui, *Le Livre de Blam* est, avant tout, " un magistral portrait d'un homme dans une ville, fait avec tant de minutie que l'un arrive à se fondre dans l'autre ".

Les critiques du *Matin* et de *La NRF* ont mis en évidence la particularité des procédés et de l'écriture dans *Le Livre de Blam*. Ainsi, Gilles Tordjman (32) parle, en faisant allusion à Alexandre Zinoviev, de la " froideur terrifiante " de l'écriture de Ti{ma. C'est une " écriture de traverse, à proximité amoureuse des gouffres : celle des hauteurs toujours béantes vues par le trou de serrure d'une vie d'homme, celle de la glaciation ". Cette froideur, confirme de son côté Laurand Kovacs (33), vient, en effet, d'un procédé spécifique : la reconstruction " minutieuse et sans emphase " d'une vie qui se déroule comme une existence vide après la mort manquée. Un procédé simple mais impitoyable dans sa simplicité : " les faits précis et nets, seulement les faits, avec juste ce qu'il faut de commentaires pour que dans leur cruauté incommensurable ils entrent dans l'humaine mesure ".

Et pour en finir avec *Le Livre de Blam*, citons enfin le critique du *BCLF* (34) qui résume dans une seule phrase ce que les autres ont développé avec plus de nuances et de détails concrets. " C'est un beau livre ", conclut-il d'une façon laconique, " sobre, sans grandiloquence, sombre, profond, pénétrant ".

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6. Trois notions clefs : violence, déchéance, néant

L'intérêt suscité par *Le Livre de Blam*, non négligeable mais modéré, a montré cependant que les critiques, après avoir accueilli avec grand enthousiasme *L'usage de l'homme*, ont commencé à prendre peu à peu leurs distances vis-à-vis de Ti{ma. L'accueil très modeste réservé à ses autres livres, en est une preuve. De plus, les rares critiques qui s'y sont intéressés n'ont pas éprouvé souvent le besoin d'entrer plus profondément dans l'analyse : rassasiés sans doute par la violence récurrente de l'univers de Ti{ma, ils se sont contentés, dans la plupart des cas, de résumer ou de moduler ce qui avait déjà dit dans les commentaires précédents.

Croyances et méfiances (35), roman qui met en scène les survivants des années soixante - les inéluctables bourreaux et victimes, mais aussi les profiteurs de la guerre, débrouillards et larbins - n'a pas, lui n'ont plus, suscité une très grande curiosité. Seuls deux articles nous semblent intéressants à évoquer. D'abord, celui de Jean-Baptiste Mauroux (36) dont l'intérêt se porte, une fois de plus, sur le phénomène de violence chez Ti{ma, mais avec une tentative de l'aborder avec un point de vue neuf. En résumant l'oeuvre romanesque de l'écrivain serbe en "trois mots clefs" - *violence, déchéance, néant* - Mauroux entre dans l'analyse du "mécanisme de la violence" décrit avec minutie dans *Croyances et méfiances*, à travers un personnage complexe, Sergeï. Et que découvre-t-il ? Un Raskolnikov, un homme passionné qui, "dans la plus incandescente tradition dostoïevskienne, se livre à un déchirant débat intérieur" en essayant d'habiller le crime en vertu. Le mécanisme du crime, sa dynamique, sont donc fondés, chez Ti{ma comme chez Dostoïevski, conclut-il, "sur les ruses de la raison", et la violence est légitimée par "l'artifice du sophisme".

L'autre article, écrit par Claude Frochoux (37), met en valeur plutôt la méthode avec laquelle Ti{ma aborde

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son sujet, aussi bien que les moyens d'expression déjà mis en oeuvre dans ses livres précédents. L'auteur de *Croyances et méfiances*, souligne-t-il, "conçoit son métier d'écrivain comme celui d'un chroniqueur" qui, avec la minutie d'un "greffier de tribunal", dresse un constat froid sur l'état de la société de son époque. Ce faisant, il n'esthétise ni ne moralise. "Il montre. Il dit. Il fait voir. Il ne tire pas de conclusions. Il n'y a pas à être pour ou contre. C'est la vie qui va." En un mot, pourrait-on résumer cette brève analyse stylistique de Frochaux, Ti{ma est "un réaliste impitoyable".

Le Kapo (38), roman traduit immédiatement après *Croyances et méfiances*, et qui clôt le cycle *Rameaux croisés*, a subi le même sort que son prédécesseur. S'intéressant de moins en moins à Ti{ma, la critique n'a pas donc vu que cet auteur fécond et voué à la recherche de la vérité humaine, n'avait pas dit son dernier mot avec *L'usage de l'homme*. C'est d'autant plus regrettable que l'on sait que *Le Kapo* est un livre aussi complexe dans sa vision du monde que profond dans son analyse psychologique de l'homme contraint de se déterminer dans des situations extrêmes.

Parmi les rares commentateurs qui se sont manifestés à cette occasion, Laurand Kovacs (39) est le seul, nous semble-t-il, qui ait senti l'importance de cette oeuvre. Avant d'entreprendre l'analyse du personnage principal - d'un Juif que le destin tragique de son peuple et la malédiction à laquelle il veut échapper poussent à commettre des crimes dans des camps d'extermination, pour passer ensuite le reste de sa vie en vaines tentatives de rachat - il pose des questions, d'après lui, très importantes pour comprendre ce roman : "Vilko Lamian, connu sous le nom de Furfa lorsqu'il est Kapo, était-il voué, dès l'origine, à la trahison ?" Ou bien, s'agit-il d'une autre chose ? Ce sont, peut-être, de circonstances qui l'ont poussé de se transformer en bourreau, et de trahir "la masse des victimes dont il doit à terme partager le sort" ?

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A ces questions Kovacs donne une réponse nuancée, après avoir analysé avec perspicacité “ l’ambiguïté intrinsèque ” de ce malheureux kapo d’Auschwitz qui est, en effet, “ à la fois bourreau et victime ”. Dans la vision romanesque de Ti{ma qui se “ détache du stéréotype ”, constate-t-il, ce personnage ambigu “ n’est pas proprement le jouet du destin ” ou des circonstances contraignantes, parce que c’est en lui-même que se trouve “ une grande partie des éléments ” qui déterminent son comportement dans une situation concrète. Et c’est là où on peut entrevoir la profondeur de la vision de l’écrivain qui refuse toute mystification et toute prise de position partielle. Ti{ma, conclut Kovacs, “ ne nous propose pas un monde manichéen et c’est pourquoi il peut débusquer, au sein même de l’humain, l’horreur la plus inhumaine ”.

Quant aux autres livres d’Aleksandar Ti{ma - *Sans cris*, *La Jeune fille brune* et *Celles qu’on aime* (40) - eux aussi, et en particulier ce dernier, ont rencontré un faible écho. Les rares critiques qui avaient lu le recueil de nouvelles *Sans cris* ont mis, par exemple, de nouveau sous la loupe le thème obsessionnel de Ti{ma : la violence. Certes, la violence n’est pas ici traitée comme une manifestation de la guerre mais comme un “ produit ” des pulsions obscures propres à la nature humaine. Réunies autour du thème du “ crime passionnel ”, ces proses psychologiques “ au sens noble du mot ”, constate Luba Jurgenson (41), ont pour ambition, chacune à sa manière, de démanteler “ le mécanisme des pulsions ” pour mettre à nu le mal qui hante leurs héros à chaque pas. C’est un mal “ ambiant, atmosphérique, qui flotte sur les pages de ces nouvelles comme les brumes pétersbourgeoises dans les romans de Dostoïevski. Car, comme ce dernier, Ti{ma a senti l’haleine du mal absolu ”, poursuit-elle en montrant comment, chez cet écrivain, même l’amour peut devenir la source du mal, comme c’est le cas justement dans la nouvelle “ L’intempérie ”, “ sans doute parmi les plus belles oeuvres de prose que l’Europe de l’Est nous a offertes l’année dernière ”.

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Pour J. Michaut (42) aussi, Ti{ma est un “ analyste rigoureux ” dont l’art “ consiste à démonter le mécanisme de ces étranges pulsions ” qui se manifestent dans différentes formes de violence : idéologique, politique et passionnelle. Mais, par rapport à Jurgenson qui situe *Sans cris* dans la lignée des proses dostoïevskiennes, Michaut finit par tirer une conclusion qui place ce recueil dans un contexte tout à fait différent. D’après lui, il s’agit ici, en effet, d’une “ littérature de l’immédiat, de l’instinct, ‘américaine’ dans son appréhension dynamique de la réalité ”, qui est “ en parfaite syntonie ” avec l’esprit de son temps.

Ces deux lectures qui situent *Sans cris* dans des contextes divers, montrent, non seulement la différence des points de vue critiques mais aussi une autre chose : le fait que ce recueil de nouvelles se prête facilement à différentes interprétations. Mais cela n’a pas été suffisant pour attirer l’attention et la curiosité d’autres critiques.

En ce qui concerne le roman *La Jeune fille brune*, livre de jeunesse de l’auteur, les critiques, toujours peu nombreux, ont remarqué, en revanche, sa particularité, sans entrer, pour autant, dans une analyse approfondie. C’est un livre qui, “ en brisant les conventions du genre ”, se situe “ à mille lieux de l’univers sombre et désespéré ”, propre aux oeuvres postérieures de cet écrivain, “ qui sont une exploration clinique de la violence humaine ”, constate, par exemple, Jean-Baptiste Mauroux (43) avant de faire un parallèle inattendu : “ *La Jeune fille brune* a la fraîcheur, l’optimisme insouciant (et) la candeur même de certaines nouvelles de Hermann Hesse. ” Sophie Massalovitch (44), elle aussi, tient à souligner que le ton de ce court roman “ empreint de nostalgie ” diffère des autres livres de Ti{ma, tandis que P.-L. Thomas (45) précise qu’il s’agit, en effet, d’une “ irrémédiable nostalgie des occasions manquées et du temps enfui ” qui donne à cet ouvrage “ en demi-teintes ” un accent particulier. *La Jeune fille brune* est un livre concentré “ tout entier sur une recherche passionnée et ardente ”.

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En un mot, conclut ce dernier, un livre “ magnifique ” et “ envoûtant ”.

7. Le personnage principal : la mémoire

S'il fallait présenter l'accueil réservé aux livres d'Aleksandar Ti{ma d'une manière graphique, en s'appuyant exclusivement sur les données exposées jusqu'à présent, on pourrait utiliser l'image d'une ligne descendante. Car, après avoir atteint son apogée avec la publication de *L'usage de l'homme*, presque au début de la présentation des oeuvres de Ti{ma en France, l'intérêt pour cet écrivain a progressivement diminué, pour se transformer finalement en un faible écho, voire en une indifférence. Cependant, à partir de 1993, grâce à un concours particulier de circonstances, Ti{ma devient de nouveau l'objet d'intérêt des journalistes et, dans une moindre mesure, des critiques littéraires.

Mais la vraie raison de ce regain d'intérêt n'est pas forcément littéraire, bien que la curiosité pour les qualités esthétiques des oeuvres de Ti{ma n'y ait pas été étrangère. Horrifié par la guerre civile dans son pays, l'écrivain quitte la Yougoslavie en un geste de protestation morale, et s'installe, pour un certain temps, en France en tant qu'écrivain résident (46). Considéré comme une autorité morale, comme un intellectuel pacifiste, il est aussitôt chaleureusement accueilli par la presse, et en particulier par les journaux régionaux (47).

Mais, bien qu'elle soit interprétée d'un point de vue politique (48), l'arrivée de l'écrivain en France et, peu après, la publication de ses deux livres dans l'édition de poche (49), ont été également un signal, une sorte de rappel, pour certains critiques qui n'ont d'ailleurs pas tardé à se manifester. Nous pensons ici surtout à Laurand Kovacs et Luba Jurgenson dont des essais inspirés, écrits à cette occasion, méritent une attention particulière (50).

Dans son essai intitulé “ Dessin d'une disparition ”

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(51), Luba Jurgenson perçoit tous les livres de Ti{ma comme des éléments d'une matière unique, comme des " fragments d'un même tableau " qui est une image bouleversante de toutes les formes de l'anéantissement de l'homme et, au même temps, un requiem pour tous les suppliciés et tous les survivants. En essayant de saisir l'essentiel de cette oeuvre unique et polyvalente, ce critique a choisi une méthode peu habituelle: au lieu d'analyser et puis d'en tirer des conclusions, Jurgenson se pose des questions. Beaucoup de questions, et en particulier celles, essentielles, qui ont également hanté les personnages de Ti{ma dans leur confrontation avec la violence et la mort.

Ce sont des questions simples, mais terribles dans leur simplicité, qui traduisent bien l'atmosphère de ce monde sans pitié, de ce cauchemar dantesque dans lequel se sont retrouvés les héros de Ti{ma : " Comment mourir en famille ? (...) Comment trouver le calme dans le pressentiment du danger, comment confier à ses enfants la certitude de la mort prochaine ? " " Comment être un survivant ? " " Comment échapper au lot commun ? "... Ces questions, posées donc au coeur du drame vécu par les personnages de Ti{ma, concernent une tragédie historique, celle de Juifs de Novi Sad. Mais la façon dont elles sont posées et traitées dans ces livres, précise ce critique, nous suggère aussi qu' " être Juif n'est pas un destin à part, mais la quintessence du destin humain ", comme disait autrefois Danilo Ki{.

D'autres questions, non moins importantes, d'après Jurgenson, touchent plus directement à la poétique d'Alexandre Ti{ma. En d'autres termes, ce sont des questions qui se sont imposées à l'auteur lui-même, contraint à la fois de vivre cette réalité souvent insoutenable, et de la transformer en une fiction d'ordre esthétique. Comment, par exemple, vivre au milieu de tous ces souvenirs, sans cesse vivants et réitérés, " de ce qui fut l'horreur absolue " ? A cette question, Ti{ma a donné une réponse claire : en écrivant ! Ou plus précisément, en écrivant des

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livres dont la vision dépasse la vérité partielle d'un témoin. Car, comme le constate Jurgenson, Ti{ma n'est ni Rousset, ni Chalamov, et ses récits n'appartiennent certainement pas à la " littérature carcérale " :

" Il est le témoin qui se tient dans les coulisses. Aussi, sa langue a-t-elle conservé la sensibilité qui habite les récits dont le personnage principal est la mémoire ; il n'a pas été frappé de non-être, il nous transmet, au-delà de l'horreur, la joie d'être toujours là (...) Le plaisir de raconter a survécu à tout le reste. " (52)

Bien sûr, précise ce critique, il s'agit ici d'un plaisir créatif qui a justement permis à cet auteur de trouver, " quelque part au milieu du magma du langage en perpétuelle mutation, un point stable " d'où il a pu observer et décrire tous ces " paysages de l'horreur " qui traversent ses livres.

En ce qui concerne l'essai de Laurand Kovacs (53), l'un des critiques les plus fidèles à Aleksandar Ti{ma, il est, en quelque sorte, la synthèse de ses réflexions exposées à plusieurs reprises sous la forme de comptes rendus. Son champ d'observation, comme c'est aussi le cas pour l'essai de Jurgenson, est l'oeuvre de Ti{ma dans son ensemble, ou plus précisément, ses grandes lignes qui sont, en effet, les éléments principaux de la poétique et de la vision du monde de l'écrivain.

D'après Kovacs, il s'agit d'une oeuvre qui est apparemment facile à situer : " le lieu de la tragédie " est presque toujours Novi Sad et, plus généralement, la Voïvodine. Le temps de la tragédie, lui aussi est très précis : c'est la période de la Deuxième Guerre mondiale, ou pour reprendre son expression, " le temps de la violence et de la mort, le temps de l'ignominie ". Quant à la motivation de l'écrivain, ou ce qui est devenu la source de son inspiration, il n'y a pas non plus un mystère. Sauvé, *in extremis*, lors des rafles de Novi Sad (1942), Ti{ma va devenir le témoin du terrible " calvaire des suppliciés ", un " témoin innocent " mais " hanté de

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remords ". Et c'est justement " de ce remords infondé, longtemps contenu et richement nourri par lui-même, que surgira, telle une explosion, l'essentiel de son oeuvre " .

Mais si cette oeuvre est facile à situer, son monde intérieur, complexe et fondé parfois sur des " relations ambiguës ", demande, au contraire, beaucoup plus de lucidité critique. Kovacs le sait bien, et le montre dans son analyse. En parlant, par exemple, de la complexité des personnages de Ti{ma, ou de sa vision de l'homme dépourvue de tout manichéisme, il met en valeur cette rare subtilité de l'écrivain examinant " les liens qui unissent le criminel à son crime et le crime à la victime ", sans jamais " sombrer dans la macabre imposture qui tend à établir la connivence entre le chasseur et le gibier ". En effet, souligne Kovacs, la vision de Ti{ma, bien qu'elle tienne compte des causes du crime historique, va au-delà de la culpabilité et de l'innocence. Son but est ailleurs : montrer " l'universel imbroglio qui fait de l'individu le jouet de pouvoirs et de forces maléfiques " .

Bien sûr, c'est d'abord à cause de cette vision confiée à un narrateur dont la vue est toujours " plus large que la situation ", et dont " le désir de témoigner n'est pas dévoyé par la passion vengeresse ", que le cycle romanesque de Ti{ma est souvent comparé au *Pentateuque*. Mais, comme le dit, à bon droit, Kovacs, il ne faut pas prendre cette comparaison au pied de la lettre. Ti{ma est avant tout l'écrivain de son époque et le chroniqueur impitoyable d'un crime historique. C'est pourquoi d'ailleurs " il se garde de l'exaltation mystique ". Le pardon, s'il survient dans ses romans, conclut-il, " ne peut pas être collectif, ni dicté par angélisme, il est lié à la dissection de l'âme en proie aux souffrances du corps et de l'esprit " .

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Ces dernières réactions, très favorables à Aleksandar Ti{ma, sont, bien sûr, des signes encourageants. Pourtant,

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elles ne peuvent pas changer essentiellement l'image de cet écrivain en France que nous avons essayé de reconstituer tout au long de ce texte : image d'un écrivain découvert avec enthousiasme et, puis, laissé à la sollicitude de quelques critiques d'une fidélité à toute épreuve.

D'autre part, nous ne pouvons pas ne pas nous rendre compte d'un paradoxe peu commun : bien que la plupart des oeuvres de Tisma n'aient suscité qu'un intérêt très modeste, les éditions L'Age d'Homme n'ont pas cessé de publier régulièrement ses nouveaux livres. Cette persévérance de l'éditeur donne à espérer qu'un jour, peut-être, l'oeuvre de Tisma sera relue dans son ensemble et réévaluée en France.

1. Traduit par Catherine de Leobardy, L'Age d'Homme 1981.
2. Voir à ce sujet : *Entretien*, propos recueillis par Antoine Spire. Cet entretien, aussi bien que deux essais écrits par Laurand KOVACS et Luba JURGENSON, fait partie d'une publication spéciale consacrée à l'écrivain par l'Office du livre en Poitou-Charentes. (*Aleksandar Tisma*, Niort 1993, p. 15-27)
3. Ghislain SARTORIS : " Mesurer le mal ", *Magazine littéraire*, n° 176, septembre 1981.
4. Laurand KOVACS : " Aleksandar Tisma : l'École d'impiété ", *La NRF*, n° 348, 1982, p. 153-155.
5. Traduit par Madeleine Stevanov, L'Age d'Homme 1985.
6. Laurand KOVACS : " Alexandre Tisma : *L'usage de l'homme* ", *La NRF*, n° 396, janvier 1986, p. 110.
7. Nicole ZAND : " Le hurlement silencieux d'Alexandre Tisma ", *Le Monde*, 18 octobre 1985, p. 19.
8. ANONYME : " Tisma (Alexandre) / *L'usage de l'homme* ", *BCLF*, n° 486, juin 1986, p. 863.
9. Jean-Loup PERRET : " La lumière et la boue ", *Minute*, 4 janvier 1986.
10. L. C. : " Roman *L'usage de l'homme* par Alexandre Tisma ", *l'Actualité religieuse*, 1985.
11. Raymond JACQUET : " *L'usage de l'homme* par Alexandre Tisma ", *Le Réveil du Centre*, mars 1986.
12. Antoine SPIRE : " Tisma maître du réalisme ", *Le Matin*, 1er octobre 1985, p. 25.
13. J.-M. DE MONTREMY : " La rentrée des 'étrangers' ", *La Croix l'événement*, 28 septembre 1985, p. 11.

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14. L. KOVACS , *La NRF*, n° 396, p. 111.
15. A. SPIRE : *Op. cit.*
16. L. KOVACS : *Op. cit.*, p. 112.
17. Olivier ROLIN : “ Alexandre Tisma, la littérature en cendres ”, *Libération*, 30 octobre 1985, p. 29-30.
18. André CLAVEL : “ Où l’homme est un loup pour l’homme ”, *Journal de Genève*, 7 décembre 1985. Dans ce texte, Clavel évoque également deux autres livres écrits par des auteurs yougoslaves : *Gullo, Gullo* de Miodrag Bulatoviæ et l’*Encyclopédie des morts* de Danilo Ki{.
19. N. ZAND : *Op. cit.*
20. J.-M. DE MONTREMY : *Op. cit.*
21. “ La plaine danubienne ”, *La Quinzaine littéraire*, n° 451, 16-30 nov. 1985, p. 8.
22. O. ROLIN : *Op. cit.*
23. C. P. : “ Une odysée croate ”, l’*Humanité*, 23 décembre 1985. Signalons ici que ce titre, sans aucun rapport avec le sujet de l’article, nous apparaît étrange, d’autant plus qu’il peut créer une certaine confusion en faisant penser que Ti{ma est un écrivain croate.
24. J.-L. J. : “ *L’usage de l’homme*, roman d’Alexandre Tisma ”, *Figaro magazine*, 9 novembre 1985.
25. “ *L’usage de l’homme* ou chronique d’une détresse bien ordinaire ”, *La Libre Belgique*, 9 décembre 1985, p. 2.
26. Traduit par Madeleine Stevanov, *L’Age d’Homme* 1986.
27. Claude FROCHAUX : “ Alexandre Tisma / *Le Livre de Blam* ”, *Journal, L’Age d’Homme* 1986.
28. *Ibid.*
29. “ La difficulté de survivre ”, *Le Quotidien de Paris*, 6 janvier 1987.
30. M. BELETTO : “ Tisma (Alexandre). - *Le Livre de Blam* ”, *Les Livres*, n° 3220, juin 1987, p. 112.
31. Laurent LEMIRE : “ Rumeurs d’une vie ”, *La Croix*, 11 octobre 1986.
32. “ Blam préfère l’oubli au pardon ”, *Le Matin*, 9 décembre 1986.
33. “ Alexandre Tisma : *Le Livre de Blam* ”, *La NRF*, n° 411, avril 1987, p. 113-115.
34. ANONYME : “ Tisma (Alexandre) / *Le Livre de Blam* ”, *BCLF*, n° 499, juillet 1987, p. 1006.
35. Traduit par Madeleine Stevanov, *L’Age d’Homme* 1987.
36. “ Le désespoir absolu d’Alexandre Tisma ”, *Liberté courrier*, 9/10 avril 1988.
37. “ Alexandre Tisma / *Croyances et méfiances* ”, *Journal, L’Age d’Homme*, novembre 1987.
38. Traduit par Madeleine Stevanov, *L’Age d’Homme*, 1989.
39. “ Alexandre Tisma : *Le Kapo* ”, *La NRF*, n° 443, décembre 1989, p. 123-126.
40. Ces trois livres sont traduits par Madeleine Stevanov et édités par *L’Age d’Homme*, respectivement en 1990, 1992 et 1994.
41. “ Le cri de Tisma ”, *Libération*, 11 avril 1991

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42. " Tisma (Alexandre). - *Sans cris* ", *Les Livres*, n° 354, avril 1991, p. 122.
43. " Quand Don Juan devient poète avec Alexandre Tisma ", *La Liberté*, Fribourg, 30-31 janvier 1993.
44. " Nostalgie sur fond de brume ", *Le Quotidien de Paris* ", 13 avril 1993.
45. " Tisma (Alexandre). - *La Jeune fille brune* ", *Les Livres*, n° 371, mars 1993, p. 80.
46. Après avoir passé deux ans en France, Ti{ma est finalement rentré chez lui avant la fin de la guerre.
47. *L'Union* (Reims) et *L'Est Éclair* (Troyes) se sont, cependant, montrés les plus accueillants. Ils ont publié plusieurs articles sur l'arrivée et le séjour de l'écrivain en France. (Voir : *L'Union* du 28 nov. 1993 et du 7 et 15 déc. 1993 ; et *L'Est Éclair* du 30 nov. 1993 et du 16 et 18 déc. 1993.)
48. A ces propos, il suffit de rappeler l'article de Jean-Baptiste HARANG qui constate que le séjour de Ti{ma en France est, en effet, une sorte d'exil. (" Tisma, Serbe acerbe ", *Libération*, 22 avril 1993, p. 19-20)
49. Il s'agit de *L'usage de l'homme* et du *Livre de Blam*, publiés au début de l'année 1993 par Julliard/L'Age d'Homme, dans la collection 10/18.
50. Ces deux essais sont publiés, comme nous l'avons déjà indiqué, dans la publication spéciale: *Aleksandar Tisma*, Niort 1993, 37 p.
51. *Ibid.*, p. 29-37.
52. *Ibid.*, p. 31.
53. " Confluences et essence ", *Aleksandar Tisma*, p. 5-13.

Arts

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PISMA



LETTRES DE  LETTERS

Sve su stvari povezane

Poglavica plemena Seattle

Godine 1854, Veliki Beli Poglavica iz Va{ingtona, ponudio je Indijancima da od njih otkupi deo njihove teritorije i obe}ao im jedan «rezervat». Odgovor poglavice plemena Seattle se smatra najlep{om izjavom ljubavi prema prirodi koja je ikada napisana.

Kako je mogu}e kupiti ili prodati nebo, zemljinu toplotu ? Ta ideja nas veoma ~udi. Ako mi ne posedujemo sve' inu vazduha i odbleske u vodi, kako vi mislite to da kupite ?

Svaki deli} ove zemlje je za moj narod svetinja. Svaka borova iglica i svaki pe{-ani sprud, i pramen magle u {umi, i proplanak i zujanje bube, svetinja su u uspomeni moga naroda. Sokovi u drve}u prenose se}anja Crvenog ~oveka. Kad odlaze u {etnju medju zvezde,

umrli Beli ljudi zaboravljaju zemlju svoga rođenja. Naši mrtvi ne zaboravljaju nikada ovu predivnu zemlju, jer ona je majka Crvenog ~oveka. Mi smo jedan deo te zemlje i ona je deo nas. Mirisne biljke su naše sestre ; jelen, konj i veliki orao su naša braća. Stenoviti grebeni, livadski sokovi, toplina ponija i ~ovek, svi pripadaju istoj porodici.

Ustvari, kada nam Veliki Poglavica iz Vašingtona javlja da hoće da kupi našu zemlju, on od nas traži previše.

Veliki Poglavica nam poručuje da će nam obezbediti jedno mesto gde ćemo udobno živeti. On će biti naš otac, a mi njegova deca. Mi razmišljamo o vašoj ponudi da kupite našu zemlju. Ali, to neće biti lako. Jer, ova zemlja je naša svetinja.

Blistava voda koja teče u potocima i rekama nije samo voda, ona je i krv naših predaka. Ako vam mi prodamo zemlju, moraćete se setiti da je ona svetinja, i moraćete naučiti vašu decu da je ona svetinja i da svaki odsjaj vode u jezeru govori o događajima iz života mog naroda i njegovim uspomenama. @ubor vode je glas oca moga oca.

Reke su naše sestre, one gase našu 'edj. Reke nose naše kanoe i hrane našu decu. Ako vam mi prodamo našu zemlju, moraćete pamtiti i naučiti vašu decu da su reke naše i naše sestre i moraćete ubuduće prema rekama osećati onu ne'nost koju ste osećali prema našim sestrama.

Mi znamo da Beli ~ovek ne razume naše običaje. Svaki delić zemlje njemu je podjednak, jer on je stranac koji sti'e no}u i uzima od zemlje ono što mu treba. Njemu zemlja nije majka, već neprijatelj. Kada je pobedi, on ide dalje. On napušta grob svojih predaka i to ga ne uzbuđuje. On ne pamti grob svojih predaka i baštinu svoje dece. Prema svojoj majci - zemlji i prema svome bratu - nebu, on se odnosi kao prema stvarima za prodaju, kupovinu ili pljačku, kao da su to ovce ili staklene perle. Njegov apetit će zemlju pojesti, iza njega će ostati pustinja.

Ja to ne razumem. Naši običaji su drugačiji od vaših. Od pogleda na vaše gradove, Crvenog ~oveka bole oči.

Mo' da je to stoga {to je Crveni ~ovek divljak i ne razume.

U gradovima Belog ~oveka nema mira. Nema mesta gde ~ovek mo'e da ~uje otvaranje li{a u prole}e, ili {u{tanje krila insekata. Mo' da je to zato {to sam ja divljak i ne razumem. Meni se ~ini da buka vredja u{i. Ne vidim za{to 'iveti ako ne mogu ~uti krik usamljenog galeba ili no}ni kreket 'aba oko jezera. Indijanci vole tihi zvuk vetra koji fiju~e kao strela po povr{ini jezera ili miomir vetra opranog podnevnom ki{om i punog mirisa bora.

Vazduh je dragocen Crvenom ~oveku jer mi svi delimo isti dah : i 'ivotinja, i drvo, i ~ovek, svi dele isti dah. Ali, izgleda da Beli ~ovek ne prime}uje vazduh koga di{e. Kao ~ovek koji je na samrti vi{e dana, on ne ose}a zadah. Ali, ako vam mi prodamo na{u zemlju, vi ne smete zaboraviti da nam je vazduh dragocen, jer vazduh deli svoj dah sa svim 'ivim bi}ima.

Vetar koji je na{em dedi dao prvi uzdah, primio je i njegov poslednji izdah. Jer, ako mi prodamo na{u zemlju, trebalo bi da je posebno ~uvate i da je smatrate osve}enom. Mi razmi{ljam o va{oj ponudi da je kupite. Ali, ako mi odlu~imo da je prihvatimo, ja postavljam jedan uslov : Beli ~ovek }e morati da se prema 'ivotinjama odnosi kao prema bra}i.

Ja sam divljak i ne umem da 'ivim druga~ije. Video sam stotine bizona kako trunu u preriji, napu{tenih od Belog ~oveka koji ih je ubio iz voza. Ja sam divljak i ne razumem kako jedan gvozdeni konj mo'e biti va'niji od bizona koga mi ubijamo samo da bi se hranili. [ta je ~ovek bez 'ivotinja ? Ako bi sve 'ivotinje nestale, ~ovek bi umro od duhovne usamljenosti. Ono {to se bude desilo 'ivotinjama, desi}e se ubrzo i ljudima. Sve su stvari povezane.

Trebalo bi da objasnite va{oj deci da zemlja po kojoj gaze, sadr'i pepeo na{ih predaka. Da bi zemlju po{tovali, ka'ite im da je ona oboga}ena 'ivotima ljudi na{e rase. Ka'ite i va{oj deci ono {to smo mi rekli na{oj : da je zemlja na{a majka. Sve {to se bude desilo zemlji,

desi}e se i sinovima zemlje. Kada ljudi pljuju na zemlju, oni pljuju na sebe.

Mi jedno znamo : zemlja ne pripada ~oveku. ^ovek pripada zemlji. To je ono {to mi znamo. Sve su stvari povezane kao krv koja spaja istu porodicu. Nije ~ovek taj koji je ispleo 'ivotnu potku. On je samo jedan njen konac. [to god on ~ini toj potki, ~ini samom sebi. ^ak ni Beli ~ovek, ~iji se Bog {eta s njime i pri~a kao sa prijateljem, ne mo'e biti izuzet od zajedni~ke sudbine. Na kraju krajeva, mo'da smo mi bra}a ? To }emo jo{ videti. Ima ne{to {to mi znamo, i {to }e Beli ~ovek mo'da otkriti jednog dana - to je da su na{ i va{ Bog isti Bog. Vi ste mo'da smatrali da je on va{e dobro kao {to 'elite da na{a zemlja postane va{e dobro, ali, varate se, to nije mogu}e. On je ~ovekov Bog i njegova milost je podjednaka i za Crvenog i za Belog ~oveka. Ova zemlja je Njemu dragocena i, nju vredjati zna-i prezirati njenog tvorca.

I Belci }e jednom nestati, mo'da i pre ostalih plemena. Ali, kad vi budete umirali, to }e biti u blesku, blistavom i u'arenom od mo}i Boga koji vas je ovamo doveo i koji je s nekim posebnim ciljem u~inio da vi gospodarite u ovoj zemlji i Crvenim ~ovekom. Ta sudbina ostaje za nas misteriozna ; mi ne shvatamo za{to su bizoni istrebljeni, divlji konji ukro}eni, tajnoviti proplanci u {umi ispunjeni vonjem mnogobrojnih ljudi, pogled na bre'uljke pune cve}a ispresecan 'icama koje prenose glas. Gde su bizoni ? Nestali ! Gde je orao ? Nestao ! Njihov kraj je po~etak pre'ivljavanja. Jer, sve su stvari povezane.

Prevod sa francuskog Dj. Konjikovi}

Basara i "Loonly Tunes"

- *Me/u javom i me/ snom* -

Spasa Ratkovic

Ovoga leta Basara je u Beogradu nesumnjivo "in". Sudeci po podacima beogradskih knjizara, njegov najnoviji roman "Looney Tunes" nalazi se u samom vrhu lestvica citanosti. Ova "manicno-paranoicna istorija srpske knjizevnosti" (kako stoji u podnaslovu dela) jos jedna je od vrlo uspehlih, inteligentnih i duhovitih Basarinih mistifikacija u kojoj se on poigrava s realnoscu i ruga svetu i vremenu u kome zivimo.

Iznenadenja nije bilo - Basara nas je ponovo iznenadio. Kao i u jednom od prethodnih romana, on i ovoga puta govori o svojoj i nasoj "ukletoj zemlji", pretvarajuci se pritom da pise istoriju knjizevnosti. Prica, slojevita i kompleksna, ispricana je sada iz jednog sasvim novog ugla. Glavni junak - Basara glavom i bradom - vodi nas od jedne do druge terevenke, po Bajinoj Basti, Budvi, Virpazaru, Labudovom brdu..., kroz paralelno vreme i paralelni prostor koji, ne obziruci se na fizicke zakone, nastanjuju realni i fiktivni ljudi - knjizevnici, politicari, disidenti; osobe od krvi i mesa, stiropora ili ektoplazme. Basara postavlja na scenu citav jedan kaos - nas sopstveni - i nudi nam jednu sasvim subjektivnu sliku vremena proslog i sadasnjeg: "*Kao sto rekoh: sve o cem u govorim vidim sa visoka, ali toga na cem u stojim nema, otislo je u nepovrat.*"

SUBJEKTIVIZAM I EGOCENTRIZAM

Sa tog svog apsurdnog položaja Basara posmatra apsurdnu stvarnost. Roman je napisan u prvom licu - piscevo "ja" svuda je prisutno. (*"Averzija prema trecem licu zauvek je ostala"*) Uobicajeno trojstvo autor-pripovedac-lik svedeno je na jedinstvo: Basara Basarinim recima govori o Basari. Time on sebi dopusta jedan sasvim specifični subjektivizam, mogli bismo reci i - egocentrizam (ovde u pozitivnom smislu reci). Nasa novija politicka i knjizevna istorija date su kroz prizmu Basarinog jedinstvenog videnja stvari: ta istorija je samo njegova, a on je u njenom centru. Piscu iz njegovog neposrednog okruzenja izbijaju u prvi plan, knjizevne tradicije su dovedene u pitanje: *"I tako stizemo in medias res. Tradicionalisti, predvodeni Disidentom,...), nikada nisu sledili tradiciju (osim, mozda, tradiciju Prve proleterske) ali su vremenom, strpljivim radom, uz nesebicnu lektorsku pomoc B. Mihailovica-Mihiza, stvorili jednu pseudotradiciju, prozu u kojoj je vladala cizma i cvrsta ruka i u kojoj se znao svaki rad, red i mir."*

Stavivsi svoj ego u srediste stvari, Basara se poigrava idejom o tome kako on, u stvari, pise esej. Protivrecnost izmedu knjizevnog subjektivizma i naucne objektivnosti samo je prividna. Vesto balansirajuci na ivici izmedu romana i eseja, Basara uvlači citaoca u svoj egocentrični sistem i navodi ga da ga prihvati kao jednu suludu, ali objektivnu realnost. Pa kako da na to ne pristanemo: citavo to Basarino ludilo i sami tako dobro poznajemo. A samom Basari nikako ne bi pristajala distanciranost od sopstvenog dela, jer kako sam kaze u ovom romanu : *"Na kraju, imamo retku sortu spisatelja - medu takve spadamo Vukovic i ja - koji su vise knjizevni likovi nego knjizevnici. Kod takvih slucajeva granica izmedu pisanja i svakodnevnog zivota veoma je tanka, ili je uopste nema."*

SUSRET REALNOG I FIKTIVNOG

Knjizevnost se mesa sa zivotom, stvarnost sa fikcijom. Basara od samog pocetka svoj roman izgradije kao "cardak ni na nebu, ni na zemlji", dovodeci u pitanje kategorije realnog i irealnog, vremena i prostora. Kod njega se uvek radi o subjektivnom vremenu i subjektivnom prostoru. Stvarnost je visestruka. Tako Basara govori o "onom vremenu paralelnom sa zvanicnim" i o prostoru koji ne potpada pod zakone fizike: "*Ali nevicni prevarama, nesigurni u solidnost sopstvene pokvarenosti, gradic u kojeg smo krenuli izmislili smo uz put...*" Fiktivni prostor naseljavaju fiktivni ljudi, cija se najezda tek ocekuje: "*Tada su pseudoljudi jos uvek bili nesigurni u sebe, nerado su se isticali...*"

Basarinim recnikom receno: ovo je jos jedna povest o propasti simulakruma. Otud toliko fikcije, toliko falsifikata; otud toliko "ontoloskih statusa" nase stvarnosti. Simulakrum SFRJ smenio je najnoviji fiktivni svet i fiktivni ljudi u njemu. Prosllost je bila samo predstava za mase, po sistemu "hleba i igara": "*Ne zaboravimo: bilo je to vreme kada je SFRJ jos uvek imala dovoljno deviznih rezervi i energenata da uspesno finansira simulakrum svog postojanja. Vrhunac masovne psihoze. Zvezdani trenutak jedne geopoliticke dezinformacije.*" Sadasnjost je jedna nova fikcija. Jos jedan pojavni oblik stvarnosti jeste svet u delima kritickog realizma: on nije uzrok, vec posledica postojanja takve knjizevnosti. Slicno Borhesu, Basara pravi svojevrsni kopernikanski obrt - fikcija je primarna nad realnoscu, stvarnost je nestvarna.

Roman "Looney Tunes" prikazuje jednu neobicnu spregu knjizevnosti i stvarnosti: s vremenom, pojavnost pocinje da lici na knjizevne opise. "*Jer, sve stvari koje nisu bile unutar fonda reci koriscenih u Disidentovim knjigama, precutno su oglasene nevazecim*" "*...Zemlja je bila svedena na dimenzije Disidentovih sabranih dela...*" "*Postupno, drzava se pretvarala u dosadno stivo..*" Basara se drznuo da na veoma duhovit i ironican nacin dovede u

pitanje već utemeljene vrednosti novije srpske književnosti (otelotvorene u liku Disidenta, naseg cuvenog pisca i bivseg predsednika) i da ih optuzi za ogranicenost, ucmalost i skucenost pogleda. Disidentov svet je precizno definisani realizam, Basarin - vecito cudenje i zapitanost.

Roman "Looney Tunes" predstavlja vapaj za autenticnoscu koja je tako tragicno ustupila mesto nekoj vrsti mimikrije. Svet srlja u propast. Njime vladaju pseudoljudi. Oni su izvrsili i prethodni "ontoloski prevrat": "*Oni koji su po inerciji jos upotrebljavali reci: nebo, duh, dusa. Bog, pa makar i u psovkama.*" Fiktivni ljudi nemaju nikakvog morala, nikakve duhovnosti. Oni ipak, kao "*postistorijska nuznost*", pokrecu nas fiktivni svet. A mi smo, rece Basara, "*jos uvek samo pijanisti u r'n'r bendu.*" Nasa realnost je od drugorazrednog znacaja.

O SMEHU I PODSMEHU

Jedna od konstanti Basarinog književnog stila jeste njegov fini, istancani smisao za humor. Citajuci "Looney Tunes" cini nam se da se Basara pisuci svoje delo odlicno zabavljao. Ironija i autoironija su nacin da se donekle distancira od dela za koje kaze da mu je istetovirano na unutrasnjoj strani koze. Mogli bismo reci da se radi o distanciranju radi jos veceg priblizavanja: Basara sa svetom oko sebe i sa sobom samim stupa u vrlo specifican odnos poigravanja i podrugivanja radi boljeg i dubljeg razumevanja.

Cemu se Basara smeje? Smeje se svemu o cemu govori. Istoriji, na primer: "*A sve su to, jednoobrazno obuceni u tamnoplava odela prekratkih rukava i nogavica, posmatrali prilicno antropoidni serbstvujujsci istoricari; gomila pohlepkih i slavoljubivih dinaroida, koji su mi hleb uzimali svesno guseci Brodelov pristup istorijskoj materiji, preferirajuci model Filipa Visnjica.*" Basarina ironija ne stedi ni književnost: pocevsi od vec pomenutih poigravanja sa Disidentom i srpskom književnom

tradicijom, pa sve do nasih dana i najaktuelnijih knjizevnika: *"Masta je odmah proradila: sama devojka koja u tri ujutru poziva nepoznatog muskarca na zurku - to postoji samo u pricama Davida Albaharija. Mora da je neka zamka."* Ili: *"Albahari je u pravu: tajna drustva postoje samo u mojim knjigama."*

Zanimljivost romana "Looney Tunes" je između ostalog i u tome što nam Basara pokazuje kako ni samog sebe preozbiljno ne shvata, kako i prema sopstvenoj knjizevnoj i privatnoj licnosti ima jedan ironičan odnos koji dovodi do većitog preispitivanja i predefinisiranja sopstvenog "ja": *"Poceo sam da licim na antikvitet. Po meni se nahvatala bledozelena patina. Golubovi su poceli da seruckaju po meni. Jednom me je - dok sam stajao na Kalemegdanu - grupa prvoboraca prispelih u Beograd na proslavu pobede nad fasizmom - zamenila sa spomenikom Duri Pucaru, pa su pred moje noge polozili venac sa petokrakom i ukipili se u stavu mirno odajuci mi postu minutom cutanja."*


Basarini pozivi na smeh su svojevrsni pozivi na saucesnistvo u raskrinkavanju jednog poludelog sveta ciji nas junaci cesto podsecaju na groteskno smesne i apsurdne likove i situacije iz Markesovih i Ljosinih dela. Suluda stvarnost provocira suludi humor - i mi se smejemo, saucestvujemo.

TO BE CONTINUED

Roman "Looney Tunes" trazi aktivnog citaoca - rekosmo vec, nasmejanog, ali i radoznalog i zapitanog nad enigmom koju nam Basara postavlja vec od prvih stranica svog dela. Potrebno je razumeti skriveni smisao mnogobrojnih "apsurdnih" dogadaja i identifikovati njihove aktere. Ko su S, S, S & S? Kakav je smisao Disidentove levitacije? Zasto je ubijena gospoda Ivanic? Basara od nas trazi mnogo vise od obicne pismenosti i knjizevne kompetencije: za potpuno razumevanje romana

"Looney Tunes" potrebno je dobro poznavati ovo vreme i ovu zemlju. Cini mi se da se radi o jednoj "neprevodivoj" knjizi.

Basarin roman kao enigma pocinje, kao enigma se završava. Autor ce u završnim rcenicama svog dela "bezobrazno" zagolicati nasu radoznalost nagovestavajuci nam resenje zagonetke (na koju smo vec pomalo zaboravili) i zadovoljavajuci se da nam - po oprobanoj metodi TV-sapunica - pricu prekine onda kad je najzbudljivije, onda kad se zapitamo: i sta dalje? Basara nam odgovara: "To be continued."



ERASMUS

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Ivo [krabalo, Dra'en Budi{a, Vlado Gotovac, Mladen
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Jugoslaviji od 1921 do 1991 godine**

*(Po svim zvani-
nim, a u nekim slu-
ajevima, i
korigovanim popisima)*

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Dr Bogoljub Ko-ovi}

**NAUKA
NACIONALIZAM
I PROPAGANDA**

*Između gubitaka i "rtava Drugog
svetskog rata u Jugoslaviji"*

Predgovor

Dr Selimir Govedarica

Uvodna re-

Dr Vladeta Vu-kovi}

Pariz, 1998.

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DEDINO PISMO

Prelaz preko Albanije (Autobiografske uspomene)

Ing. Stevan [uica (1901-1988)

“ *Draga deco,* Zemun, Petak,
26.10.1984 .0:33 h

Od spavanja opet nema ništa ! A za ovo jutro u planu mi je mnogo toga ; ~ak i 2 penjanja na merdevine (5m visoke) radi sasecanja vrhova morskog duda i tuje, da nebi ove zime sneg polomio te moje ukrase u bašti ... Razmi{ljah da li ste primili moja pisamca, vi koji ste danas tamo u belom svetu ; da li po{ta sti'e do Pariza i Atine, i da li uop{te imate vremena da ih pro-itate... Morah ne{to preduzeti bar do 4:30, da «pariram» nesanicu...

E, pa evo, moje preduzimanje je u slede}em - jedan esej i to :

@IVOT I PRIKLJU^ENIJA VA[EG RODITELJA
dok jo{ be{e de~ak od 13 godina i koji prodje Albaniju pe{ke 1915-te (srpska Golgota), a to traja{e od septembra 1915-te do 30-og decembra 1915-te ! Novu godinu do~ekasmo na Italijanskom Transatlantiku “ RE VITTORIO “ u kabinama I klase, {to za nas be{e pravi zemaljski raj

28. JULA 1914 - Buknuo je I svetski rat, a mi smo ‘iveli u Zemunu, u Austro-Ugarskoj monarhiji. Moj tata, major austrijski, zbog velikosrpstva, be{e konfiniran (pod stra‘om ispred ku}e). A kada hrabra srpska vojska potu-e Austrijance - ‘estoko- morado{e Austrijanci da se povla-e

u haosu i to no}u prema Batajnici. Tata moj, Jovan, zaklju-i da Austrijanci be'e i da ga ne bi odveli iz ku}e, skloni se duboko u vinograd. Medjutim stra'a ispred ku}e razbe'e se, kao i glavnina vojske, tako da je tata bio spa{en. Do 3 sata ujutro kuljala je austrijska vojska i tada se sve umirilo.

Kada je svanulo, gledamo kroz prozor : Nigde nikog nema ! Kao izumrli grad! Kad oko 6:30 h, 28.8.1914, ~uju se uzvici - i na ulici {ta vidimo - Srpska vojska !

Narod i deca se vesele i opkolili prvog srpskog oficira, majora Djuki}a, koji nastupa u Austriji. Sav oki}en belim pe{kirima i cve}em ! Za njim ide predhodnica, i tako stigo}e do Stare Pazove, {to traje}e 3 dana. Naravno, radovala se srbadija Zemuna. Ta mala srpska vojska da potu~e mo}nu i veliku Austriju ! Odli~ni behu srpske vojne stare{ine - vojvoda Putnik, vojvoda Mi{i}, pa Stepa Stepanovi} koji na Ceru dobi jednu od najve}ih bitaka i zarobi more Austrijanaca i opreme !

Ali iz strategijskih razloga morala se povu}i srpska vojska preko Save u Srbiju, a sa njima mnogi Srbi-Zemunci i cela na{a porodica, sa 2 ru~na kufera i maminim "schmukom" (brilijanti i drugo). Ku}a puna-prepuna, sa podrumom gde be}e oko 3000 l. vina - ostade. Oplja~kali su je proaustrijske pristalice i marinci. Samo nadjosmo klavir kada dodjosmo ku}i 1919-te u mesecu novembru - iz Afrike (Bizerta).

Jedini most koji je spajao Austriju sa Srbijom be}e 'elezni~ki most koji su Austrijanci digli u vazduh, ali srpska in'enjerija je brzo improvizirala opravku mosta tako da smo mogli, ali pa'ljivo, da predjemo u Srbiju. Tada je po~elo na{e pe{a~enje a i te{ko}e koje ratovi donose.

^im je Austrija objavila rat Srbiji, odmah je po~elo bombardovanje Beograda. Svaki dan! A preko na{ih glava letele su granate iz topova (haubicer, haubice-srpski), koji su izbacivali djulad pre~nika 305 mm.; one su u vazduhu nekako pucketale. A i dunavska austrijska flotila sa svojih monitora (ratni brodi}i), tukla je Beograd takodje

i to sa mesta, kod *[iroke Staze*, gde smo se obi-no kupali. Eto, ti mornari sa monitora odneso{e svu burad sa vinom. Pa vojska mora za vreme rata da dobija i vino a i rum (obi-no pre nekog juri{a). Po ceo dan ~ule su se eksplozije u Beogradu. A nama svima krivo i u sebi psujemo Austrijance.

Kada uspe{no predjosmo preko poru{enog mosta u Beograd, odosmo kod maminog brata, uja-Nece (Nestor) na Vra-ar. Ku}a velika i bogata. Tu se zadr'asmo par dana pa se preselismo kod *Topovskih [upa*. Tamo nisu padale granate. I tako 'ivotarismo do februara 1915-te jer su Nemci do{li u pomo} Austrijancima. Kao i uvek, dobro opremljeni, disciplinovani, pod komandom generala Makenzena, i da njih nije bilo, ne bi mogli Austrijanci zauzeti Beograd.

A kako smo provodili dane kod *Topovskih [upa* ! Austrijske granate iz haubica 305mm, nisu ugro'avale tu zonu, pa nam 'ivot po-eo da biva sno{niji. Be{e i kuvanja, ~ak koji put i kola-a. Pasulj be{e hrana broj 1. Mama je sve to stvarala sa minimalnim sredstvima. Najvi{e vremena provedosmo u kom{iluku kod g-dje Mare u-iteljice - udovice. Mu' joj pogibe u Balkanskom ratu. Ona je imala 3 }erke na{eg uzrasta. Jedna se zvala Rada - to sam zapamtio - a be{e nekako nama jako naklonjena i privr'ena. Sve se de{avalo u velikoj sobi sa nekoliko minderluka (kreveti za nu'du). I kuvanje i spavanje i dru{tvance. I oni pobego{e kod *Topovskih [upa*. Bilo nam je prijatno odlaziti kod njih. Sava i ja ~uli od nekih gostiju da mo'e da se ide bez dozvole na vojni polo'aj na Torlaku a da sada tamo nema vojske. Ostali su samo rovovi sa grudobranima. I nas dvojica, radoznali, bez pitanja ot{etasmoo tamo (1½ sat hoda) i stvarno - duboki rovovi pa u cik-cak. Be'anijsku Kosu lepo vidimo, a bogme, i Austrijanci Torlak. Sko-ismo malo u rovove i tr-karali, pa krenuli natrag. Idemo mi onako kao u {etnji - nikoga nismo sreli- kad na oko 40-50m visoko zasvetli crvena svetlost a kuglice iz tog svetla se rasprskavaju u vidu ki{obrana i udaraju nadole. Zemlja se malo

zapr{ivala. Mi u prvi mah ni{ta ne preduzimamo ali kad puknu{e jo{ nekoliko tih {rapnela, mi trkom preko grebena i be'.

Pa to su austrijski posmatra~i, durbinima, sa Be' anijske Kose, primetili na Torlaku neke kretnje (mene i Savu !) i mislili da je to srpska prethodnica - opasna po njih - i otvorili {rapnelsku vatru. To je, malo komi~no, na{ zaklju~ak. Stigosmo ku}i na vreme ba{ za ru~ak i nikom ni re~i toga dana. Eto, nije nam bilo sudjeno da stradamo !

ODLAZAK U SKOPLJE

Mi se blagovremeno prebacismo dalje od fronta, u Skoplje, vozom (ipak je funkcionisalo a i hrane be{e), i tamo nam dado{e kao najhitnije neki tavan u ku}i kod Du{anovog Mosta. To be{e lo{e. Februar mesec, sneg se topi. Lapavica. Ali jedan Srbin, Toza Petrovi}, ma{inovodja, pozove nas u njegovu malu ali lepu ku}icu i tu nam ve} be{e dobro. Njegova 'ena Zora a i }erkica Dobrila behu tu ; a pobrinu{e se da nam nadju ve}i stan - 2 sobe i kujna. Gazdarica Rumunka (g-dja Olga), udata za Srbina (g. Vlada), be{e vrlo ljubazna i uvek vesela. Kao da nije ratno doba.

Da bi mogli da pre' ivimo te{ku situaciju, srpska vlada je svim izbeglicama dala zajam u novcu, ve} prema broju ~lanova porodice (taj zajam su posle rata brisali). Medjutim vojvoda Mi{i} primi u srpsku vojsku tatu, tako da sada, stanje - mnogo bolje! Nika se zaposlio na 'eleznici kao morzista (telegrafista), Djoka u bolnici kod engleske misije, Sava u srpskoj vojnoj bolnici kod doktora potpukovnika Peri{i}a (koji umre ubrzo od pegavca - tifus). Tifus je harao u' asno ! Bele va{i prenosile su tifus. A ja sam bio pisar u komandi mesta a i raznosio hranu i hleb po ku}ama za ranjenike (u nekoliko ku}a, ja) i svaki dan dobivao 1 beo okrugli hleb koji smo u slast tro{iili, a to be{e velika stvar !

A u Skoplju? Tamo smo se okupljali i vidjali sa ostalim izbeglicama iz Zemuna u kafani Grand Hotel. Tu

je redovno dolazio i Branislav Nu{i}, komediograf, koji je tada bio glavni urednik novina "Srpski Jug". Voleo je da sa izbeglicama iz Austrije razgovara. On nas je uvek i izve{tavao o najnovijim vestima sa fronta i uvek nas hrabrio. Mene je koji put, pre podne, ~astio sa kajganom ili }evap-i}ima sa lukom. Ali u kafani normalno be{e da se pije kafa crna. Ja nau-ih da na `aru kuvam crnu kafu i kada gazda Kostaki ne be{e prisutan, ja kuvah kafu za mu{terije.

U Skoplju tada jo{ ne be{e oskudica. Bilo je mnogo furund`ija Turaka (pekara). Jednom sedmi-no be{e velika pijaca (ba{ uvek). Jedno jagnje be{e 3 dinara. Nedeljom popodne be{e redovno velika igranka u selu Gornje Vodno - to je na brdu a put vodi do Markove Kru{ke. Kolo be{e veoma veliko, i do 200 igra-a-igra-ica. Uhva}eni za ruke, bilo je lepo gledati ih kako igraju. Mami se to veoma svidjalo. Ali {ta nam se nije svidjalo je ono kada u hlebu nadje{ grumen peska. Kada se to ne vidi, pa iako se pod zubima ose}a pomalo peska, moglo je da prodje, ali ~itav d`epi} peska, grupisan, ne prolazi.

Najva`nije u Skoplju be{e Du{anov Most i crkva Sv.Spasa u savr{enom duborezu (oltar). I danas postoje, a vrlo simpati~ni behu tada Turi}i (mladi Turci), ~ista}i cipela, s leve i desne strane mosta. Be{e ih oko 20 sa svojim sandu~etom za nogu, sa po 2 ~etke sa kojima su klepetali alternativno po sanduku da dobiju mu{terije. A govorili su glasno : "~istimo, ~istimo..."

To u Skoplju traja{e od februara 1915 do septembra 1915, jer moralo se be`ati. Nemci nadiru kao ma{ina (2 velike dr`ave protiv jedne male Srbije). E sada po~inje pe{a~enje !

NAPU[TANJE SKOPLJA

Ja dobio pu{ku-karabin sa zadatkom da pratim zarobljenike i - krenusmo. Po ki{nom danu! Mama, tata kao komandant zarobljeni~ke komande, Djoka, Sava pa i ja. Nika je morao da ostane u Skoplju sve dok nije i poslednji voz oti{ao. On (Nika) i{ao drugom kolonom i

više od godinu dana nismo znali šta je sa njim niti on za nas.

Prvi dan, stigismo u Tetovo premoreni. Smestismo se na tavanu iznad konjske štale. Smrdilo mnogo (amonijak), ali toplo, pa ka' i "hvala bogu". Spavasio onako, s'brda-s'dola. Jedosmo nešto suvo. Napolju gu'va ! Mama samo žuti i ekonomije sa hranom. Vojska na sve strane. Jedni idu radi odbrane Skoplja, drugi se povlače. Ama i topovi sa konjskom vučom su tu, i sve ostalo. Ubio' e !!

Drugi dan prodjosmo kroz Gostivar i zanošismo u gradiću Mavrovi Hanovi. Presedismo u nekoj krčmi. Nije bilo loše. Spavalo se. Le'ali na 2 stolice, na podu, sedežki...Treći dan teraj za Debar. Tamo se još ne oseća rat.

U 2-3 kafanice ljudi (samo muški) sede. Pijuckaju rakiju i kafu. Tu je i ževapd'ija. Tata poruči za nas. To su tako veliki ževapi ! Kao 3 ili 4 naša, ali od ovijeg mesa. Ama, toliko ukusno ! Tu smo ostali nekoliko dana. Čekamo dalja naredjenja. Naredjenje - izvršenje.

Četvrti pokret! Pramac- Ohridsko jezero! Mesto, Struga. Vreme je poslu'ilo. Prolazimo kroz selo Lukovo. Tamo samo vidiš orahe (drveće). Nekoliko žena nudi da kupimo orahe, ali ništa ne uzesmo i uveče stigismo u Strugu. Reka Crni Drim izlazi iz Ohridskog jezera. Prvi put videh u velikim korpama jegulje. Nismo uzeli ništa, produ'ili uzbrdo i stignemo na groblje pravoslavno. Tu nam odrediše da se smestimo za nekoliko dana i to u mrtvačnicu (dosta uredno), koja je nad jezerom. Patos - daske, ali razmaknute pa nije hladan vazduh ozdo, a jezero huji, misliš apokalipsa. Namestimo asure i naravno, u odelu pole'emo i zapalimo peš. Sa groblja pokupismo stare krstove i daske pa mama pripremila čaja dosta a i proje. Fino beše.

Sutradan prošetismo Strugom a s druge strane jezera vidi se lep Ohrid. Djoka i ja odlučismo da se operemo u jezeru, ali avaj ! Talasi ! A voda hladna, oko 10°. On ipak zaplivao, vrlo kratko, a ja ne mogadoh

zaplivati ve} priljubio ruke uz telo, pa to ti je ! Kupanje zavr{eno !

STI@EMO U ALBANIJU

Peti pokret - u 4 sata izjutra. Tata ka'e da je ova etapa podu'a i stalno se penjemo uzbrdo stazama i vu~emo stvari. Djoka jo{ uvek nosi d'ak pun knjiga i re~nika. Treba}e, zlu ne trebalo! Sava vodi konja, @u}u (mali brdski konji}), sa nekim namirnicama i pirind'om. I ~ebad! Morali smo nekoliko puta da predahnemo. A kada pade mrak - mi u velikom snegu ! Hladno mnogo ! Prolazimo kroz « saobra}ajnice » od snega oko 2m visoke. Sada smo na]afasanu, granica Srbija-Albanija. Najvi{a ta~ka. Jedino meni se noge po~ele da smrzavaju - imam vojni~ke cokule. Tata mi ka'e da skinem cipele pa u ~arapama, teraj dalje, i situacija se popravi. Ugledasmo jednu ~kiljavu svetlost u daljini. Stignemo do nje, to je neka tro{na pove}a koliba ali ima vrata i pe} i prozore. Kad mi tamo, a ono ve} puno sveta. Prepuno. I mi se ugurasmo. Svi stoje, nema sedenja, ali nije hladno. Ama sardine prave ! Ni{ta nismo jeli. Glavno nije vi{e hladno, ~ak i pretoplo od pe}i. Sava dobije od tate zadatak, u zoru, da ode u izvidnicu sa @u}om i u mestu Prens, na 20km, da obezbedi sme{taj, pa da dodje i izvesti. Sava ode ali ga nema natrag (izgubio konja). Mi krenemo oko 8 izjutra po snegu i ne slutimo ni{ta. Kad ono, {to se mi vi{e spu{tamo sve manje snega i kad stigosmo u Prens a ono ba{ fino toplo. To je prvo mesto u Albaniji. Sunce sija, vo}ke cvetaju. Savu nadjemo a posle - i konja. To je bilo oko 18h. Napravimo bivak. Ja sa mojom sekirom nase~em drva. Napravih vatru. Svi oko vatre sede na zemlji a mama odmah onaj bokal (sav crn od zape~enog gare'a spolja) - pa ~aja podosta. Spavanje oko vatre. Sava premoren od nevolja ~vrsto zaspe i ispru'i noge duga~ke ali se ubrzo probudi jer po~e da ga pe~e. Cipela se zapalila (samo jedna).

ELBASAN.

Ujutro, opet ~aj i vojni~ki peksimit (tvrd ko djavo, mo'e da stoji i 1 god.). Prili~no ohrabreni i nahranjeni, krenemo Albanijom, pravac Elbasan - sresko ve}e mesto. Civilizacija doprla, istina malo, ali dovoljno. Stignemo tamo oko 16h. Vidim veliki zid oko ku}e. Harem. Prvi put u 'ivotu videh na drve}u pomorand'e. Nismo ulazili u mesto i napravimo bivak pred gradom, nedaleko od onog harema. Ogromne stene! Mnogo! Kao menhiri! A ima i maslina. Neke vre'e i poviju{e, od letos, oplele se po jednoj maslini i ja to uzmem sebi za le'aj. Dobro be{e. Temperatura prijatna. Spavalo se dobro ali }ebe mora bar preko ledja.

Albanke iz onog harema videle mamu ('enu) u toj nevolji, pozovu je preko jednog askera (stra'ara) i mama se malo okrepi, opere ali nije ostala na spavanju. Do{la u bivak da se pobrine oko ~aja i da nam napravi od grisa knedle umesto hleba. Ona je za sve vreme bila najhrabrija, najistrajnija, neumorna i energija. Njoj su samo deca na brizi a i re{avala je sve uspe{no. Retka 'ena. Obrazovana u institutu u Be-u. Prva se digne izjutra i poslednja sedne oko vatre. Onda 'ene nisu nosile pantalone, na'alost. Mu~ilo je mnogo {to ni{ta nije mogla da dozna o najstarijem sinu.

I moji zarobljenici behu stalno sa nama ali odvojeno. Niko ni ne misli da pobegne. Gde ? A hrana ? Ovako, ako dodju u savezni~ko ropstvo, ima}e bar urednu hranu i spavanje. Avaj! Mnogo ih je usput pomrlo kao i srpske rezervne trupe, mladi}i. Svako jutro ista slika. Oni koji su se digli idu dalje a oni koji le'e - nikad se vi{e ne}e di}i. Na te grozne slike smo se, naravno, navikli, jer je to bilo redovno, pa nekako oguglasmo i ogrubismo. A i tata se razboleo od te{ke dizenterije. Vojni lekar, Dr. Zec, ga le~io bez uspeha pa tati dojadila odvratna dijeta i jednog dana re{i da se najede ka-amaka (polenta), pa kud pukne da pukne. Mama mu to fino priredila i - ~udo nevidjeno ! Sutradan tatu pro{la grozna dizenterija (po 10 puta dnevno te tera, i samo sluz i krv). ^ovek potpuno iznemogne. Eto, sre}a u nesre}i.

] UKUS

^im krenusmo iz Elbasana, nove nevolje! Iako je {ef dr'ave Albanije, Esad pa{a - prijatelj Srba - bio na na{oj strani, ipak neke grupe, frakcije, nisu nam bile naklonjene. Na na{u kolonu iznenada, iz daleka, neki pripuca{e. Mi svi pogleali, a i zarobljenici (oni vi{e ni nisu bili pravi zarobljenici; skoro kao i mi; samo u austrijskoj uniformi). Kur{umi prosvira{e kroz vazduh, samo fiju~u, i tata naredi da se raspodelimo i legnemo u strelce i da u}utkamo to neprijateljsko gnezdo. Naredjenje be{e "brza paljba", ali ne vi{e od 5 metaka. I ja naravno, pucao, sa mojih 14 godina, nekako va'no i ponosno. Ono neprijateljsko gnezdo prekinulo vatru (nikada nismo mogli doznati ko su bili), i mi, teraj dalje nogu pod nogu pravac] ukus (albanski KÖKES). I{li par dana i bez nekih ve}ih *priklju~enija* (avantura, do'ivljaja) stigismo u neku kasabu - mesto bedno. Ali tu vojna komanda negde nabavila kukuruzno bra{no i podeli{e svima po 1kg (i zarobljenicima). To se ~uvalo kao zenica u oku. Sa hranom sve te'e postaje. U divljini smo. (Setismo se neki put onih perfektnih kifli od Niznera, koje nam je svaki dan donosio Herman na biciklu, a na ledjima puna korpa! On je raznosio stalnim mu{terijama, 1 kifla ili zemi~ka-kajzerica, ko{tala je 2 krajcare ili 4 filira - ne{to kao 4 pare.)

U] ukusu bivak i nekoliko dana odmora. Kuvao se ka~amak a ono nepojedeno stavismo u d'epove od sakoa pa polako putem vadi{ iz d'epa i kusa{. Da ga je samo bilo vi{e! Na{ @u}a konji} gura. Hrane ima. Trava so~na. Ama dobio i on malo kukuruznog bra{na. Djoka izvadio samo neke re~nike, iz d'aka, i oprostio se od knjiga. Sa njima smo kuvali ka~amak. Lepe suve knjige i dobar plamen!

U tom istom] ukusu pored bivaka prodje jedna manja jedinica srpske vojske, u dobrom stanju, naoru'ana. Komandir be{e poru~nik [umatovi}, Nikin kolega iz zemunske gimnazije. I on je ~esto dolazio u na{u ku}u, po podne, na atletsko hrvanje i gimnastiku pa slu~ajno zapazi

mamu (ona je tim djacima uvek ne{to ponudila u Zemunu - {trudle, gro'dje i sl.) i dotr-a do nas. Raspita se kako nam je i bez mnogo re~i naredi da se donese nama 1 vre}a pirind'a i peksimit. Pa to be{e ne{to ne~uveno, neverovatno ali istinito! Taj [umatovi} je bio Srbin. Prebegao u Srbiju i postao oficir. Od Franje [trajhera sam doznao da su [umatovi}a u {koli zvali po nadimku "tetka". Dakle, nama "tetka" dobra be{e a @u}a dobio na ledja bra{no i peksimit koji smo sa sla{}u umakali u ~aj. I sad se pitam kako je mama operisala sa tim ~ajem i {e}erom i odakle joj. Da, ona nije mnogo govorila ali je bila "super" doma~ica iz Vojvodine (Srbobran), {kolovana u Be~u, to sam ve} rekao.

PEKINJE

Posle] ukusa i dugog putovanja od preko nedelju dana, pravac Pekinje, stigismo jednog jutra oko 5 sati pred neku veliku vodu (to leti presu{i), dubine oko 90cm. Duva{e vrlo hladan vetar i to jako. Nama pomalo zima a i meni. A mama "ni 5 ni 6", skine sa sebe jednu starinsku vunenu maramu i zave`e mi, preko ledja i spreda. A ja umesto da ne primim, jo{ kako se obradujem i mislim to tako mora. *Quel type!* Ne mislim dalje o tome ve} ajde gazi tu ogromnu baru - do pupka voda. Sa @u}e skinusmo robu i svaki po ne{to natovari na ledja da mama sedne na konja, a tata, ve{t vojnik, stalno je i{ao ispred svih da rekognoscira teren i utvrdi kojim putem da se ide dalje. Nije bilo karti ni vodi~a - uvek je prona{ao najmanje te`ak put. Tu baru gazismo nekih 3½ sata. Be{e puno pijavica i na dnu kao trska a kretali smo se sporo. ^im predjosmo baru, oko 10h, ja nasekao dosta bagrema (akacija)- on gori i kada je potpuno sirov- te se su{ismo jedno 2 sata. Ubrzo, zatim, stigismo pred Pekinje.

Tamo nekoliko askera (stra'ari sa pu{kom) o~igledno prijateljski nas gledaju a jedan (to smo doznali kasnije) otr~i kod kajmakana - gradona~elnik, "le maire" - i izvesti ga da dolazi i jedna 'ena sa decom, i taj isti asker u~tivo nas pozdravi i poka'e gestom da podjemo sa

njim. On nas odvede do kajmakana (Pekinje je mnogo bolje od] ukusa ali onako, jo{ primitivno). Kajmakan je imao ku}u na sprat. Kulturan ~ovek - prvo se obrijao pa nas pozdravio u ku}i. Dobro be{e {to smo znali francuski te se lako razumesmo. @ena mu umrla a 2 sina se {koluju u Carigradu. U "living-room" se smestismo na asure - na podu, oprasmo se sa sapunom i toplom vodom (be{e nam skoro neobi~no), i polegasmu na asure. Pod-daske ali se 'uti od ribanja i vrlo ~isto. Odmorismo se, a oko 6h po podne kajmakan u novom odelu, pozove nas u drugu sobu sa postavljenim stolom - onako obi~no, "of course", ali be{e i neobi~nog : pe~ena }urka topla, sira i kajmaka i crn hleb pravi ("au son" - sa mekinjama). Nemo' ' sladje biti! Spavasmu po prvi put ljudski. Nije bilo hladno jer be{e pe} upaljena! Ujutro oko 6h odosmo u bivak, gde ostasmo par dana, a kajmakan nam podari, za put, 1 korpu sa drugom }urkom i hlebom i sirom. "Incroyable mais vrai". Mama mu je poslala pismo iz Bizerte i zahvalila na svemu, ali da li je to primio nismo znali.

FIJERI

Slede}a etapa, od Pekinje do Fijeri, traja{e vrlo dugo. Oskudica sa hranom. Nigde 'ive du{e niti ku}ice. Sre}a, nije hladno. Napatismo se mnogo. Usput, ipak, po neki izvor bistre vode a i to je ve} mnogo. Prelaze}i preko drvenog mosti}a iznad potoka, dogodi se nevolja. @u}a, sa tovarom pirind'a i peksimetom i ~ebadima, propadne i - bu} u vodu! Nije se ozledio (nisko be{e) ali hrana se pokvasi. Aman, zar i to! Nema kud. Pravi bivak odmah, lo'i vatru, su{i hranu malo po malo. To je trajalo celu bogovetnu no}, ali hrana be{e spa{ena. To opet mama. Izvela perfektno ne prozboriv{i ni re~i. Strpljenju nije bilo kraja. [e}era vi{e nije ni bilo, pa smo pili ~aj bez {e}era.

Kad stigosmo u Fijeri (ne{to bolje mesto)- ve} mesec decembar. Zatekosmo u pekari crn hleb kao poga~e i uzesmo, naravno. Ali ve} slede}i dan nije vi{e bilo. Bivak vi{e nismo pravili ve} svako za sebe. Mi na livadi

zauzesmo napu{tenu {upu nekog grn-ara i tu napravismo sa slamom legalo a moglo se i kuvati na nekom ognji{tu (dosta dobro). @u}a je takodje tu. Va{i (ta re~ nema veze sa zamenicom, ve} to je imenica onog odvratnog insekta) se nakotile, naravno, pa smo sada mogli sistematski da ih uni{tavamo (sa noktima oba palca zajedno, pa kad ~ujes "puc", zna~i odzvonilo joj). To nisam naveo do sada ni jednom. Ali u svakom bivaku to je bila obavezna preokupacija. Kad pogleda{ oko sebe samo vidi{ narod dr`i ko{ulju i samo ne{to ~eprka. Medjutim tih gamadi be{e najvi{e u toploj zoni, naime oko svitnjaka od ga}a. Tu }es ih uvek na}i bez gre{ke. Nemogu}e je bilo re{iti se toga. Kad se u bivaku o~isti{ danas, sutra opet ve} ih ima. Neverovatno! Ko{ulje smo odva{ljavali (ono, u ko{uljama uvek be{e manje, eventualno u zoni svitnjaka i u borama ko{ulje), ko je bio ve{t taj je napravio vaticu od suvih trava (i ja i Sava i Djoka) pa, dr`e}i ko{ulju za rukave, nadvio ko{ulju nad vrele gasove vatre, vrlo kratko vreme i tako nekoliko puta. Ko{ulja se naduva kao de~iji balon usled lak{i}h gasova koji idu gore i ra{ire ko{ulju a simpati~ne va{ke (va{i) se kremiraju. To je naro~ito lepo bilo gledati u mraku. Podse}alo me na "nevidljivog ~oveka" od Wells-a. Sre}om nije bilo pegavog tifusa ina~e bi bio pravi pomor, jer ga va{i prenose.

U Fijeri doznadosmo da }emo tu ostati du'e (oko 3 nedelje) jer moramo ~ekati savezni~ke brodove da stignu u Valonu (to je morska luka manje vrednosti; veliki brodovi ne mogu pristajati uz kej (obalu) ve} se usidre « adekvatno » (podalje), pa se ~amcima odlazi do broda i stepenicama na brod. I u Dra~u je bilo sli~no (i to je luka u Albaniji). Dobro nam je do{lo to ~ekanje i zbog odmora a i zbog reke Voju{a gde smo se prali (i ve{) i redovno umivali. Nije ba{ bilo pre~isto, ali nema bolje. Jedino veliko zlo pretilo nam je, jer je tata imao trbu{ni tifus i veliku temperaturu. Tu je bio sa na{om grupom opet onaj Dr. Zec, a lekova nije bilo te je mama (opet mama - najistrajnija i neumorna) preko celog dana i no}i menjala hladne ~arsave oko tate. To se dobro svr{ilo,

posle 7 dana i tata je po~eo da jede omiljenu "ajnbren" supu i vodu od pirind'a, koga smo sa~uvali i osu{ili kada jadni @u}a upade u potok. Mi deca smo smatrali sve to {to se de{ava kao neku zabavu i malo ja{ili @u}u po indijanski. A skupljali smo i gran~ice radi ognji{ta i kuvanja ~aja i supe od kostiju crknutih konja a i od kopita (sekirom se sase~e tvrdi oklop kopita). To je bila vrlo cenjena supa. Imasmo i soli. Pravo je ~udo bilo kada vojna komanda pronadje neko kukuruzno bra{no i podeli svima po malo. A jadni zarobljenici a i rezervne trupe (mladi}i), iscrpljeni, nisu mnogi to ni okusili, jer mnogi, kad po~e{e ostali da ustaju, nisu se vi{e ni dizali. Dok drugi, iako su uspeli da dodju na reku Voju{u da se umiju, prilikom naginjanja, ~u}e~ki, samo su pali glavom u vodu i tu ostali. Pa to vam je prava apokalipsa u najte'em izdanju. Ja sam jednom i{ao sa Savom i grizao neku koru od proje a jadni jedan zarobljenik mi otr'e to iz ruke i strpa u usta (kao na filmu). Meni u prvi mah be{e krivo ali ubrzo, sãm shvatih da je to oprostivo. A drugi put, opet sa Savom i{li na reku i prekora~ujemo preko mnogih mrtvih i preko jednog koji be{e na zemlji, u ropcu (zarobljenik, Madjar, umirao je - to sam posle zaklju~io), i ja se sa'alih i naivno mu stavim moju proju na usta, misle}i da }e mu pomo}i. Tu nije vi{e bilo pomo}i. A koliko hiljada prodjo{e kao taj zarobljenik...

U Fijeri je bilo i Grka, katolika, i manjih radnji sa kolonijalnom robom (ali bedno). I mi ti se, Sava i ja, upoznamo sa jednim Grkom, gazdom jadne radnjice. Ja sam znao vrlo malo albanski (ke buk= ima li hleba; ska buk= nema hleba; ka buk= ima hleba; mir mies= dobro jutro; kasa= {ta }es ti, a i znao brojati do 20= njezit). Pa, svaki dan odlazili u tu radnju i pomagali pone{to; a gazda nas ~astio sa po jednim lokumom iz otvorene kutije u kojoj behu pome{ani i sitni, crni, izmeti od mi{eva. Ama ko te pita! Uzesmo ratluk i u slast pojedosmo. Ako se ba{neko zrnce zadr'alo na ratluku, prostim udarcem, noktom, to kvrcne{ i to odleti. Ina~e taj Grk be{e dobar hri{~anin. Prodavao nam vrlo jeftino zelene kru{ke a mama ih

skuvala i ja sa Savom prodavao tople, kuvane, kruške. Najbolji kupci behu nam austrijski oficiri-zarobljenici; medju njima i Franja [trajher* i Duka Stojanovi}, oba iz Zemuna, na{i dobri poznanici. Tu u Fijeri ostatak zarobljenika odvedo{e negde na obalu Jadranskog Mora i predado{e italijanskoj vojsci u nadle'nost, a meni ostade karabin.

U Fijeri be{e stalno lepo, decembarsko, ju'no vreme - bez ki{e. Be{e je ipak jednom no}u, pa prokisavala {upa te se digosmo sa slame. A redovni posetioци {upe, no}u, behu poprili~ni pacovi. I oni gladni. Nisu nas napadali, samo {etali po sru{enom zidu. Sava mene no}u budi i pokazuje te goste. Mi "mrtvi hladni" ni ne gledamo ih. To mi sve sada izgleda kao da nije ni bilo. Jedino mama se pla{ila da no}u ne zagrizu ne~ije uvo jer glad ne pita.

Pa, 3 nedelje u Fijeri, bez vesti, odse~eni od sveta - neizvesna sudbina, ali ipak u miru provodismo dane. Znali smo da }emo i}i u Valonu, ali nismo znali kada. A nismo bili ba{ tako gladni. Stroge porcije! Ne mo'e "repete"! Znala je mama koliko je dovoljno hrane. Vrlo retko, onaj Grk nabavljao je bivolsko mleko i prodavao; samo nama, zbog dece i 'ene. Vrlo se ~esto krstio. Imao je i sina, pa se i s njim igrasmo klikera.

Stigla vest : 30og decembra pokret za Valonu!!! Tata naredio ustajanje u 2h, polazak u 3h ujutro. Tata nam ka'e da je put vrlo duga~ak i da ra~una da stignemo u Valonu, na obalu, sa 3 odmaranja, oko 5h popodne, a mo'da i kasnije. Zavisi da li }emo morati zaobilaziti neka sumnjiva mesta.

Pucanja nije bilo. Savezni~ka vojska, Italijani, ve} su se iskricali u Valoni a i engleske misije crvenog krsta takodje, sa lakom hranom za bolesne i za zdrave. To smo se obradovali! Jedino mama je znala engleski a i francuski i nema~ki i madjarski, a tata, nema~ki i francuski. Ja prili~no francuski a nema~ki dobro, kao i Sava i Djoka. Ti jezici su nam doprineli da prodjemo sada najbolje i sa hranom i sa sme{tajem na prekrasnom

prekookeanskom brodu "Re Vittorio".

PUT ZA VALONU

30. decembar 1915. - No} prohladna. Ustadosmo ta~no. Mama pregleda da li smo dobro obu~eni sa {alovima oko vrata. Ja moju pu{ku ne dam nikom, ve} na rame i nosim jedan zambil sa raznim namirnicama. Svako je ne{to morao da nosi, a i @u}a neku arhivu. On se nikad nije bunio. Hranio se prili~no. Kri{om smo mu davali onaj tvrdi peksimit od [umatovi}a (tetke). Ali be{e sena koliko god 'eli a i vode.

Krenula kolona, odu'ila se. Priklju~i{e se nekoliko 'ena (supruge vojnih muzi~ara i 'ene nekih narednika). U po~etku idosmo lakim korakom. Odmorili se dobro u Fijeri (3 nedelje). Mrak, a staze uzane! Obilazismo okuku reke. Svi ~ute i kora~aju. Sada su no}i najdu'e. Mosta nema. Tu izgubismo bar 4 sata. Nikako da svane a hodamo ve} 5 ~asova i kad predjosmo prvu uzvi{icu po~e da svi}e. I mi se jednostavno radovali tom dogadjaju. Oko 11 sati - stop. Pola sata odmora. Svako vadi iz d'epa po ne{to i gricka, najvi{e ka~amak (on se zgodno dr'i u d'epu i lako se vadi; ne treba kesa ili {erpa). Pokret! Au, majku mu, dobro bi bilo da smo jo{ malo sedeli na travi ili kamenu. Al' ne mo'e. Teraj dalje, ~uti i trpi. Posle jedno 1/2 sata hoda ugledasmo prvu kolonu italijanskih vojnika, sa mazgama natovarenim vojnom opremom i provijantom (hranom). Mazge dobro uranjene, lepe, ~iste a i vojnici takodje (saveznici na{i). Talijani nas, onako, ljubazno pozdravljali i nudili da popijemo malo vina, da se okrepimo. Bogme, ja popih na iskap 2 "deci". Dobro be{e crno vojni~ko vino. Ali nismo se mogli du'e zadr'avati jer - gde je Valona! Malo zatim naidje jedan Albanac (onda su se zvali "Arnauti"). Pitamo ga koliko ima do Valone a on poka'e prstima "3". Ja se ume{am pa mu ka'em: "Tre sahat?" On se za~udi i brzim korakom, ama vrlo brzim, ode. Ko zna gde }e. Mi se mislimo "pa nije daleko" i pomalo likujemo u sebi. Dobro se ugrejasmo i pomalo se znojili. Opet uz brdo (ne veliko)! Ve} je 15 sati

popodne. Odmora jo{ nema. Naidje opet jedan brzohodi Arnautin, kai{ mu kao da }e da spadne, ali ne, tako oni to nose. On objasni da ima jo{ 3 sata. I tako be{e jo{ nekoliko puta po 2 sata...

Naredba "STOJ"! Odmor ½ sata. Sada je 15h30. Nailazi opet talijanska kolona sa mazgama. Mazga be{e od neprocenjive vrednosti tada u Albaniji i bespu}u. Samo kozije staze. Doznadosmo da vi{e ne}e biti odmora. Tek na obali kod Engleske Misije. Taj put smo svi zapamtili. Ne smemo zakasniti !!

STI@EMO NA OBALU

Jedno 2 sata hodasmo po tvrdom a zatim - pla'a beskrajna; sitan pesak, noge upadaju a du{a ti na nosu. Au, {to sam 'edan! Nemamo vi{e vode. Izvor na koji smo ra~unali - presu{io. Pa mo'e se bez vode i 24 sata. Idemo po pesku. Vu~emo se bukvalno. Djoka, sportista, dr'i me pod mi{kom da mi olak{a. Mama ne govori ba{ ni{ta, samo tek: "Jo{ malo, pa }emo sti}i"! Sava dobro gura, a i tata. Pa, za oficira to nije ni{ta.

Oko 19 ~asova naidjemo na prvu englesku, manju misiju za prvu pomo}. Ja zamolim vode a ona, 'ena u uniformi, odmah mi dade, pa zamolim jo{ i popih u slast. A ona onoj do nje: "poor little boy", i pogladi me po licu. Mama joj se zahvalila na engleskom, naravno, i odosmo dalje a tamo navalili da piju vodu, i neko jelo, i usput jedu. Oko 8 sati uve}e prestade pesak, ve} zemlja, a tu neki pove}i {atori. Veliki kazani sa vru}im ~ajem sa mlekom i jo{ {to {ta. Engleskinje, u vojni~kim uniformama (tada videh prvi put u 'ivotu 'ensskog poru~nika) samo nude - pi}e i laku hranu. Na stolovima na stotine posuda sa ~ajem i u papirima sendvi~i, pa ~okolada...Moja mama sada prvi put se vajkala {to sam popio 2 velike ~a{e vode a ovde je tako fini ~aj. Ipak smo i ovde pili i jeli pa oti{li na mesto gde dolaze ~amci sa broda i seli. To be{e oko 21 ~as no}u. Zna~i od 3 izjutra do 21h pe{a~enje - sa malo odmora. Ukupno 17-18 sati hoda u jednom naletu.

NA BRODU

Kada sti' e ~amac, jedva uspesmo da ustanemo. Samo smo se ~udili tome. A jo{ vi{e }emo se ~uditi u brodu (~ekaj samo malo). Preneso{e nas u ~amac, pa do broda, pa na stepenice visoke. Popnemo se s mukom, samo da ne po~nemo padati, a kapetan broda sa svojim "segondima", kulturno nas pozdravlja; svi su obu~eni k'o iz kutije. Kada spazi{e mamu, gospodja-signora, i decu, kapetan se jo{ jednom pozdravi i re~e: "Signora, prego di qua" (gospodjo, molim vas ovuda), i jedan oficir nas odvede (kao na filmu) u luksuznu I klasu sa malom trezarijom. Posle 10 minuta jedan slu'benik nam donese ~ist ve{. Poskidasmo va{ljivi ve{ pa lepo kroz prozor~e pobacismo u more. Okupamo se u kadi propisno i - novo iznenadjenje! Kelner u fraku slu'i nam ve~eru: bouillon, entrée, pe~enje, kifle, vo}e...ama sva{ta! A na{ @u}a ostade sa ostalim konjima koje je ~uvao jedan seiz (konju{ar vojni). Ja posle ve~ere reknem kamerijeru na francuskom: "Les poires sont très bonnes". On ni{ta ne veli, ali ubrzo donese jo{ "aufzac" kru{aka i sme{i se.

^ujemo od tate da mu je kapetan rekao da }emo biti ukotvljeni jo{ par dana pa tek posle (no}u) krenuti. To se mora radi podmornica nema~kih. Mi legosmo u fine krevete i "k'o zaklani" spavasmao do oko 11 sati. "Ama {ta je to" - doviknem Savi, "ja ne mogu ni ruku ni nogu da pokrenem" a on: "Ni ja!". A Djoka mo`e, te{k kom mukom. Premoreni! Tata, k'o oficir, izdr`ava sve bez muke. Medjutim, na{a junakinja mama (quelle femme et quelle mère), pa ustala jo{ u 7 sati! Pospremala, lepo se obukla, i ~eka decu da doru~uju. Opet doru~ak "gala". [togod za`eli{..Mo`e i "od ptice mleko"! Oko 12h ipak uspesmo da ustanemo, da se tu{iramo i obu~emo ali bez va{iju ovog jutra.

Suze mi naidjo{e kada pisah o mami mojoj. Njoj ni{ta ne treba, samo njenoj deci. Sve }e da izdr'i. Takvo vaspitanje, takva doma}ica, njena kultura...Nije zbog ni~ega, ~erka guvernora Tunizije, admirala Geprata, rado

pose}ivala mamu u Bizerti. A i sam guverner je bio kod nas, jednom, da vidi kako smo se smestili. A i mnoge Francuskinje su mamu jako cenile i pozivale. Admiral nas je 2 puta pozvao na "gala" ru~ak u svojoj rezidenciji. Svirala je vojna muzika, dole, u parteru.

Pa, kada osvanusmo na brodu, be}e 31.decembar, Sveti Silvester. Poslu'enja na brodu nisu prestajala. A **1.januara** be}e ~estitanja na sve strane. Mnogi sa broda, Srbi i oficiri, dolazili da ~estitaju Novu godinu i da ~uju {ta }e biti dalje, jer jezik nisu poznavali. Centar postade na{ apartman na brodu. Kapetan broda se interesirao {ta }u ja raditi sa karabinom. A tata njemu rekne da bi on jako voleo ako kapetan ima "hobi" za pu{kama. I tako ja odnesem moju pu{kku-karabin, koja je ispalila 5 metaka, kapetanu. Video sam da je jako bio zadovoljan tim poklonom "ratnika" Stevana.

Ceo 1.januar provedosmo na brodu. Pregledasmo tu grdosiju. Malo svirali u klavir u salonu. Mama je odsvirala, prili~no dobro, "Minuten valcer" od [opena i "Fur Elise" a Sava komad iz operete "Regimentstochter" (Marija, pukovska k}i). Da nije mama prva otsvirala mi bi se stideli da sviramo. U salonu behu na{i Srbi, g. Mika, pa [aplinac, pa 2 vojna kapelnika i.t.d. Malo njih.

2. januar 1916 - No} posle ve~ere. More besni. Talasi preko 1½ m. ^uje se neko muvanje po palubi. Verovatno }e biti nekog pokreta - ali dr'i se u tajnosti. Oko pono}i ~uje se dizanje kotve i rad ma{ina i - polazak u neizvesnost (zbog podmornica). Ali dobro be}e {to je more uzburkano; podmornice nemaju "{anse". Medjutim, de'urni tobd'ija je na svom mestu, kod protupodmorni~kog topa. Svakog sata se smenjuju. Jutro **3. Januar**, more se smiruje. Vidimo kako se vulkan Etna pu{i; posle X sati vidimo i vulkan Stromboli. Bljuje s vremena na vreme lavu. A **4. Januara** 1916-te oko 10 sati ulazimo u Zaliv, te pri prekrasnom, lepom sun~anom danu (tamo je uvek tako), vazduh ~ist k'o suza, ugledamo na{u slatku Bizertu.


Na pristani{tu more naroda. Vojna muzika. Admi-
ral Geprat i ostali, do~ekuju hrabre srpske vojnike. Bizerta
se beli, du' pla'e ogromni drvoredi palmi. Na bulevaru
lakirani fijakeri odbljeskuju na suncu. Sva su srca
uzbudjena. ^uje se "Vive la Serbie", a mi sa broda "Vive
la France"! Uzbudjenju nema kraja. Takva lepota posle
one epopeje! Takva divna srca francuskog naroda! Na
našem brodu je i junakinja, ~uvena Milunka, narednik sa
nekoliko odlikovanja.

A sada dolazi sme{taj u karantin koji traje e 4 nedelje
u kasarni Farre. I tu dobismo posebne prostorije, na
spratu, iznad stra'are. Be e odli~no.

O mom {kolovanju u Bizerti, sve do kraja rata,
moglo bi opet dugo da se pri~a. Dan je ve} uveliko
svanuo! Za danas je dosta pisanja, sad moram u ba{tu da
posvr{avam razne poslove.

Va{ tata i deda

*Franja [trajher se posle rata isto vratio u Zemun i tu smo
se lepo dru'ili i posejivali sve do nedavno do njegove
smrti.



A JUNGLE WALK ([etnja kroz d' unglu)

Egon Ciklai, Buenos Aires

Ima ve} dvadeset i {est dana kako nismo videli ni jednog tigra u Chitwanu - ka'e mi kao dobrodo{licu naturalista Jigmi. Njegova lepa glava apolonskog Bude gospodari kratkim i preciznim telom, lak osmeh daje blagim crtama lica izraz tako mirne sigurnosti da mu sitnom stasu pridaje tu herojsku dimenziju koju imaju legendarni samuraji koje je Akira Kurosawa preneo na filmsko platno.

- Nosim sa sobom feti{ koga je blagoslovio jedan afri~ki ve{tac - ka'em mu u {ali kada napu{tamo aerodrom Baratpura i, ve} sede}i u d'ipu, vozimo se kroz zelenu ravnicu Terai-a, nepalske d'ungle. Jigmi me posmatra sa ~udnom pa'njom i, tako ozbiljno da ostajem zbunjen, odgovara mi zagonetno: - Onda }ete ga mo'da videti.

Sa bukom d'ipa koji se udaljava iza visoke zavese drve}a na obali reke, nestaje dvadeseti vek i velika ti{ina pada na ~amac te samo slu{am laki {um vesla po vodi. Kako stajem na pesak suprotne obale ~ujem iz daljine trubu slona.

- Namasti (1), sahib - pozdravlja me jedan polugoli Taru; stavlja mi venac {umskih cvetova oko vrata i ka'iprstom mi boji ~elo crvenilom. Jigmi i ja pijemo arak (2) dobrodo{lice: pe~e kao vatra. Stigli smo u Kraljevski Park Chitwan.

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- Kha, hha, hhaa - vi~e langur (3).

Bez pogovora, Goberdan, na{ nepalski vodi~, di'e desnu ruku; u {aci mu kvrgavi {tap dug metar i po, pokretom nas prikiva u mesto. Lice lovca, u kome su se arijevske i mongolske krvi pome{ale u jednakoj meri, nije vi{e isto; uvek snobivljivo i ~ak boja'ljivo, sada je zategnuta i tvrda maska.

-Kha, khoo, hhaa - laje i dalje langur. Veliki majmun crnog lica i sivog tela, predmet gotovo beo pod 'estokim svetlom, sedi na visokoj grani drveta Sal, na drugoj strani isu{ene dolinice. Gleda na dole, pogled uprt na granicu {ume i izgorele trave.

Nas ~etvoro smo nepokretni, okamenjeni. U dubokoj senci drve}a, na na{oj strani doline, stojimo na samom rubu jaruge. Deset ili dvanaest metara nani'e, 'uti dol je poplavljen podnevnim suncem, naizgled vreo i nem kao {iroka i prazna avenija.

Goberdan je 'iva statua, podignuta mu je ruka kao ~eli~na; ~ini mi se da on mora da vidi, da ose}a, stvari koje su tajne za na{a ~ula. Vreme ne prolazi vi{e u minutima, ne mo'e se meriti, ve} je intezivno trajanje {to klizi polako, jedno ~ekanje koje nosi jednu prastaru vrednost, mo'da onu preistorijskog lovca; te~e sna'no u nama kao voda koja }e ispuniti dolinu kada, uzev{i stra{no crno lice Bairaba (4) izbrazdano besnim munjama, pristigne monsun, a valovi, kao besna bujica, se bace u veliku reku Narajani i zemlja proguta u svoju 'ednu utrobu potop kao {to boginja Parvati (5) zavija lingam (6) mra~ne pojave [ive (7).

Kao skazaljka ~asovnika, izmedju lave'a i lave'a, lice usamljenog langura mu'jaka, minut za minutom, kre}e se polako k nama. Vidimo ga sada jasno, iska~e izmedju srebrenih zalisaka i brade nju{ka crna kao ugalj.

- Vidim mu o-i, svetlucaju kao dijamanti - mrmlja engleskinja Chris, dogledom zalepljenim na obraz.

- Tigar - siktanje nepalca je ugu{en krik, usmine iske'ene mu otkrivaju duge 'ute zube, drhti {tap od

ukro}ene 'estine.

Razdra'eni bu{imo o~ima po visokoj travi, tra'imo po grmlju, zamoreni smo od obmana, 'edni uspeha. Ta gde je? Ne vidimo ni{ta? Jo{ jedna varka?... Ta potraga je ve} izli{na, bezuspe{na...

Kao lagana vatra kroz 'uto {iblje, uporedo s nama kre}e se jedan veliki tigar, crven i beo, crnih pruga. Masivna silueta, pognute glave kora~a zami{ljeno; nestaje i prikazuje se kao nastupni plamen, ignori}e nas koji smo jasno vidljivi, udaljeni jedva pedeset metara; figura mu zra~i talase mo}i, otpravlja male eksplozije koje nas {tipaju, udaraju; vidi se kako mu igraju ogromni mi{i}i, u dva skoka bi mogao biti na nama; jo{ jedna 'uta zavesa ga sakriva i po zadnji put se prikazuje u svojoj stra{noj velelepnosti Bag (8) nepalaca, ta fabulozna ma~ka koju su nazvali Kraljevski tigar Bengala - te nestaje.

Munjevita pojava nas napu{ta: stoje tri paralizovane osobe, izmorene, bla'ene od milosti koja se ~udesno spustila na njih. Zauvek }e ostati u se}anju, kao 'igosana plamenom, trenutna slika divote u retini, i sve ja~a svest da nas je po{tedila najsmrtonosnija ma{ina za uni{tenje ~etvorono'nog sveta.

Goberdan, traga~ Taru, stoji uspravan i oslonjen na svoj {tap, mada pored nas, kao da je istovremeno odvojen i ostaje van na{eg zapadnja~kog odu{evljenja. Za tog mu{karca Teraja tigar je samo jedan stvor njegovog sveta, sused s kojim treba pa'ljivo postupati pri susretu u d'ungli. Triumf nepalskog lovca je jednostavan i prakti~an, sko~i}e mu presti' medju njegovim drugovima, medju mahutima (9) i vodi~ima; posle mesec dana neuspeha on je taj koji je prvi prikazao tajanstvenu prugastu zver strancima. Tra'i}e ga turisti i plju{ta}e rupije.

Bili, mu' od Chris, je prozai~an:

- Nisam imao ni trenutak da ga snimim - ka'e utu~en, gledaju}i bateriju teleobjektiva - sve se desilo tako brzo. Iznenada veseo, uzvikne:

- Pa danas ti je rođendan, draga - grli je ose}ajno. - Sretan rođendan. Tigar ti je poklon. - Skromna Chris, crvena kao jabuka, prima poljubac.

- Predivan poklon. Velika vam hvala - sme}ka se Engleskinja.

I ja ~estitam i Goberdan, koji naizgled razume da se ne{to naro~ito de}ava, takodje dodaje jedan boja'ljiv pokret. Jo{ smo okupani aurom tigra. Udru'eni.

U senci visokog drve}a Sal vra}amo se logoru brzim korakom. Nijedna jaruga nam se ne ~ini strma, noge nisu te}ke, a put je poduga~ak. U zelenoj svetlo-tamnosti crveni Axis jeleni s belim ta~kicama skaku}u kao ne'ne i 'ive porcelanske figure iz Kopenhagena, momentalno smo vesela deca u jednom svetu Walt Diznija.

Chris se iznenada zaustavlja na stazi.

- Nije to bilo samo za moj rođendan, Bill. Ovog datuma je kraljica Elizabeth zasela na presto, jednog {estog februara, istog dana kada je umro njen otac, kralj George ... tigar je hteo pokazati svoje veli-anstvene boje za nju, po~astiti zastavu. - Njeno izborano lice stare devoj~ice je blistavo. - *Trooping the colour!* Parada zastave!

Ostajem van magi~nog kruga tih ostrvljana, zapadnjaka tako bliskih i tako dalekih; ja, jedan republikanac koji uzalud poku}ava da razume ose}aje tih vernih podanika.

Zami{ljen, kora~am pored sinova toga naroda koji je ofarbao uniforme svoje kraljevske garde tigrovim bojama, s tom nepogre{nom intuicijom za dramu i bojnu parafernaliju koju nosi u svojim ratni~kim korenima: belu boju koja je osnova svih boja, prozra~nog vazduha i vasion; crvenilo {to je boja krvi i bojeva; crnilo tamne drame, boja 'alosti i smrti; i pone{to 'ute boje, vesele kao 'ivot (to isto 'utilo {to se za deli} sekunde videlo na trbuhu tigra), 'utilo, ta~no, veselo kao sam 'ivot ali takodje i blizak rođjak mrke boje, koja je ona palih na boji{tu i trule'i tela, povratka grudi.

@eleo bih u~estvovati u toj svetkovini boja, u tom

tigrastom pri~e{}u.

- Jorge Louis Borges je takodje bio fasciniran lepotom tigra, - ka'em i grozni-avo tra'im po pam}enju re~i pesnika, tog kralja bez krune svih Nobela. "Tigar obala Gangesa... njegove pruge i kosti {to trepere pod divnim krznom..." smeten, ne uspevam navesti ni jedan stih.

- [ta bi dao Borges da danas bude sa nama!

- Ko? - pita me ljubazna Chris.

- Oh, jedan veliki argentinski pesnik koji je nedavno umro.

- Oh. Kakva {teta - ka'e Chris.

- Da. Bio je jedan od najve}ih ovog veka.

- Oh.

Nastavljamo put }utke. Lebde medju nama senke tih ostrva Ju'nog Atlantika, njihovih Falklands, mojih Malvinas. Nikad ih ne}emo spomenuti; takt, prijatna privilegija, nam zatvara usta.

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No} Teraja nas obla~i svojom tamnom i blagom kabanicom. Oko vatre i reda praznih fla{a se skupilo malo bratstvo za{titnika i ljubitelja tigra. Tu je Sand'aj Mi{ra, tamno i arogantno lice sa velikim marcijalnim brkovima Pundjaba; plamen~i}i igraju po nepalskim nali~jima Jigmia i Samuela, osvetljavaju njihove tvrde i pljosnate obraze, njihove mongolske o~i.

Nisu tu Chris i Bill; Goberdan ih je odveo u logori{te pitomih slonica. Naoru'ani mo}nim fla{evima ~ekaju u kolibi jednog mahuta dolazak usamljenog divljeg slona, velikog mu'jaka *rogue*, nasilnika {to no}u provaljuje iz gustine pra{ume i name}e svoju strast pasivnim 'enkama u lancima.

Na sre}u su oti{li na spavanje ruski *nouveaux riches*, ti mafiozni kapitalisti sa razmetljivim zlatnim satovima i

lo{im manirima. Takodje spava ve} i grupa Kineza iz Taiwana koji se smeju neprekidno. "Smeju se kad tigar umire, po{to danas mogu skupo da plate tanjir supe njegovog penisa", ka`em samom sebi u nepravednom nastupu netolerancije prema tom narodu ~ija me umetnost i vitalnost oduvek zadivljuju.

Sand`aj, Indus visoke kaste, naizgled pogadja moje misli i s balavim osmehom gladi brkove lakrdija{ki. Stalno me u~i ne~emu s njegovim engleskim jezikom iz *public school-a*, stalno mi protivure~i, {to me dra`i. Re~mu je laka i brza, brbljivost kao poznata jer, ~ini mi se, raste iz istog stabla kao ona koju nasledih; ta argentinska ili sredozemna tendencija ka pri~anju u njegovom slu~aju bi}e indoevropska:

- Taj tigar mo`e da sko~i na tigricu nekoliko puta svakog ~asa, sir. Kinezi, kada su jo{ imali tigrove u svojoj zemlji, su ga posmatrali hiljadama godina i u Taiwanu poneki senilni taipani, milioneri ~iji je libido popustio, pla}aju za obrok supe jednog "gospodina tigra", garantovane mo}i, preko tri stotine dolara. To je, verujem, jedno skupo jelo za svakog od prisutnih, ne?

Voleo bih da licu dam skepti~an izraz; ne impresionira me njegov ekskluzivni `aket od twida, mo`da skrojen u samom *Savile Row-u*, koga mo`e da sebi priu{ti samo retki Indus, vrlo bogat, niti mi se dopadaju zapovedni~ki gestovi kojim se obra}a posluzi "Nepal tiger lodge" da mi poka`e da je on gazda logora.

- Tigar kojeg ste danas videli, sir Bert, je teritorijalni mu`jak, ina~e se ne bi usudio {etati po dolini u po dana. Mora da ra~una s nekoliko `enki na svojoj teritoriji.

- Svi mladunci }e onda nositi njegove gene? - pitam ga kao dobro informisan ~ovek. Neka zna da poznajem temu.

- Naravno. Ova }e oblast biti obele`ene njegovim nasledjem.

Sand`aj ima spreman odgovor na svako pitanje, taj bramin je sveznalica; pravda, misti~na ili logi~na, uvek je na njegovoj strani; bez protivure~nosti me{a zapadnu

nauku sa beskrajnim induisti-kim Panteonom. Ve} sam nau-io da crna Kali, strahovita boginja, ne ja{i na tigru ali njena bliznakinja, Durga, to ~ini. Da li bi ga skandalizovao nepristojnim pitanjem: sa svojom svemo}nom seksualnom potencijom tigra, nije li ponekad uzja{io neku bo'ansku gospodju?

Jigmi i Samuel, na{i naturalisti, slu{aju }utke, ne upli}u se u razgovor. Je li to zato {to su name{tenici Mi{re? Jigmi je [erpa i Samuel je Magar, ali obojica ka'u da pripadaju tim ratnicima Gurka ~ija je re~ gvozdена. Rezervisani i trezveni su, naro~ito hermeti~ni Samuel. Njihova tibeto-birmanska lica su kao zid, ~ine pregradu protiv nas, ario-kavkazijanaca. Mada mi smeta pretenciozna verboragija Sand'aja, ipak mi je bli'i. Je li to zato {to veruju u Gospodara Budu ili zbog druga~ije krvi? Ne znamo kako vide i ose}aju stvari, ali je jasna i uo~iva jedna ~udna ~vrstina njihovog dr'anja.

- Zna li, Jigmi, da sparivanje tigra traje prose~no petnaest sekundi? - hteo bih da uvedem u diskusiju s pundjabijem najmladjeg naturalistu i omalova'im velelepne ma~je ~orbe taiwanaca. - Razumete li vi onda te Kineze i njihove supruge?

[erpa Jigmi je izgleda usre}io nekoliko }erki velikog naroda Hana i ~ak jednu lepoticu zemlje u kojoj se radja sunce, sve dame naroda ~uvenih i najfinijih obi~aja, i to bez tro{ka jedne rupije na afrodizija~nu gastronomiju.

Harmoni~ni lik malog naturaliste ostaje nepromenljiv, nije me ~uo naizgled, usta mu zadr'avaju ~vrste ali meke crte mladog Bude koga sam prona{ao u "Musée Imaginaire" André Malroa.

Kako mi Jigmi ne odgovara, Samuel, koji i pored svog izgleda oficira Gurka daje ~udno prvenstvo krhkom [erpi, uzima re~:

- Vekovima su Kinezi sanjali posedovati silu tigra i, najzad, odu{evljeni, mogu da je kupe. Tolika je potra'nja da se ve} pojavila nelojalna konkurencija, sir Genta; vrlo je probita~an posao falsifikovanje skupocenog organa. Ozbiljne i preskupe apoteke Singapura i Hong-Konga

primorane su da brane svoj glas luksuznim i detaljnim katalogima s preciznim fotografijama, ~ak daju svojim produktima uverenja o istinosti.

Potpuno neo~ektivano daje nam obilje nau~nih ~injenica tako da ga moram gledati pa'ljivije; prvi utisak mladog Magara bio je taj kr{nog ratnika s te{kim kukrijem (10) o pojasu. Sada se pojavljuje ozbiljan i odli~no informisan profesionalac.

- Kri{na (11) - prekida ga Sand`aj i uvodi jedno novo bo`anstvo - usre}ivao je Gopije, pastirice koje su tra`ile telesnu slobodu kroz iznemoglost seksualne po`ude; govorio je: "Nije va`no kako mi prilaze, va`no je da tra`e moje bo`ansko bi}e".

- "Ne vidim nikakvu vezu" - pre}utkujem moj kartezijski odgovor; nastavlja Sand`aj tangencijalno, elipti~no i nejasno, neumesno; potse}a me na enigmati~nog profesora Godbola, tu braminsku li~nost iz "A Passage to India", romana E. M. Forstera, koji zbunjuje svog engleskog kolegu Fieldinga. Da li govori Sand`aj o ~oveku ili o tigru? A uznemiruje me ta svestrana i preterana opsesija "oslobodjenja" tela jedne kulture izmu~ene svojim pomahnitalim senzualizmom.

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* *

Magla jo{ nije opkolila logor. Sutra ujutro rano, u {est sati, done}e mi ~aj, pa ipak odla`em povratak u moj mra~ni bungalow gde me o~ekuje vla`an krevet i gumena fla{a s toplom vodom kao jedina uteha.

S balkona na strmini, sede}i na klupi, vidimo isu{enu reku koju je puni mesec obojio srebrom. Samuel mi ~ini dru{tvo.]utke posmatramo no}nu dolinu.

- Deda mi je bio lovac tigrova - prekida Samuel ti{inu. - Jako bolestan, pred samu smrt, zahtevao je srce "gospodara tigra", ne bi li ozdravio. Moj otac, kao poslu{an i dobar sin, bezuspe{no je tragao po d`ungli -.

^ini pauzu a ja takodje }utim, volim ga slu{ati.

- Ja sam napustio tradiciju, ne}u vi{e jesti tigrovo srce. Sada sam mu za{titnik.

Idemo na spavanje, ustajemo. Ali, d'ungla, iznenada velikodu{na, ho}e da nas nagradi za istrajnost i po{tovanje; govori nam kao {to nam je langur vikao ovog jutra: "tigar", a sada nas oslovljava li~no glas stra{nog gospodara Teraja.

"Auuuung-aoung-oooo", ori se dugotrajna rika; ispunjava dolinu neodoljivim izazovom. Ostajemo prikovani na klupu dok se oholo izazivanje valja pomr~inom, kao da nas tra`i, dodiruje. Samuel mi pribli`uje lice, posmatra me pa`ljivo.

- Slu{ajte. To je va{ tigar koji ide naokolo, poznaje vas. Jigmi mi je kazao da vi imate amulet (12) da ga prizovete... - Smejem se nelagodno:

- To je bila {ala. Nemam ni{ta.

I dalje me gleda, naizgled ga nisam ubedio. Pita me nepoverljivo:

- A za{to no}as ide tigar naokolo, tako blizu? - Slegnuh ramenima.

- Jigmi vidi stvari - uverava me Samuel - rodio se u godini Drvo-Tigar, istog dana i u isti znameniti ~as kao kralj Butana, zato i nosi isto ime. Verujem u njegovu vidovitost.

Rastajemo se. Ostaje neizre~eno mnogo toga.

"Auuuung, auuu..." udaljava se polako uznemiravaju}a rika.

Zaostajem posle nekoliko koraka i govorim u pravcu gde se Samuelova lampa povija po puti}u:

- Mislim da }u pisati o njemu.

(Izvod prvog poglavlja iz ekolo{ke novele pod naslovom "SOS Tigre")

(1) Namasti = indijski i nepalski pozdrav.

(2) Arak = rakija.

(3) Langur = prili-no veliki majmun; lat.: presbytis entellus.

(4) Bairab = tantri-na, stra{na forma boga [ive u Nepal.

- (5) Parvati = boginja, 'ena [ive (vidi [iva pod (7)).
- (6) Lingam = bo'anski mu{ki ud.
- (7) [iva = svemo}ni induisti-ki bog, stvaralac i razara-.
- (8) Bag = nepalsko ime tigra.
- (9) Mahut = vodi~ slona.
- (10) Kukri = srpasti veliki ratni bode'.
- (11) Kri{na = osma inkarnacija Vi{nua, jedan od tri glavna bo'anstva u brahmanizmu; najpopularniji bog koji je uzimao na sebe razne oblike, do sada devet, da bi oslobodio bogove i ljude od zla; deseta inkarnacija (kalki) o~ekuje se tek u budu}nosti, i tada }e uni{titi sve svoje neprijatelje i osloboditi svoj narod od tudjinskog gospodarstva.
- (12) Amulet = predmet koji tobo'e, za sujeverne ljude, ima ~arobnu mo} da {titi od svake bolesti i nesre}e.

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KATEGORIJE ^LANAKA I RUBRIKE

1. PISMA ^ITALACA. 1/2 strane po pismu.

2. ORIGINALNI ^LANCI.. To su argumentovana izlaganja novih vidjenja pojedinih problema sa eventualnim originalnim re{enjima. Du`ina i struktura kao "analize i duzi komentari". *Autori bi trebalo da vode ra-una da naslov opisno odgovara sadr`aju -lanka. ^lanak bi trebalo da po-ne kratkim rezimeom (80 do 100 re-i). Naslov i rezime bi trebalo prevesti na francuski i engleski. Jedan ili vi{e po-etnih paragrafa bi trebalo da poslu`e -itaocu, koji nije stru-njak za predmet o kome se pi{e, kao uvod, kako bi razumeo kasniji tekst, a stru-njaku da poslu`i kao vodi-kroz relevantnu nau-nu literaturu iz oblasti koja se obra|uje. Tekst treba da se zavr{i kratkim zaklju-kom. Ako je vi{e elemenata zaklju-ka, treba spomenuti samo one najva`nije. Ograni-ena relevantna literatura je data na kraju, citirana po redosledu po kome je spomenuta u tekstu. Fusnote, koje ne spadaju striktno u literaturu, su takodje dozvoljene. Autorima se preporu-uje da, u idealnom slucaju, u -lanku dokazuju samo jednu -injenicu, pri tom koriste}i argumente koji su u nauci opste prihva}eni i koje ne treba naknadno dokazivati. Tekst mora da ima oblik ZAKLJU^IVANJA. Posebno je va`no da se uzme u obzir da "Dijalog" objavljuje kao centralne -lanke argumentovane studije koje nekad mogu i da budu ne dva suprotna MI[LJENJA (koja objavljujemo u posebnoj rubrici "kratki komentari") ve} dva suprotna argumentovana ZAKLJU^IVANJA. Premise na osnovu kojih se zaklju-uje moraju zadovoljiti kriterijume relevantnosti, prihvatljivosti, biti dovoljno osnovane za zaklju-ivanje, a zaklju-ivanje mora*

da poseduje elemente za uspešnu odbranu od suprotnih tvrdnji.

3. KOMENTARI.

i) **KRATKI KOMENTARI.** To su kratki komentari, napisani od strane urednika, uređivač-kog saveta, ili izuzetno, -italaca. Odnose se na važno pitanje u datom "Dijalogu" ili na momentalno aktuelne probleme. Pošto autor izražava svoje MIŠLJENJE, struktura je slobodna, novinarska, mada je poželjno da tekst ima izvesne elemente ZAKLJUČIVANJA (videti opis originalnih pitanja, kao i naše "Posebne napomene"). Literatura, ako je citirana, data je u tekstu. Dužina teksta je prosečno 1 strana "Dijaloga".

ii) **KOMENTARI PITALACA.** To su komentari (1 do 2 strane "Dijaloga" po komentaru), koji imaju strukturu pitanja, ali ne produbljuju i suviše predmet o kojem se radi. Rezime nije potreban, mada je citiranje literature poželjno.

iii) **ANALIZE I DUZI KOMENTARI.** Komentari (u najnovija dostignuća u izvesnoj oblasti. Poželjno je da ne budu duži od pet stranica "Dijaloga". Struktura kao struktura PITALACA.

4. **AKTUELNOSTI.** Prikazi, bez dublje analize, povodom kulturnih i naučnih događaja (1 strana po prikazu). Prikazi novih knjiga koje ne spadaju striktno u literaturu (1 strana po knjizi).

5. **LITERATURA I UMETNOST.** Proza i Poezija. Originalna neobjavljena književna ostvarenja. Maksimalno ukupno 10 strana "Dijaloga". Izuzetno bi omogućeno objavljivanje drugih priloga ili ODLOMAKA knjiga u nastavcima. Književna i umetnička kritika. Obuhvaćene su sve umetnosti. Pitanja 3 do 5 strana "Dijaloga" Likovna kritika. 3-5 strana. **Likovni prilozi.** Kratki prikazi Prikazi novih knjiga koje spadaju u literaturu u širem smislu (1/2 do 1 strane "Dijaloga" po prikazanoj knjizi).

6. **DOGAĐAJI.** Kalendar kulturnih i naučnih događaja.

7. **OGLASI.** Spiskovi i cenovnici novih knjiga. Reklame i oglasi.

Posebne napomene

Mada se bavi svim temama od opšteg značaja, časopis je pokazivati malo veći interes za teme koje se tiču Evrope i Balkana. Pitanje bi trebalo da imaju pretenzije na formu argumentovanih zaključivanja. Mišljenja, lična uverenja, neargumentovani stavovi nisu tipični za "Dijalog" i autorima savetujemo da izbegavaju takve forme. Mišljenja, stavovi, deklaracije, izlivi psiholoških stanja, i sve neargumentovane tvrdnje, ili suviše opšte - te nepogodne za dokazivanje, ili konkretne - ali nepoduprte dokazima, ostavljaju malo ili ne ostavljaju uopšte prostora za dijalog. Opšte prihvaćene činjenice nije potrebno posebno dokazivati sem kad se radi o specijalnim znanjima. Nasuprot, sve nove tvrdnje moraju biti poduprte argumentima. Koristi se argumenti mogu biti druge opšte prihvaćene činjenice, ali i nove činjenice koje, ako ne predstavljaju direktna iskustva, moraju biti poduprte argumentima.

Pitanje su "opšte" prihvaćene činjenice nije uvek jednostavno odrediti. Snaga rezonovanja na kojima te činjenice počivaju čini ih "opšte" prihvaćenim. Broj ljudi koji ih prihvata nije sam po sebi kriterijum. Često samo ponavljanje nekih "činjenica" (u široko uticajnim medijima) ostavlja lažan utisak da su one "opšte" prihvaćene. U tom smislu o snazi rezonovanja može se suditi samo ako se prikaže ceo tok rezonovanja tj. ako tvrdnja bude praćena kompletnim dokazivanjem - ako ima dijalošku formu. Dijaloška forma je tipična forma u kojoj dolazi do merenja argumenata, upoređivanja, proveravanja i najzad zaključivanja o tome koje je rezonovanje bolje.

Pisani tekst, u odsustvu direktnog sagovornika, rekonstruiše tu "dinamiku" dijaloga unapred eksponirajući celo rezonovanje i time eksponira najjače ali i najslabije delove rezonovanja, omogućavajući merenje argumenata od strane čitaoca. Kompletano argumentovano zaključivanje omogućuje čitaocu potpunu rekonstrukciju saznanog procesa autora. Snaga dokaza ne leži u količini dokaza (recimo citiranju dugih listi korišćene literature), već u njihovoj snazi kao primenjenog rezonovanja takođe sačinjenog od snažne argumentacije. Ima tekstova koji sadrže kompletne argumentacije te tu nije potrebna dodatna lista dokaza, izvora tj. literature. Premise na osnovu kojih se zaključuje moraju zadovoljiti kriterijume *relevantnosti*, *prihvatljivosti*, biti *dovoljno osnovane* za zaključivanje, a zaključivanje mora da poseduje *elemente za uspešnu odbranu od suprotnih tvrdnji*. Sama činjenica da je jedna tvrdnja snabdevena eksplicitno svim elementima koji su doveli do njenog nastajanja otkriva potencijalne slabe tačke argumenata te čitalac može da proveri sam argument ne bi li verifikovao njegovu validnost i uporedio sa eventualnim lično razvijenim argumentom.

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